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In the last two decades, evolutionary explanations of cultural practice have become prevalent 
within the social sciences and humanities, including religious studies. This thesis is a critical 
analysis and recension of one of these applications of evolutionary theory to cultural practice. 
Specifically, I analyse a secondary case study to investigate the explanatory power and politico-
ethical considerations that arise from the application of costly signalling theory to Māori tā 
moko. Utilising primary and secondary source materials, this research was conducted within an 
interpretivist and inductive qualitative framework with the aim of offering a reflexive critique of 
the explanatory power that costly signalling theory carries for tā moko and, more broadly, of the 
illustrative efficacy of evolutionary explanations when applied to indigenous cultural practices.   
In a critique of the Cisco case study, I identify some of the more general, global 
deficiencies of evolutionary explanations of culture and explore the rich, indigenous narrative 
complexes which shape understandings of Māori tā moko. I maintain that the argument for moko 
as a costly signal, based, in part, upon Māori warfare is a reiteration of mythologised aspects of 
Māori culture which divorces tā moko from its ontological and epistemological underpinnings. 
In separating it from its Māori context, the reflexivity of tā moko is denied and Westernised and 
colonised conceptions of tā moko which etically view Māori cultural practice through a veil of 
alterity are perpetuated.  
In response to the concerns the application of costly signalling theory to tā moko 
generates, I propose an alternative model: transmissive assemblage. Drawing from actor-network 
theory, indigenous ontological perspectivism, and Kaupapa Māori, the transmissive assemblage 
model provides a symmetrical and decolonised framework which both challenges and enhances 
the dominant Western scientific paradigms used to explain indigenous practices. By focussing on 
the interactions between agents and the associations which circulate between them, rather than 
on the agents themselves, this integrative model makes an original contribution to scholarship in 
allowing the emergence of heteroglossia and by providing a balanced platform for indigenous 
voices and emic perspectives to be represented in the context of Western scientific research. In 
doing so, I argue that integrative, reflexive, and decolonised approaches to indigenous cultural 
practice which focus on process, as opposed to agency, enhance the explanatory power of 
evolutionary explanations by affording indigenous groups the opportunity to assert their own 
agency within the paradigm of Western science.       
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Introduction: The Evolution of Evolutionary 





In 1975, E.O. Wilson published a controversial book titled Sociobiology: The New Synthesis 
which claimed that human social behaviour is rooted in biology.1 One year later, in the final 
chapter of The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins asserted that “cultural transmission is analogous 
to genetic transmission in that, although basically conservative, it can give rise to a form of 
evolution,” propelled by imitation in the form of a cultural replicator called the meme.2 
Concurrently, the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins referred to sociobiology, the study of the 
social through evolutionary processes, as “vulgar” and upbraided its champions for bringing 
about “the final degeneration of evolutionary biology.”3 These two polarities gave rise to a wave 
of work devoted to developing and analysing evolutionary explanations of culture, which, over 
the last two decades, has resulted in a significant increase in their use within the social sciences 
and humanities to explore the establishment and perpetuation of human cultural practices.4 In 
fact, Irons credits Sahlins’ initial critique of sociobiology with generating invaluable debate and 
discussion about the application of evolutionary processes to culture, which has led to the 
formation of new evolutionary explanations like costly signalling theory.5  
                                                 
1 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 2-576. 
2 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 189, 192. 
3 Marshall Sahlins, The Use and Abuse of Biology: An Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology (Ann Arbor, MI: 
The University of Michigan Press, 1976), 3. 
4 Eric A. Smith, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, and Kim Hill, “Controversies in the Evolutionary Social Sciences: A 
Guide for the Perplexed,” TRENDS in Ecology and Evolution 16, no. 3 (Mar., 2001): 158. 
5 William Irons and Lee Cronk, “Two Decades of a New Paradigm,” in Adaptation and Human Behavior: An 
Anthropological Perspective, eds. Lee Cronk, Napoleon A. Chagnon, and William Irons (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de 
Gruyter, 2000), 10, 15. 
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Today, amongst other uses, evolutionary explanations are commonly employed to 
identify how individual-level processes of individual and social learning inform traits or 
behaviours found at the population-level, accounting for increasingly complex societies.6 They 
also have been shown adept at accounting for cooperation between non-relatives, which is 
considered central to explaining the development of modern societies.7 Additionally, 
evolutionary explanations have been extended to account for the modification of selection 
pressures when organisms create niches in response to their environments. These modifications 
have been shown to not only affect selection pressures in their own environments but also in 
other environments, both locally and more distant.8  
 Evolutionary explanations have been applied to countless cultural practices. From sub-
Saharan land rights, to Chinese footbinding, to the development of musicality, evolutionary 
explanation has far reaches and continues to grow in popularity.9 However, when evolutionary 
explanation is applied to specific cultural practices with their own underlying narratives, 
important questions regarding the exegetic power generated through evolutionary explanation 
begin to arise. In hopes of drawing attention to the significance of some of these questions, this 
study is devoted to an investigation of the various narratives that inform one such application of 
                                                 
6 Peter J. Richerson and Robert Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
7 Brian Paciotti, Peter J. Richerson, and Robert Boyd, “Cultural Evolutionary Theory: A Synthetic Theory for 
Fragmented Disciplines,” in Bridging Social Psychology: Benefits of Transdisciplinary Approaches, ed. Paul A. M. 
Van Lange (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers, 2006), 366, 368; Stuart A. West, 
Ashleigh S. Griffin, and Andy Gardner, “Evolutionary Explanations for Cooperation,” Current Biology 17, no. 16 
(2007): R661-72; Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund, “Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity,” Nature 437, no. 7063 
(2005): 1291-8; Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson, “Solving the Puzzle of Human Cooperation,” Evolution and 
Culture (2005): 105-32; Robert L. Trivers, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quarterly Review of Biology 
46, no. 1 (Mar., 1971): 35-57. 
8 Paciotti, Richerson, and Boyd, “Cultural Evolutionary Theory,” 365.  
9 Jean‐Philippe Platteau, “The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to Sub‐Saharan Africa: A Critical 
Assessment,” Development and Change 27, no. 1 (1996): 29-86; Kim Sterelny, “SNAFUs: An Evolutionary 
Perspective,” Biological Theory 2, no. 3 (2007): 317-28; Henkjan Honing et al., “Without It No Music: Cognition, 
Biology and Evolution of Musicality,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B: Biological 
Sciences 370, no. 1664 (2015): 20140088, accessed July 24, 2015, http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2014.0088.  
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evolutionary explanation to a particular cultural practice. Thus, the scope of this study is 
relatively modest, but, in analysing a case study and the narratives surrounding the practice in 
some depth, I aim to highlight important issues at a broader theoretical and political level. 
Narrative, as employed throughout this thesis, is based upon a fairly basic and broad 
definition. Specifically, I understand narrative to be “the representation of an event or series of 
events.”10 I have intentionally selected a broad definition of narrative which can accommodate 
representations of the practice of tā moko from a myriad of perspectives. Utilising a broad 
definition of narrative enables the avoidance of myopia and encourages decolonisation by 
permitting simultaneous examination of the various ways in which tā moko narratives are crafted 
and perpetuated without requiring the use of a specific lens.  
In 2010, a new narrative of tā moko (Māori tattooing practice) emerged. This narrative is 
grounded in evolutionary explanation and predominantly draws upon Pākehā (European New 
Zealand) sources from the 19th and early 20th centuries. This thesis considers the issues that 
emerge from this cultural evolutionary analysis which is out of step with the emergence of those 
tā moko narratives, largely drafted by Māori scholars since the 1990s, which emphasise Māori 
ontology and epistemology. After discussing the narratives which frame this thesis, I situate 
Jayme Cisco’s treatment of tā moko as a costly signal within this narrative nexus and utilise her 
research as a foil to examine costly signalling theory’s explanatory utility through an analysis of 
her claims and the broader implications of those issues that are illuminated through my 
investigation.11  
                                                 
10 H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 13. See pages 13-17 for counter-arguments to the employment of broad definitions of narrative. 
11 Jayme Cisco, “Maori Moko: A Costly Signal?,” (M.A. Thesis, University of Missouri-Columbia, 2010). 
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Moko generally refers to the facial tattoos of the Māori (indigenous people of Aotearoa 
New Zealand) which, though now typically done with a modern tattoo machine, historically 
involved using a chisel to tap a deep groove into the face into which pigment was rubbed.12 
Costly signalling is a theoretical model adapted from behavioural ecology for the human realm in 
an attempt to explicate the perpetuation of high cost behaviours despite evolutionary pressures 
against them.13 In seeking to explain tā moko through costly signalling theory, Cisco’s research 
reveals a reinvented, inaccurate, and mythologised version of Māori tā moko which denies Māori 
narratives and, in fact, re-colonises them.  
Although Cisco argues for moko as a costly signal and provides detailed evidence in 
support of her claims, her case study brings to light a number of issues that arise when applying 
Western evolutionary explanations to non-Western cultural practices. In addition to examining 
some of the confusion that her research into tā moko reveals, particularly surrounding the general 
premises of costly signalling theory, such as the identification of signallers and receivers and 
what constitutes a signal, I am also interested in what Cisco’s treatment of tā moko as a costly 
signal illuminates about how costly signalling theory treats the selection processes that led to the 
development of tā moko, how it accounts for the contents of what is signalled or transmitted, and 
how this accords with Māori understandings of tā moko. To frame this discussion, I pose the 
central research question of this thesis: how and why can a critical evaluation and decolonised 
recension of costly signalling theory enhance our understanding of cultural practices? 
                                                 
12 Rawinia Higgins, “Tā Moko—Māori Tattooing—Origins of Tā Moko,” Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New 
Zealand, last modified August 13, 2013, accessed January 28, 2015, http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/ta-moko-maori-
tattooing/page-1. Though still uncommon, in the last decade, a resurgence in the chisel technique has emerged. 
13 Herbert Gintis et al., “Strong Reciprocity and the Roots of Human Morality,” Social Justice Research 21, no. 2 
(2008): 249; Joseph Henrich, “The Evolution of Costly Displays, Cooperation, and Religion: Credibility Enhancing 
Displays and Their Implications for Cultural Evolution,” Evolution and Human Behavior 30 (2009): 244. 
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For indigenous peoples, the term research is often loaded with negative connotations, 
generated from the impact of colonisation and imperialism.14 In the words of Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith, “the ways in which scientific research is implicated in the worst excesses of colonialism 
remains a powerful remembered history for many of the world’s colonised peoples.”15 Yet, 
within evolutionary explanations of culture, indigenous peoples’ views of their own practices are 
absent, instead replaced with a linear, Westernised voice. By divorcing the practices from their 
innate ontological and epistemological contexts, they are easily misconstrued and, rather than 
serving as an affirmation of identity and belonging, are morphed into a non-descript context of 
alterity. However, this does not have to be the case. 
There is room for evolutionary explanations of culture to evolve. As this study suggests, 
by encouraging heteroglossia and non-agentic dependence, costly signalling theory can be 
updated into an integrative and symmetrical form. Moreover, by resisting the tendency to 
agentically contour costly signalling, Māori tā moko is effectively decolonised. As we shall see, 
when the focus falls on the associations between agents, rather than on the agents themselves, the 
mechanisms that support existing power dynamics crumble and are replaced with a reassembled 
social network determined by connections, in the space between which Māori holistic reality is 
more readily reflected.16  
Though I do not use heteroglossia in the Bakhtinian sense to focus on the “complex 
stratification of language,” my understanding and usage of heteroglossia is still inspired by 
Bakhtin’s emphasis on language and, in this case, narrative as a means through which we engage 
                                                 
14 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Books; 
Dunedin, N.Z.: University of Otago Press, 1999), 1. 
15 Ibid. 
16 For an explanation of holistic reality see pages 29-30 of this thesis. 
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“in a historical flow of social relationships, struggles, and meanings.”17 I specifically employ 
heteroglossia as a means to highlight the tensions and conflicts that arise from the socio-
historical associations that determine the various ways moko is interpreted and conveyed through 
a multiplicity of narratives.  
From the outset, readers should be aware that this thesis is not about signalling theory 
which is a vast and complicated area. Whilst costly signalling theory is part of a vast literature 
within signalling theory, I emphasise that it is not my intention to engage or critique signalling 
theory as a whole, aside from where becomes necessary for elucidating and contextualising 
costly signalling theory. Neither is this study intended to serve solely as a critique of Cisco’s 
research into tā moko as a costly signal. 
Rather, this study is a reflexive critique, both interpretive and conceptual in nature, of 
costly signalling theory’s explanatory power for Māori tā moko and, more broadly, about the 
illustrative efficacy of evolutionary explanation as applied to indigenous cultural practices. I 
utilise Cisco’s research only as a case study to illuminate some of the insensitivities and issues 
that can arise when utilising Western scientific explanations to account for an indigenous 
practice. Thus, my primary aim is not to produce a treatise based upon a critique of Cisco, per se, 
but rather to illuminate problematic areas within costly signalling theory that become apparent in 
the application of costly signalling theory as an explanation for to tā moko and to discuss 
possible alternative ways to approach costly signalling in order to enhance its exegetical vigour. 
In the discussion of alternatives to costly signalling theory, I seek to illuminate the key features 
that a more symmetrical and decolonised model of costly signalling theory would have. 
                                                 
17 M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981), 270-3, 
291, 501; Sue Vice, Introducing Bakhtin (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1997), 18; Benjamin 
Bailey, “Heteroglossia,” in The Routledge Handbook of Multilingualism, eds. Marylin Martin-Jones, Adrian 




In many ways this thesis mirrors my own evolution as a scholar. When I first encountered 
evolutionary explanations of culture, I was a bit incredulous. My own background in the study of 
mythology caused me to wonder what they provided that more traditional accounts of culture and 
cultural practice did not. However, after exploring cultural evolutionary theory and other 
evolutionary explanations of culture, I was left with a sense that science had finally put to rest 
many of the issues that had plagued studies of culture for decades.  
Thus, when I initially began this project, I was convinced that costly signalling theory 
possessed some critical explanatory power for tā moko (Māori tattooing) that more traditional 
methods did not.18 I was certain that it provided a new account of the reasons behind the 
development and perpetuation of tā moko. The linear signallersignalreceiver relationship 
was simple and straightforward. This was exciting, particularly since I have always been 
fascinated by body modification and tattoo; the thought that science might provide new 
perspectives on age-old practices was enticing. In asking how and why evolutionary explanations 
enhanced our understanding of cultural practice, I was sure that they did and, specifically, that 
they provided us with unique ways to isolate specific cultural interactions. 
However, the shift in my question is indicative of my own change of heart over the 
course of this thesis journey. Whilst I still believe that evolutionary explanations of culture have 
                                                 
18 “Explanatory power” is a phrase used throughout this thesis and is commonly found in the scientific discourse. 
For a detailed explanation of explanatory power, see Jonah N. Schupbach and Jan Sprenger, “The Logic of 
Explanatory Power,” Philosophy of Science 78, no. 1 (2011): 105-27. For relevant examples of its employment, see 
James Farris, “The Logical Basis of Phylogenetic Analysis,” in Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, 2nd ed., 
ed. Elliott Sober (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 340-56 and Robert Frank, ed., The Explanatory Power of 
Models: Bridging the Gap between Empirical and Theoretical Research in the Social Sciences (New York: Springer 
Science+Business Media, 2002). Explanatory power describes how well a theory is able to account for the subject it 
seeks to explain. I have also used explanatory force, explanatory utility, exegetical capacity, exegetical vigour, 
exegetical utility, and illustrative utility as alternatives to explanatory power.  
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explanatory force, I maintain that for them to reach their explanatory potential requires that they, 
themselves, evolve. Such evolution can only occur through active attempts at critical evaluation 
and recension, whereby evolutionary explanations of culture can be updated and re-synthesised 
into more integrative and symmetrical versions of themselves. This study is one attempt to utilise 
critique and recension to elucidate how one small part of the vast array of evolutionary 
explanations, costly signalling theory, might evolve into a more symmetrical and decolonised 
form.   
Throughout my study, I have consistently wondered why more critical analysis of this 
theoretical tradition has not taken place in relation to the study of cultural practices. Sure, there 
are countless articles on discrepancies about the finer points of cultural evolutionary theory 
which tend to take for granted its explanatory power. Additionally, broad, misinformed attacks 
which tend to avoid addressing the actual mechanics of the models themselves also circulate. 
Yet, little exists in the way of critical, scholarly analysis of evolutionary explanations of culture 
and their approaches to the study of cultural practice and, specifically, indigenous cultural 
practice. 
Utilising Cisco’s treatment of tā moko through a costly signalling theory lens as a case 
study reveals that more explanatory power is generated in the critique of evolutionary 
explanation than through the assumption of its exegetical utility. Indeed, through the examination 
of costly signalling theory’s mechanics and approach to tā moko, a great deal of light is shed on 
areas where the theory may benefit our understanding of Māori tā moko but also where it falters. 
As I have learned, it is perhaps only through a critical treatment of current evolutionary theories 





Although I do believe that theoretical applications of costly signalling are useful in identifying 
the selective mechanisms and evolutionary patterns of certain cultural practices from a Western 
scientific perspective, I remain doubtful about the depth of its explanatory power for human 
behaviour, outside of theoretical applications. I have specific reservations regarding costly 
signalling theory’s ability to illuminate new processes or features of indigenous cultural practices 
in ways that are relevant to indigenous groups and not already identified and accounted for 
within the epistemological and ontological realities of the group itself. I utilise Cisco’s treatment 
of tā moko through a costly signalling framework to further highlight and investigate the 
legitimacy of these reservations.   
The exploration of the Cisco case study leaves us with the sense that it is only through 
evolutionary explanations of cultural practice that the selective mechanisms and processes which 
shape cultural practices can be identified. The implication is that the groups from which cultural 
practices are derived, in this case Māori, do not have the exegetical capacity or appropriate tools 
to identify and expound upon these mechanisms and processes. Hence, Western, academic 
explanation is necessary, since it is only through the discourse of science that the specific 
processes and mechanisms which develop and mould culture can be understood. 
Yet, indigenous groups, like Māori, often possess their own accounts of their cultural 
development and evolution, as well as detailed elucidations of the selective mechanisms which 
influence their practices; and, though the language employed differs considerably from the 
explanations posed through the guise of Western science, the content is not always so 
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dissimilar.19 As June George affirms, “a community’s practices and beliefs pertaining to the 
conduct of its members’ lives often deal with the same content areas that are dealt with in 
conventional science.”20  
Whilst the lack of research from within evolutionary explanations regarding alternative 
views of cultural evolution and what they potentially could offer Western perspectives of cultural 
evolution is disappointing, simultaneously, this gap represents an exciting area for new research 
explored in this thesis. Indeed, such a deficit reflects a need to examine the relationship between 
evolutionary explanations of culture and indigeneity, and, specifically, to explore the emic/etic 
dynamics between etic evolutionary explanations and emic understandings of the practices they 
claim to explain. It is my aim, in the chapters which follow, to address this dynamic by using 
Cisco’s application of costly signalling theory to Māori tā moko as a case study to critique costly 
signalling theory and by advancing an alternative model, transmissive assemblage, which utilises 
aspects of costly signalling but which also incorporates actor-network theory and elements of 
indigenous ontological perspectivism and Kaupapa Māori, which may afford indigenous groups 
a more symmetrical platform for the expression of their perceptions of their own practices within 
the context of evolutionary explanation. Transmissive refers to the communicative aspect 
borrowed from costly signalling theory. Assemblage is intended to reflect that the composition of 
the model is composed any number of agents and perspectives. 
The rationale behind situating this thesis within religious studies is three-fold. Firstly, 
religious studies is concerned with the interdisciplinary study of religious and spiritual practices 
                                                 
19 Arun Agrawal, “Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge: Some Critical Comments,” Development and Change 26, 
no. 3 (1995): 413-39. 
20 June M. George, “Chapter Three: Indigenous Knowledge as a Component of the School Curriculum,” in What is 
Indigenous Knowledge?: Voices from the Past, eds. Ladislaus M. Semali and Joe L. Kincheloe (New York; London: 
Falmer Press, 1999), 85. 
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and beliefs. Admittedly, Māori religiosity, in the sense of whether or not Māori beliefs can be 
described as religious, is debatable. As Henare explains, much of the difficulty that arises in 
defining religion within a Māori context is attributed to the fact that, “Maori religion is not found 
in a set of sacred books or dogma, the culture is the religion.”21 Yet, as slippery as attempts to 
define and interpret traditional Māori religion with Western labels are due to its embeddedness 
within Māori life, Māori spirituality is not debatable; and, any study that involves a facet of 
Māori life must take into account the spirituality by which it is shaped.22  
Discussions of Māori spirituality can be somewhat challenging, since it is what is lived 
and not what is theologised or idealised.23 Within the Māori world, there was and is no 
separation between the sacred and secular. Tā moko (the practice of moko) was and is part of the 
ritualised expression of this spiritual world, a point underscored by its mythological origins, 
which, for Māori, express beliefs and values that influence social structures and inform 
identity.24 However, Moira McClennan cautions that Māori spirituality encapsulates more than 
prayer, rituals, or delineating specific times for spiritual practice; rather, she impresses it is 
embedded in all aspects of Māori life, underscoring that its application is the key to its 
understanding.25 Thus, the lived-ness of Māori spirituality must be contextualised by its 
                                                 
21 Manuka Henare, “Te Tangata, te Taonga, te Hau: Māori Concepts of Property,” in Conference on Property and 
the Constitution, Wellington for the Laws and Institutions in a Bicultural Society Research Project (Hamilton, N.Z.: 
University of Waikato, 1998), 3; Ella Henry and Hone Pene, “Kaupapa Maori: Locating Indigenous Ontology, 
Epistemology and Methodology in the Academy,” Organization 8, no. 2 (2001): 235. 
22 James Irwin, An Introduction to Māori Religion: Its Character Before European Contact and Its Survival in 
Contemporary Māori and New Zealand Culture (Bedford Park, S. AUS: Australian Association for the Study of 
Religions, 1984), 73. 
23 T.P. Tawhai, “Maori Religion,” in The World’s Religions: The Study of Religion, Traditional and New Religion, 
eds. Stewart Sutherland and Peter Clarke (London: Routledge, 1991), 96-8; Henry and Pene, “Locating Indigenous 
Ontology,” 235-6. 
24 Michael O’Connor and Angus MacFarlane, “New Zealand Maori Stories and Symbols: Family Value Lessons for 
Western Counsellors,” International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling 24 (2002): 231. 
25 Moira McClennan, “Maori Spirituality, Christian Spirituality, and Spiritual Direction,” a paper submitted in 
partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Spiritual Directors’ Formation Programme of Spiritual Growth 




application within the fluidity of a cultural landscape impacted and shaped by over 200 years of 
Western and Christian religion, thought, culture, and beliefs.  
Likewise, the same pliancy evident in the lived-ness of Māori spirituality must also be 
reflected, more generally, in our understandings of religion and spirituality. Religion and 
spirituality are not static; they evolve, shift, and are re-conceptualised within the context of 
environmental and cultural changes that affect all populations. Such flexibility is reflected in the 
myriad of definitions and interpretations both religion and spirituality evoke.26 Brian Zinnbauer 
and Kenneth Pargament even challenge the utility of the very categories themselves, given the 
inherent adaptability of these systems and the way they evolve “in the life of an individual.”27 
Yet, despite the challenges presented by the tractability of spirituality, generally, and Māori 
spirituality specifically, spirituality is central, not only to the methodologies employed within 
this study but also to shaping the case study research through which the central argument and 
conclusions emerge. 
 Secondly, when indigenous groups are the subjects of a study framed by Western 
science, their inherent religiosity or spirituality is often overridden or ignored, despite the fact 
that it is their practice(s) being studied, a point which often remains unacknowledged within the 
realm of evolutionary explanations of culture. Cisco’s handling of Māori tā moko unearths issues 
that arise when indigenous holistic realities are not considered integral to dialogues about 
indigenous peoples’ own practices. In part, this inattention is due to existing tensions within 
evolutionary explanation regarding its relationship to religion. For instance, Dawkins condemns 
                                                 
26 Brian J. Zinnbauer et al., “Religion and Spirituality: Unfuzzying the Fuzzy,” Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion 36, no. 4 (Dec., 1997): 549-50. 
27 Brian J. Zinnbauer and Kenneth I. Pargament, “Chapter Two: Religiousness and Spirituality,” in Handbook of the 
Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, eds. Raymond F. Paloutzian and Crystal Park (New York: The Guilford 
Press, 2005), 27. 
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religion, claiming it “subverts science and saps the intellect.”28 Although such comments are 
typically directed toward monotheistic traditions, such vehement reactions to religion also result 
in the dismissal of indigenous ontological and epistemological views as primitive and 
philistine.29 Yet, indigenous groups, generally, and Māori, specifically, have sophisticated 
understandings of the universe and their place within it, views which offer accounts for cultural 
evolution and are capable of identifying the selective mechanisms and influences which facilitate 
change. 
Thirdly, a significant portion of research within costly signalling centres on establishing 
explanations for the evolution of religious practices and behaviours, which means that religion 
serves as a foundational framework for costly signalling theory’s own development. The link 
between religious signals and group cooperation is not new; Émile Durkheim had come to this 
conclusion at the beginning of the 20th century.30 In the 1960s, Clifford Geertz proclaimed the 
anthropological study of religion dead; however, later scholars within anthropology, such as 
Alexander Gallus, Eugene d’Aquili, and William (Bill) Irons turned to evolutionary explanation 
to identify the selective mechanisms and pressures that evolved to allow for religious thought 
and the development of religious practices.31 Where E.E. Evans-Pritchard denounced the ability 
to construct cross-chronological generalisations about religious behaviour and its evolution 
                                                 
28 “Fundamentalist Religion and Science,” Talk of the Nation, NPR, October 6, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=6210151.  
29 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, especially pages 35, 41, 52, 213, 254, 318. 
30 Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995), 
24, 29; Richard Sosis, Howard C. Kress, and James S. Boster, “Scars for War: Evaluating Alternative Signaling 
Explanations for Cross-Cultural Variance in Ritual Costs,” Evolution and Human Behavior 28 (2007): 234; Joseph 
Bulbulia et al., “Why Do Religious Cultures Evolve Slowly? The Cultural Evolution of Cooperative Calling and the 
Historical Study of Religions,” in Mind, Morality, and Magic: Cognitive Science Approaches in Bibilical Studies, 
eds. Istvan Czachesz and Risto Uro (West Nyack, New York: Acumen Publishing, 2013), 197, 206.  
31 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (London: Fontana, 2003), 87-8; Alexander 
Gallus, “A Biofunctional Theory of Religion,” Current Anthropology 13, no. 5 (1972): 543-68; Eugene G. D’Aquili, 
“Human Ceremonial Ritual and the Modulation of Aggression,” Zygon 20, no. 1 (1985): 21-30; William Irons, 
“How Did Morality Evolve?” Zygon 26 (1991): 49-89.  
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through time, those employing evolutionary explanations in the context of religion “necessarily 
assume that the relevant behaviors can be generalized across time and space.”32  
In 2006, Richard Sosis discovered that religious behaviours meet Rebecca Bliege Bird 
and Eric Smith’s criteria for costly signals.33 The range of religiosity within different groups was 
deemed unobservable. Group members were shown to benefit from “accurate” transmission of 
variation, because the more extreme a believer’s commitment the more he or she is perceived to 
be cooperative, and the more desirable he or she becomes as a “social partner” to within group 
members.34 Indeed, religious group members are met with many advantages of belonging to the 
group that entice others, without the same commitment, to infiltrate the community in hopes of 
gaining these benefits. Yet, despite these findings, Irons and Joseph Bulbulia observe that little 
exists to explain why, in evolutionary terms, religion would be selected as a preferred means of 
signalling over other signs of commitment. That advantage simply cannot be clearly identified.35  
Literature Review 
As an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary study, this enquiry traverses the literature of a 
number of different areas. The literature I canvass in the following review derives from the areas 
of anthropology, religious studies, indigenous and Māori studies, theoretical biology, cultural 
evolutionary theory, and costly signalling theory. Although this literature covers a wide range of 
                                                 
32 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); Richard Sosis and Candace 
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theories, this literature review is framed through a lens of reflexivity. I am specifically concerned 
with the occurrence of reflexivity or lack thereof within early and contemporary literature, as 
well as with how the presence and absence of reflexivity paves the way for the development of 
decolonised methodologies of cultural practice, which I later use to critique Cisco’s analysis of tā 
moko and to develop a framework for my own model of transmissive assemblage.  
Evolutionary Theory 
In his 2007 article, entitled “SNAFUS: An Evolutionary Perspective,” Kim Sterelny defines a 
fitness trap as “a situation created by a strategy that sweeps the population because it is 
individually advantageous when not universal, but once fixed, the strategy reduces the absolute 
fitness of everyone.”36 In following pages, Sterelny cites female genital mutilation and Chinese 
footbinding as examples supporting the existence of fitness sinks, per his definition. Though an 
interesting proposition, upon closer examination a number of issues concerning the cultural 
application of fitness sinks to footbinding surface. 
 One issue that comes to the fore is the idea of footbinding as “individually advantageous 
when not universal.” If we consider Chinese footbinding superficially, this is a sensible 
statement. Footbinding did emerge out of the upper echelon of Chinese society and, upon its 
initial emergence and for some time after, served as a signal that a woman was highly cultured 
and amongst the elite. However, further research reveals that, even at its inception, footbinding 
was not the only signal to indicate a woman of elite status, a fact entirely absent in Sterelny’s 
analysis. This is problematic for making the argument for footbinding as a fitness sink, since, the 
historical record indicates that footbinding, in and of itself cannot be identified as a single 
strategy resulting in increased fitness benefits for those who engage in the practice. Rather, elite 
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Chinese women were expected to have a package of characteristics which differentiated them 
from commoners; footbinding was only one part of the whole package. Training in classical 
literature and embroidery skills were integral to the elite package women in the upper strata of 
society were expected to possess.37 Furthermore, when prospective brides were being assessed 
for marriageability, it was not just that the woman’s feet were bound, but the shoes, which 
covered the woman’s feet, were scrutinised and deemed an important criterion for brides-to-be. 
Bridal daughters were literally judged by the shoes they made, and it was the shoes that were 
actually checked not the bound feet.38 
 There is evidence to indicate that when a matchmaker went to a groom’s house, a shoe 
made by the potential bride was taken along as a sample of her accomplishment and ultimately as 
a testament to her inherent worth.39 Textile skill served to signal a woman’s moral and economic 
worth, and certain social gradations were reflected in the fabric and construction of the lotus 
shoes themselves.40 Thus, the shoes a woman created and the embroidery adorning them were 
more indicative of a woman’s worth than the simple fact that she was footbound.41 Dorothy Ko 
goes so far as to assert that shoes had more to do with footbinding than the body did; thus, she 
emphasises how critical the shoes were to the whole establishment of the practice of 
footbinding.42 If this was the case, then it was not the act of footbinding that conferred an 
advantage for elite women but actually the embroidery skills a woman possessed. 
                                                 
37 Yuan-Ling Chao, “Poetry and Footbinding: Teaching Women and Gender Relations in Traditional China,” World 
History Connected 6, no. 2 (2009), accessed September 13, 2015, http://worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/ 
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38 Dorothy Ko, Every Step a Lotus: Shoes for Bound Feet (Berkeley; Los Angeles, CA: University of California 
Press, 2001), 77, 79. 
39 Ibid., 61. 
40 Ibid., 79, 81; Chao, “Poetry and Footbinding.” 
41 Ko, Every Step, 85. 
42 Ibid., 104. 
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  Additionally, there was a great deal of regional variance when it came to footwear.43 
Research shows that the type of shoe, including embroidery work and regional reflection is what 
actually indicated the status of a woman. As Yuan-Ling Chao observes, “...the shoe for the 
bound feet became the site for the expression of refinement through intricate embroidery.”44 The 
desire for the “smallness” achieved through binding was defined in different ways depending 
upon region. In some areas, small might mean less width, a smaller arch, tiny ankles, or tips that 
came to a point.45 All of these traits were determined by the trends celebrated in a particular part 
of China; though the ideal woman would have bound feet with all of these characteristics.46 
Whilst most women who bound tried to achieve this “ideal,” “the majority of women could only 
hope to accentuate their best feature while hiding the worst.”47 Thus, it becomes apparent that 
not all footbound women had the advantage of higher status when the practice was rare, which is 
essential for footbinding to be classified as a fitness sink. There still was considerable variation 
amongst footbound women, including genetics, which determined how small binding could 
make their feet, type of binding which was determined by region, embroidery and textile skills, 
and materials involved in the crafting of shoes. Moreover, even if we were able to confidently 
establish that all footbound women benefitted from elevated status, we cannot confidently assert 
whether it is the footbinding, some other practice in the expected package of characteristics, or 
the entire package itself that resulted in an advantage for elite women.  
 Although this study is not about Chinese footbinding or fitness sinks, this example 
provides a good illustration of some of the dangers and shortcomings of the practical application 
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44 Chao, “Poetry and Footbinding.” 
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46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. For more information on Chinese footbinding and revisionist views of the practice, see Dorothy Ko, 
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of evolutionary theories of culture, particularly when considered within a historical context. 
Though, theoretically, Sterelny’s concept of a fitness sink is possible and provides an interesting 
framework to analyse the spread of such an unusual and painful custom, ultimately the literature 
on Chinese footbinding does not support his argument and, to the contrary, provides a great deal 
of fodder against it. At the very least, it suggests that footbinding, itself, would not be the cause 
of a fitness sink. 
 We would hope that this is not a recurrent theme within evolutionary explanations of 
culture, but unfortunately it is. Whether it is underdeveloped case studies, like the footbinding 
example, niche-construction theory whose champions regularly only cite two main human 
examples, lactose intolerance and sickle-cell anaemia, in support of their claims, or memetic 
(meme) theory, which suffers from a vague and unclear unit of selection (the meme), the 
difficulties of translating evolutionarily based models to culture are seen time and again, leaving 
behind a trail of questions about their illustrative efficacy and place within studies of culture.48   
As Soros explains, the contributions of science are of unparalleled significance, but 
precisely because of its achievements, its explanatory power may have been “carried too far.”49 
What Soros goes on to describe is the tendency of the natural sciences, when applied to human 
phenomena, like culture, to unnaturally separate thought and fact. Though in the natural sciences 
human thoughts about a subject, by design, do not affect fact, within the social sciences and 
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humanities thoughts about a subject are integral to our understanding of a phenomenon. 
Accordingly, Soros asserts that “if the study of events is confined to the study of facts, an 
important element, namely the participants’ thinking, is left out of account.”50 This omission is 
the focal point of tensions that arise between the etic application of evolutionary theory and emic 
indigenous perspectives on cultural beliefs and practices, so it is timely now to turn to 
anthropology to explore these issues further. 
Anthropology 
 
Though the use of evolutionary theories to explain culture is relatively recent, questions about 
the explanatory efficacy of cultural theories when contextualised and applied within indigenous 
populations are long-standing. Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries a number of scholars 
within the social sciences and humanities have contributed to the development of a cross-
disciplinary dialogue about reflexivity grounded in the work of early anthropologists. In 1887, 
Franz Boas proposed the need to consider endemic views of culture, positing that “the main 
object of ethnological collections should be the dissemination of the fact that civilization is not 
something absolute, but that it is relative, and that our ideas and conceptions are true only so far 
as our civilization goes.”51 Bronislaw Malinowski expressed a keen awareness of the significant 
challenges posed when studying indigenous groups, embodied within the tentative space between 
the observer and the observed, both living and interpreting the world within the constraints of 
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In Ethnography, the writer is his own chronicler and the historian at the  
same time, while his sources are no doubt easily accessible, but also  
supremely elusive and complex; they are not embodied in fixed, material  
documents, but in the behaviour and in the memory of living men… 
The Ethnographer has…the duty before him of drawing up all the rules  
and regularities of tribal life; all that is permanent and fixed; of giving an  
anatomy of their culture, of depicting the constitution of their society. But  
these things, though crystallised and set, are nowhere formulated. There is  
no written or explicitly expressed code of laws, and their whole tribal tradition, 
the whole structure of their society, are embodied in the most elusive of all  
materials; the human being.52 
 
Boas and Malinowski were instrumental in the inaugural understanding of cultural relativism, a 
term first coined by Alain Locke.53 Both men can be considered pioneers in the effort to combat 
the ethnocentric voice that characterised Victorian scholarship by developing an academic 
awareness of the effects generated by the methods employed to study indigenous groups and the 
interpretive mechanisms utilised to draw conclusions about a given culture’s practices and 
beliefs. Evans-Pritchard further questioned anthropological practice, drawing attention to the 
difficulties of translating one’s experiences of an outside culture into a form that has meaning 
and relevance to both oneself and within one’s own culture.54 
Twenty years later, interdisciplinary American scholar James Clifford continued to 
explore the role of the anthropologist in constructing representations of indigenous people. His 
work initiated a reflexive movement within cultural anthropology, art history, and other 
disciplines, to historically and rhetorically examine the effects of globalisation and 
decolonisation on contemporary indigenous populations, on the portrayal of indigeneity, and on 
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the role and ethical responsibility of those studying and writing about indigenous groups.55 
Synchronously with Clifford’s work, similar currents of thought around societal power dynamics 
and the subjectivity of human experience began to emerge in sociology. French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu became preoccupied with dynamics between colonial observers and the indigenous 
groups they observed. In critically analysing the space between the observer and the observed, 
Bourdieu confronted the biases projected onto indigenous cultural groups from within the 
“scholastic” culture of academia.56 To Bourdieu, the reflexive process is the only way to 
accurately illuminate one’s prejudices.57 In light of Bourdieu’s contributions, this thesis is 
framed by a reflexive approach.  
Religious Studies 
Similar reflexivity is present within religious studies, as enquiries into the effects of imperial, 
colonial, and global powers on contemporary religions are numerous.58 Peter Beyer has produced 
a number of treatises on the effects of globalisation, paying particular attention to how global 
change has affected the outward manifestation and meaning of religious practice.59 Selling 
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Spirituality is an attempt to expose the commodification of spirituality and reclaim spirituality 
from its current neo-liberal, “sanitised” state.60 In Empire of Religion, David Chidester seeks to 
provide an alternative methodology for the academic study of religion which sheds light on the 
imperial and colonial powers that have shaped religious studies but have largely been ignored.61  
Reflexive attempts to decolonise religion have also been applied in specific spiritual and 
religious contexts. Many of these efforts occurred during the 1980s and 90s within studies of the 
effects of imperial and colonial influences on Hinduism and the East.62 Other attempts at critical 
analyses of the application of religious studies methodologies have been conducted on groups 
throughout the world. In Decolonising African Religions, Okot p’Bitek seeks to reveal the 
European infrastructure through which indigenous, African spirituality has assumed its current 
identity, thus validating the cultural mandate of African spiritual cultures to de-Hellenise, in 
hopes of allowing them to be understood on their own terms.63 Likewise, an anthology edited by 
David Joy and Joseph Duggan delves further into the process of decolonising religions, with 
topics ranging from decolonising the constructed identity of Christ to reformulating Asian 
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theology by addressing existing tensions “between an ‘original’ Christianity and its ‘Asianized’ 
derivative.”64   
Mythology, my own area of expertise, also participates in the move towards reflexive 
methods in the study of cultural processes. Paul Ricoeur, a phenomenologist, maintains that the 
best place to begin to understand religious experience is through the language that is used to 
describe it. Thus, the starting place for any discussion of a group’s understanding of their own 
practices is from within the culture itself.65 Sam Gill also employs myth to investigate scholarly 
practice when interpreting a group’s beliefs and practices. In acknowledging the persisting 
colonial agenda evident through the study of myth, Gill stresses the need for the decolonisation 
of modern academia to find a middle ground between objectivism and subjectivism.66 Gill’s 
awareness of the need for decolonisation within academia is significant, in that it aligns with the 
aims of this study by underscoring the dangers of studying cultural groups through the lens of 
alterity and by encouraging reflexivity within the academic tradition through the cultivation of a 
multiperspectival approach to non-Western epistemology and ontology.  
Wendy Doniger’s writing on myth focuses on storytelling and how a culture’s myths 
provide self-definition. She remains acutely aware that the entry point into understanding any 
cultural group is from within their own stories and their own views of the meaning behind 
them.67 This entry point is encapsulated by Doniger’s term “metamyth,” or what, in this thesis, is 
called narrative assemblage. A narrative assemblage is an overarching, theoretical narrative (a 
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narrative about narratives) comprised of any number of narratives or parts of narratives gathered 
into a single context. The narrative assemblage “enables us to look at all of the variants [of 
narrative] at once and ask our various questions simultaneously.”68 In critiquing issues that 
emerge from Cisco’s account of tā moko, the narrative assemblage exposes the layers of etic 
discourse involved in the construction of Cisco’s mythologised narrative. The narrative 
assemblage cultivates further reflexivity by encouraging reflection upon the ways in which 
narratives are discovered or constructed and by providing a platform where this awareness can be 
utilised to foster constructive dialogue to decolonise and revise existent narratives through 
heteroglossia.  
Indigenous and Māori Studies 
 
The reflexive work on myth within religious studies resonates within indigenous and Māori 
studies. Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, whose work scaffolds onto Edward Tylor’s early 
anthropological approach to religion, probes the structurality of the foundational concepts of 
nature and culture within Western and non-Western, specifically Amerindian (indigenous 
peoples of the Americas), groups. He explores the relevancy of traditional, Western divisions 
made between nature and culture as applied to non-Western cosmologies. His observations of the 
drastic differences between Western and non-Western cosmological constructions prompts de 
Castro to introduce the term multi-naturalism to describe non-Western cosmologies where 
“culture or the subject” takes “the form of the universal, whilst nature or the object” assumes 
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“the form of the particular.” This is in contrast to Western, “multiculturalist” cosmologies, which 
maintain a universality of nature through the gaze of cultural plurality.69  
The multi-naturalist perspective affords scholarship a holistic, metaphysical lens 
inclusive of all cosmological aspects of existence. By ceasing to cling to the anthropocentricity 
of Western models, de Castro provides an integrative model whereby humans cannot be 
separated from the rest of the natural world in which they live. This allows scholars a rare 
opportunity to extend ontological and epistemological perceptions ad infinitum, in turn giving 
indigenous groups a multi-vocal platform from which to articulate their own metaphysical 
realities without the strain of intermediaries who inevitably distort the message.70  
Indigenous ontological perspectivism’s integrative nature is not limited to human agents, 
rather any object, animal, etc. that is ascribed “a soul is capable of having a point of view,” yet 
the original condition of man and animals described within mythological accounts is human.71 
The perspective that animals are originally human in nature overturns the assumption that the 
inherent animalistic nature of humans requires palliation that only culture can provide.72 As de 
Castro elaborates, “if we conceive of humans as somehow composed of a cultural clothing that 
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hides and controls an essentially animal nature, Amazonians have it the other way around: 
animals have a human, socio cultural inner aspect that is “disguised” by an ostensibly bestial 
bodily form.”73 Despite the fact that, at their cores, humans, animals, and other entities are 
human, the “way that humans perceive animals and other subjectivities that inhabit the world 
differs profoundly from the way in which these beings see humans (and see themselves).”74 
Thus, to understand the past, or even our current state, requires that we come to know “the mind 
of the narrator.”75 The result of this relationship, inverse to Western conceptions, is the 
attribution of “social relations” to “nature.”76  
De Castro further develops this relationship: “animals and spirits see themselves as 
humans: they perceive themselves as (or become) anthropomorphic beings when they are in their 
own houses or villages and they experience their own habits and characteristics in the form of 
culture.”77 For instance, as jaguars feast on the blood of a recent kill, they view themselves as 
imbibing manioc beer. In like manner, de Castro maintains that animals’ social institutions are 
identical to human organisations, replete with shaman, chiefs, and meaningful ceremonies.78 
De Castro turns to conflicting ontologies to further elaborate upon this inversion. Where 
Western, multiculturalist ontologies are based upon “the mutually implied unity of nature and 
multiplicity of cultures,” indigenous ontologies are multi-naturalist, reflecting “spiritual unity 
and corporeal diversity” and perceiving nature as the particular and culture as the universal 
form.79 Thus, Western ontological models presume one’s perspective or point of view is 
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generated from the subject, whereas indigenous models more often purport that the point of view 
generates a subject. This suggests that process determines subject.  
Although there are significant differences between Māori and Amerindian groups, de 
Castro’s emphasis on ontology through relationality marks a major turn in anthropology, which 
has been lauded and utilised within Māori contexts.80 McCarthy explains that de Castro’s 
employment of relationality to forgo the subject/object duality so prevalent in the West translates 
well into Polynesian and Māori ontologies and practices where a perspective shaped by 
connectedness prevails.81 Even whakapapa, the foundation of Māori social structure, can be 
“more broadly interpreted” as being shaped by relationships “of all kinds that connect 
everything: not only humans, but also animals, plants, the land, and natural forces.82 
 Corroborating evidence of the applicability of de Castro’s multi-naturalist and relational 
ontological stance within a Māori context is also present within Tau’s work. According to Tau, 
the world was created by the atua in both a physical and human sense, “because atua also 
signified and created thought.”83 Tau maintains that not only were atua “spiritual” entities, but 
recently deceased ancestors and unusual or significant “natural phenomena,” in some Māori 
traditions, were also atua.84 Whilst Tau’s view is controversial and simplistic, with regards to his 
narrow treatment of the deceased, importantly it does affirm that causal agents for Māori are 
many, and that any concept of agency needs to be extended to atua and other natural entities 
which are central to Māori holistic reality.85  
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De Castro’s ontological position also inverts evolutionary explanation which has broader 
implications for indigenous groups, including Māori, and draws attention to the tensions that 
arise when Western science is employed to account for indigenous practice, as the Cisco case 
study reveals. The anthropocentric nature of Western evolutionary explanation does not translate 
into many indigenous conceptions, which allow for anthropomorphism but which are not 
particularly anthropocentric, since other entities, aside from human beings, are considered to be 
“human.”86 Anthropocentric tendencies of Western explanations of cultural evolution occlude a 
key ontological perspective for indigenous groups, making explanations of cultural evolutions 
irrelevant for the very groups whose practices and beliefs evolutionary explanations seek to 
clarify. This is unfortunate, because as Gill observes, academia exists to help bridge “the reality 
of our world and our understanding of it.”87 If explanations of cultural practice have no relevance 
to the indigenous groups to whom the practices belong, then we, as scholars, are failing in the 
endeavour to bridge this gap. 
Also aware of the divergences between indigenous and Western perspectives, Sahlins, the 
anthropologist who castigated sociobiology, delivers a compelling critique of the ways in which 
Western, ethno-historical accounts have shaped cultural narratives for both the West and 
indigenous “others.” To overcome the Western tendency to categorise and label, Sahlins seeks to 
rise above the limitations of Western ontological and epistemological conceptions and challenges 
the anthropological community to deconstruct their narratives of alterity that are projected onto 
indigenous groups. To replace these narratives, Sahlins suggests establishing a framework 
through which indigenous ontologies can be appreciated on their own, rather than in 
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juxtaposition to Western modes of existence.88 As Joseph Epes Brown remarks of indigenous 
groups:  
We are still very far from being aware of the dimensions and ramifications 
of our ethnocentric illusions. Nevertheless, by the very nature of things we 
are now forced to undergo a process of intense self-examination; to engage  
in a serious re-valuation of the premises and orientations of our society.89 
 
In a reflexive study of Māori anthropology, Amiria Henare, a proponent of de Castro, exposes 
the conflict between cultural and social theory and indigenous realities. She concludes that Māori 
anthropologists have adopted Western anthropological theories “in an attempt to articulate 
(possibly untranslatable) concepts of their own.”90 Yet, within anthropology, the idea that Māori 
may actually view the world differently is dismissed precisely because they utilise Western 
social theories, an act lamented by the wider anthropological community as a “tragic irony that 
such people can only proclaim their difference using ‘our’ language, because they are no longer 
themselves.”91  
Māori historians assert that the very foundations of Western scholarship are “shaky” and 
challenge the application of empirical methodologies grounded in 19th century interpretive 
evidence when studying Māori people.92 As Nepia Mahuika observes, Western constructions of 
Māori history essentialise Māori people by “reducing them to a homogenous group.”93 To 
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combat this tendency, Mahuika emphasises the role of oral history in Māori constructions and 
understandings of the past. However, because Māori conceptions of time defy Western, historical 
definitions of the past which are situated in an empirical context, Mahuika questions whether 
Māori history can even be written, maintaining that if it is, then it will likely be “Western in 
conception.”94  
As Tuhiwai Smith admits, “imperialism frames the indigenous experience,” in part by 
regulating and shaping the emergence of cultural narrative.95 In light of this imperialistic 
framework, Kaupapa Māori was designed to allow Māori to regain their own cultural autonomy, 
in part, by challenging “unequal power relations” so evident in “the dominant hegemony of 
westernized positivistic research.”96 Within Māori communities, it is widely acknowledged that 
Western models of research often breach unspoken epistemological and metaphysical boundaries 
that are known and sacred to Māori.97 Having to explain or justify what is often something 
inherently understood because it is lived, serves as a constant reminder to Māori of their position 
as “other.”98 Yet, evolutionary explanations of culture do not acknowledge this. 
The recognition of the power of the colonial discourse to subordinate and diminish 
indigenous realities has been acknowledged throughout the humanities and social sciences.99 
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However, this same reflexivity is absent within evolutionary explanations of cultural practice. 
This reflexivity is, instead, replaced by a sense that science remains the objective observer and 
transcends the need for reflexivity; that scientific principles and practices have no agenda aside 
from the pursuit to explain evidentially-based occurrences in the natural world and that the 
natural world is the sole milieu in which we exist. Yet, this is a paradigm developed by 
Westerners which takes for granted the cultural significance of alternative accounts of physical 
and metaphysical reality. Hence, the development of terms like “Eurocentric sciences,” used to 
describe how knowledge of the natural world was intentionally contoured to “Eurocentric 
worldviews, metaphysics, epistemologies, and value systems.”100  
Indeed, the reflexivity so apparent in the above literature is difficult to find within 
dialogues of evolutionary explanations of culture, a lack which draws attention to the need for 
models that foster multi-perspectival approaches to cultural practice. In light of the need for 
more symmetrical models, the study also draws on science and technology studies. Specifically, I 
explore Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory as a possible theoretical framework to hybridise 
with costly signalling theory in order to create a new model to explain cultural practice with 
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French sociologist Latour’s actor-network theory is a reflexive, ontological, and metaphysical 
approach which hones in on process and associations with the aim to explain what “recording 
device” allows entities to be described in as much detail as possible.102 Actor-network theory 
uses four main components in its quest to understand what moves when tracing associations and 
the means through which this movement is recorded.103 First, is “the attribution of human, 
unhuman, nonhuman, and inhuman characteristics.”104 Contrary to most social models, which 
explain society through the “social relations of individual human agents,” Latour extends this 
agency to all agents, both human and non-human.105 Anything from which action is derived is an 
agent.106 Whether the agent in question is an individual, group, “amorphous,” “zoomorphous,” 
material, or any other configuration, “the same semiotic price” is paid. Thus, the “work of 
attributing, imputing, distributing action, competences, performances and relations” remain 
constant, though the means and outcomes differ.107  
As Latour acknowledges, the limitations of agency are not solely located within the 
material with which scholars of the social sciences and humanities work, but the scholars 
themselves are subject to the inhibitions of agency, which leads us to the second component: “the 
distribution of properties among these entities” and the “connections between them.”108 Rather 
than seeing the role of the social and scholars who study the social as one of ordering, Latour 
believes the social needs to be reassembled via “tracing associations,” which affords social 
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informants (agents) the opportunity to develop their own social realities; afterall, “other agencies 
over which we have no control make us do things.”109 A focus on process with regard to cultural 
practice, removes us from an agent-centric perspective toward determining what has led us to our 
current state.110 More specifically, by “tracing associations” agents are freed from being defined 
by what they do, with emphasis falling instead on what supplies agents with their actions which 
facilitates their innate fluidity, “as circulating objects undergoing trials.”111 This brings us to the 
third and fourth components of actor-network theory: the “circulation entailed” by the attribution 
of characteristics, the “distribution of properties and the connections established between them” 
and “the transformation of those attributions, distributions and connections of the many elements 
that circulate, and of the few ways through which they are sent.”112 Such an approach provides 
indigenous peoples and, particularly, indigenous scholars with a unique framework to transcend 
“the disconnections that are apparent between the demands of research, on one side, and the 
realities they encounter amongst their own and other indigenous communities, with whom they 
share lifelong relationships, on the other.”113 
In the present case where we examine a case study wherein costly signalling is applied to 
tā moko, controversies swirl between costly signalling theory and Māori realities which are more 
holistic. By holistic reality, I am referring to the confluence of realities which affect indigenous 
peoples’ lives. Indigenous peoples must navigate a number of worlds. As Taiaiake Alfred and 
Jeff Corntassel maintain, “indigenousness is an identity constructed, shaped and lived in the 
politicized context of contemporary colonialism.”114 Indigenous peoples are indigenous to the 
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lands they inhabit and, for Māori, the land is the tangible, transtemporal placenta which links 
tangata whenua to their ancestors and future descendants. Tangata whenua also share traditions. 
Even today, these traditions are lived by Māori; they are not some past custom eradicated by 
colonisation. The “traditional” world, in the sense of a lived belief or practice passed down 
through the generations, is simply that which has been continually lived. 
Simultaneously, modern Māori also live in a Western world with its own beliefs and 
practices which were forced upon their ancestors through colonisation. Tuhiwai Smith recounts 
that, “imperialism frames the indigenous experience. It is part of our story, our version of 
modernity.”115 Since the Māori urbanisation following World War Two, more and more Māori 
now live urban lives, working in bustling city centres, where they are seen as the minority. In 
2006, 84% of Māori lived in urban areas.116 This shift diminished the influence of traditional 
social structures, particularly as increasing numbers of urban Māori sought Western-style 
education through Western universities and institutions.117 Māori now run television and radio 
studios, own successful businesses and tourism ventures, and are active in politics, gaining 
international recognition. Yet, this modern Westernised lifestyle, for many Māori, coexists with 
their more traditional, Māori belief system; they are not mutually exclusive ways of being in the 
world. Māori have adopted certain elements of Western culture but not at the expense of Māori 
ontology and epistemology. 
I have coined the term holistic reality to reflect the integrative nature of lived Māori 
worlds. It is intended to honour the multiplicity of realities Māori and other indigenous peoples 
navigate, which are synthesised into modern, indigenous living. Holistic reality embodies that 
                                                 
115 Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, 19. 
116 Te Ahukaramū (Charles Royal), “Māori: Urbanisation and Renaissance,” in Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New 
Zealand, last modified February 3, 2015, accessed September 20, 2015, http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/maori/page-1.  
117 Te Ahukaramū, “Urbanisation and Renaissance.”  
35 
 
which is transtemporal and transpatial; that which is shaped by the past and guides the future; 
yet, holistic reality recognises that the past is ever-present and refers to what is lived in its 
totality.  
The tensions apparent between costly signalling theory and Māori realities are imbedded 
in the ontological differences between Western and indigenous modes of enquiry. The categories 
which costly signalling theory permits simply do not offer Māori control over their own realities, 
but, rather, force them into an artificial Western reality intentionally designed to have analytical 
power generated by extruding them through pre-fabricated categories in the form of the signal, 
the signaller, and the receiver. However, rather than allowing the data to determine the validity 
of the model, particularly when evolutionary explanations are translated into the social sciences 
and humanities as justifications for cultural practice, certain data is manipulated or ignored to 
generate explanatory utility within the model. This is precisely the dynamic Tuhiwai Smith 
addresses throughout the social sciences where researchers treat the positivistic research process 
as “value-free” and “objective.”118 Yet, these same research processes continue to misrepresent 
or exclude indigenous ontological and metaphysical realities, instead replacing Māori experts 
with the “authoritative” voice of the “methodological” expert.119 By forgoing agency and 
focussing on process articulated through what Latour calls infralanguage, actor-network theory 
provides a unique approach “to trace connections between the controversies themselves,” which 
creates methodological space wherein multiple voices can emerge simultaneously and realities 
cease to be clad in a singular guise.120 In fact, it is precisely these controversies that enable social 
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associations in the form of “a series of transformations” to be traced and it is in this tracing that 
agent network theory’s explanatory power is realised.121 
This review reveals a rich body of literature within the social sciences and humanities 
dedicated to reflexive and decolonised enquiries into indigenous cultural practices. The research 
surveyed above illuminates longstanding ontological and epistemological tensions between 
Western and non-Western approaches to cultural practice. By elucidating these tensions, this 
review draws attention to a significant gap within evolutionary explanations of culture which do 
not pursue reflexive and decolonised approaches to cultural practice. Simultaneously, the gaps in 
the literature also reveal considerable room for heteroglossic interplay, whereby all voices, 
Western and non-Western, can be synthesised through approaches like actor-network theory to 
develop symmetrical and balanced accounts of cultural practice.   
Methodology 
 
This inductive and interpretivist study is situated within the humanities, and although grounded 
in religious studies, it is interdisciplinary in nature. Moreover, this thesis reflects a shift in my 
own views on the explanatory power of costly signalling theory. Utilising primary sources in the 
form of tā moko narratives, first-hand accounts documenting tā moko, and moko designs (which 
do not appear within the thesis itself), as well as other secondary literature, which I have 
gathered to constitute the research data, I critically analyse Cisco’s costly signalling theory 
approach to tā moko in a case study. In line with the inductive approach, my findings are a 
malleable product of the research process and are derived in a fluid investigative context which 
allows conflicting accounts to coexist. Chapter Four of this project is designed to facilitate 
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heteroglossia with the aim of negotiating this conflictual space by providing a symmetrical 
model and dialogue which can accommodate this dialectic. 
Although my expertise within religious studies is mythology, in this study, my choice to 
opt for the term narrative over myth was guided by the connotations myth carries within Māori 
culture. As Doniger observes, “colonial and missionary hatred (or loathing) of non-Western 
religions,” did considerable damage to indigenous groups’ mythologies and contributed to 
further mythologisation of the peoples’ themselves.122 Myth became a means to identify and 
objectify the other, as well as a measurement stick utilised by Westerners to determine 
indigenous authenticity, resulting in essentialising concepts like the “noble savage.”123 Thus, the 
havoc that was wreaked on indigenous cultural identity through imperialist and colonising forces 
largely played out in the destruction of indigenous myths and creation of new myths framed by 
Western conceptions of indigenous peoples. The last two decades, however, have been 
punctuated by efforts to decolonise this “Western discourse about the Other.”124 In keeping with 
these efforts, and since this is not a thesis about the politics of mythology, I have chosen to 
employ the term narrative, as opposed to myth. 
 Readers will also note my choice to employ the term indigenous peoples. Whilst I am 
aware of the controversies swirling around the use of the terms indigenous and indigenous 
peoples and the collectivist concerns that arise from such usages, in keeping with the 
decolonising aims of this study, my use of the term is one of relationality.125 Like Tuhiwai 
Smith, I find the employment of the ‘s’ in peoples an acknowledgment of the differences 
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between indigenous groups and of their self-determination.126 The term indigenous peoples has 
permitted “the collective voices of colonized peoples to be expressed in an international arena” 
and has served as an “umbrella enabling communities and peoples to come together, 
transcending their own colonized contexts and experiences, in order to learn, share, plan, 
organize and struggle collectively for self-determination on the global and local stages.”127 Thus, 
its use within this thesis underscores the autonomy and sovereignty of indigenous peoples whilst, 
simultaneously, accepting a shared collective experience shaped by the processes and effects of 
colonisation.  
My approach to this thesis is multi-layered. Whilst it starts out as interdisciplinary, in 
Chapter Four, the approach shifts towards transdisciplinarity and transperspectivalism, two terms 
which also warrant clarification. Transdisciplinarity extends beyond interdisciplinarity, which is 
inherently limited by the very disciplines it seeks to incorporate, and is also transperspectival. 
My understanding of transdisciplinarity is borrowed from Basarab Nicolescu, who purports a 
multi-dimensional reality which transcends duality and integrates both “the universe and the 
human being,” acknowledging them as coevolutionary.128 Transperspectival refers to the attempt 
to go beyond the bounds of defined perspective to instead engage with the dynamic interactions 
which inform perspective. 
Mainly, the study draws from secondary sources in the fields of history and 
anthropology, but I also utilise actor-network theory from the wider field of science and 
technology studies and decolonising frameworks from indigenous studies. Actor-network theory 
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is a relational theory which looks at the networks formed between causal agents which can be 
animate or inanimate objects.129 For decolonising methodologies, I predominantly draw from 
Smith’s Decolonizing Methodologies and Kaupapa Māori Theory.130 Based upon orally 
transmitted Māori knowledge systems, Kaupapa Māori, as an analytical approach, provides a 
distinctively Māori framework which critiques non-Māori “constructions and definitions of 
Māori” by “affirming the importance of Māori self-definitions and self-valuations.”131 As a non-
Māori with only limited knowledge of te reo Māori, I employ Kaupapa Māori as a theoretical 
platform from which to launch discussions of the issues raised when applying costly signalling 
theory as an explanation of tā moko and, more broadly, as a means to help illuminate how 
evolutionary explanations of culture might better accommodate indigenous perspectives. 
However, I also draw from indigenous ontological perspectivism, which adds further dimension 
to the possibilities presented when incorporating indigenous holistic perspectives into 
transdisciplinary models of cultural practice. As de Castro explains, when competing ontologies 
finally come to a truce, rather than developing a single set of principles or beliefs, “a different 
world” is constructed.132 Specifically, the world shifts to accommodate the integration of a 
multiplicity of perspectives. 
My usage of actor-network theory, indigenous ontological perspectivism, and Kaupapa 
Māori is one of concentricity. As a relational approach, actor-network theory provides an 
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effective relational framework, based upon the attribution, distribution, circulation, and 
transformation of associations between entities, which allows us to create a symmetrical network 
founded upon process. Within the context of this study, actor-network theory serves as an 
overarching framework into which indigenous ontological perspectivism and Kaupapa Māori are 
situated.  
Indigenous ontological perspectivism is a theory which emphasises the relationality 
between humans and the world in which they live. I utilise the theory to flesh out the network(s) 
identified by actor-network theory to include particular elements of the natural world. 
Specifically, indigenous ontological perspectivism allows us to extend our attribution of 
associations, and, specifically our attribution of social relations, to nature.133 Thus, indigenous 
ontological perspectivism can be conceived of as isolating the beginning and end of network 
associations by providing the means to identify and discuss agents and outcomes of the 
interactions between them. 
Kaupapa Māori which is based upon a set of philosophical beliefs and values specific to 
Māori forms the inner circle of my concentric approach. Because this study involves a Māori 
case study and aims to further a more symmetrical and decolonised approach to indigenous 
practices, it is essential to incorporate a specifically Māori ontology and epistemology. The 
employment of Kaupapa Māori highlights and mobilises a distinctively Māori voice which 
allows features of the revealed network(s) to be defined in Māori terms.   
As a non-Māori, I may be vulnerable to the claim of recolonising my own study by 
attempting to speak for Māori and by not being a speaker of te reo Māori. To avoid this, I defer 
to prominent Māori scholars and sources to back my claims. Furthermore, my aim is not to speak 
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for any group but to provide an integrative context which facilitates heteroglossia so that every 
faction may speak for itself. In light of my lack of knowledge of te reo Māori, my treatment of 
Māori narrative relies on popular translations corroborated by secondary accounts.  
Naturally, any academic study has limitations and has to acknowledge the ethical position 
of the researcher in relation to the study. Although I have taken many precautions against 
transgressing Māori views and sensitivities and cultivating a context of alterity, it is possible that 
I have breached unspoken boundaries which are sacred to Māori. In fact, as I write this, I find 
myself searching for instances where I may have unknowingly done so. I can only hope that my 
awareness of this possibility serves as a testament to my sincere effort to approach Māori 
material with the utmost respect. 
Conclusion 
As I touched upon above, along with actor-network theory, indigenous ontological 
perspectivism, and Kaupapa Māori comprise a concentric approach I utilise to support this study. 
Actor-network theory has three main consequences when employed as a methodology for 
studying cultural practice. Firstly, by concentrating on movement and connectedness, the 
researcher is able to locate himself closer to the practice itself, rather than to the agents 
performing the practice, which is more commonly the starting place for analysis. As Latour 
observes, “there is no such thing as a proximity or a distance which would not be defined by 
connectibility.”134 Tracing connectedness can rapidly alter our perception of associations 
between agents. Variables which may appear to be intimately linked when assessed through 
agent-based models, prove “infinitely remote” when their associations are traced.135 Instead of 
                                                 




getting lost in arguments over individual or group-level dominance, actor-network theory tracks 
associations to reveal “how a given element becomes strategic through the number of 
connections it commands, and how it loses its importance when losing its connections.”136  
Thus, the question of whether there is a connection proves to be the only relevant 
question to ask, and the actor-network is the only means through which emergent connections 
can be “traced and inscribed.”137 Yet, the agent is not separate from the network, nor does he or 
she simply “lay down the net.” Rather, the agent’s definition of the world “outlines, traces, 
delineates, describes, files, lists, records, marks or tags a trajectory that is called a network.”138 
Tracing must be facilitated by agents within the network, as the network’s very existence is 
dependent upon these traced associations.139 Additionally, tracing connections enables groups to 
maintain their own autonomy by determining their own self-definition by tracing the linkages 
that connect phenomena.140 
Secondly, within actor-network theory the actions of agents are provided by 
“actantiality,” which is not determined by what agents do but by what supplies agents “with their 
actions.”141 What determines the actions of agents allows the impetus behind cultural practices 
like moko to extend in any direction. For tā moko, this augmentation extends to atua, tikanga 
Māori, and other forces that affect agents within the network, adding a dimension to moko 
neglected by Cisco.  
Lastly, as Latour emphasises, the agent in actor-network theory is not designed to 
substitute for traditional, social scientific concepts of agency. Neither is the network a 
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replacement for society. Rather, Latour describes both the agent and the network as “two faces of 
the same phenomenon, like waves and particles.”142 The social is simply local circulation and the 
network the most accurate description of this process. Once causes or factors are added, the 
network is further extended; one need not work outside of the network itself to incorporate new 
elements into it. Thus, the network is insulated and encapsulated “by its own frame of reference, 
its own definition of growth, of referencing, of framing, of explaining.”143 Agents permit us to 
see what they do, as well as why and how they do it, and it is through tracing these circulations 
that we are able to grasp more about cultural practice than through strict definitions of specific 
entities.144 Latour aptly observes that “it is us, the social scientists, who lack knowledge of what 
they do, and not they who are missing the explanation of why they are unwittingly manipulated 
by forces exterior to themselves and known to the social scientist’s powerful gaze and 
methods.”145 Thus, actor-network theory helps us to settle ontological tensions that emerge 
within agent-centred models and between the researcher and subject, which encourages and 
provides an effective space for reflexivity to emerge. Actor-network theory is unique in that it 
bypasses superficial conceptions of the social, instead allowing the connections to determine the 
number of possible dimensions.146 Either an element is part of the network or it is not and fades 
into the descriptive background.147    
As Latour explains, the “problem” of reflexivity is transformed into an “opportunity” 
when “the epistemological myth of an outside observer providing an explanation in addition to 
“mere description” disappears.”148 No “privilege” is granted to any entity or to the observer, nor 
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do “a priori limits on knowledge exist,” since the associations speak for themselves in an 
environment determined by their composition, distribution, circulation, and reconfiguration. 
Thus, for an entity to be ascribed the status of explaining, predicting, accounting for, or 
“dominating,” it must be circulated and distributed; it must “network.”149 Furthermore, actor-
network theory fosters heteroglossia, forgoing the need for agents to be censored, since the 
concern is tracing associations between them.  
In seeking an integrative approach to cultural practice, relationality or tracing 
associations is beneficial for both Western and indigenous metaphysical and epistemological 
models, in that it allows us to set representations and agency aside and focus on the 
transformative and accumulated nature of action, responsible for the evolution of culture without 
sacrificing any of its complexity and without reducing “native peoples as helpless playthings in 
the grip of the all-powerful logic” of Western science, which leaves us “remote from human and 
social interest.”150 Even before Latour, Ruth Benedict recognised the value of seeking out the 
integration within cultural groups, which results in “diverse patterns” which “do not lend 
themselves profitably to generalizations,” and which better facilitates an understanding of the 
relational positioning of individual to group.151  
Additionally, tracing associations provides us with the analytical means to question the 
idea of indigenous peoples ending up in their current position by following a “natural 
evolutionary path, determined exclusively by [their] interaction among technology, demography, 
and environment, a trajectory then truncated by the irruption of History.”152 By forgoing the 
dichotomy and even the employment of the terms, nature and society, we find that the notion of 
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complexity, as well as differing ontological perspectives, are endorsed through their 
connectivity, transforming history into a process of symmetrical construction and reclamation 
that surpasses mere perception and transforms into a validated, holistic reality.153  
 Where actor-network theory traces association between agents, indigenous ontological 
perspectivism traces associations from the point of view to the agent, allowing the process by 
which agency is ascribed to be mapped. Indigenous ontological perspectivism forgoes the 
agentic tendency of Western scientific models to define themselves by the objects a subject 
produces, which helps the subject to foster an external recognition of itself—the only means by 
which a subject can “know itself objectively.”154 Because “an object is an incompletely 
interpreted subject,” indigenous ontological perspectivism maintains that complete interpretation 
is only possible by determining an object’s relational position. In part, this is because IOP 
recognises that agents are not bound by the constraints of biology which means that they can 
only be understood with regards to how they are situated in a “network of social relations.”155 If 
we accept de Castro’s stance that the world is perceived or represented in the exact same way for 
all entities and that what differs is the world that is seen, then social relationality is the only way 
to develop an accurate portrayal of another’s world since these traced associations also serve as 
channels for exchange. When opened up to exchange, not only is an agent traded for a social 
relation, but perspectives of the relationships themselves can be substituted.156  
In this way, the world that both actor-network theory and indigenous ontological 
perspectivism describe is entirely relational and open to transformation. Various ontological 
perspectives are also better able to be shared. By tracing connections, Westerners are able to 
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integrate a universalised perspective and to establish connections within the whole. Likewise, 
indigenous groups are able to disconnect elements and “particularize relationships,” in a way that 
runs contrary to the more typical, universalised nature of relationships within indigenous 
contexts.157 Furthermore, a relational approach to culture and its practices carves out space to 
honour the transformative nature of culture, a view which both indigenous and evolutionary 
explanations uphold.  
Kaupapa Māori methodology provides a unique opportunity to recognise the limitations 
and agenda of “Eurocentric sciences.” Not only that, but it provides a distinctly Māori 
framework which has the latitude to serve either as an independent methodological framework or 
to be integrated into a new framework through which to model cultural practices. In the 
endeavour to present a new model of cultural practice which integrates indigenous 
understandings, Kaupapa Māori is, therefore, invaluable. 
The Chapter Map 
To carry out this study, I will first establish the background for the research, including a 
discussion of the historical development and current state of evolutionary explanations of culture 
and, specifically, costly signalling theory. The introduction to evolutionary explanations of 
culture is followed, in Chapter Two, by an introduction to Māori tā moko. Chapter Two 
specifically highlights the various narratives that comprise tā moko, which I later utilise, in 
Chapter Three, to contextualise Cisco’s work as part of the confluence of tā moko narratives 
which both contribute to our understanding of the practice but which also perpetuate its 
mythologisation. Chapter Three offers a critique of Cisco’s application of costly signalling 
theory to tā moko. I am particularly concerned with the structural ambiguity that is presented 
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when costly signalling is applied to a specific cultural practice, as revealed by the Cisco case 
study, and with the divergence between Māori and costly signalling theory explanations of tā 
moko. To be clear, this study employs Māori tā moko and Cisco’s treatment of tā moko only as a 
means to critically analyse costly signalling theory’s explanatory power and to draw attention to 
the tensions and challenges that arise when applying evolutionary explanations to indigenous 
practices. Building upon these findings, Chapter Four makes the case for an updated version of 
costly signalling theory, what I call transmissive assemblage, based upon actor-network theory, 
indigenous ontological perspectivism, and Kaupapa Māori. To reiterate, my aim in updating 
signalling in this way is to illustrate how evolutionary explanations can be more integrative and 
symmetrical, which, in turn, provides indigenous peoples with a voice and a way to explain their 

















Chapter One: The Science of Culture 
 
 
Introduction and Background 
In a compelling discussion of conceptual issues facing those who seek to employ evolutionary 
explanations for the domain of culture, Elliott Sober describes emergent dilemmas surrounding 
issues of clarity in terms of fogs and mirages.  
…a science enveloped by fog has at least one consolation. A fog does not  
foster the illusion of clarity; the lack of visibility is patent. More insidious  
than the fog is the mirage. Fogs are seen for what they are. Mirages are  
trickier, engendering the mistaken conviction that things are as they seem…158  
 
Indeed, as Chapter Three illuminates, the image of Sober’s mirage is evoked by Cisco’s 
application of costly signalling theory to tā moko. Yet, to understand what is not there we must 
first have knowledge of what is, which requires that this study first be contextualised within the 
dialogues around evolutionary explanations of culture and especially within costly signalling 
theory.  
Standard demarcations of evolutionary explanations of culture include three sub-fields: 
evolutionary psychology, cultural evolution, and human behavioural ecology.159 Though 
researchers from these sub-fields maintain that the application of evolutionary theory to the study 
of human behaviour is useful, simultaneously they tend to diverge on certain key issues, such as 
“the extent to which genes, environments and socially transmitted information explain 
behavioural variation.”160 However, in recent years, the lines between these subfields is 
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becoming increasingly blurred and their distinctions are being challenged.161 My exploration into 
evolutionary explanations of culture focuses on two of the three subfields, namely cultural 
evolution and human behavioural ecology. Although this study mainly involves human 
behavioural ecology in the vein of costly signalling theory, I also borrow some examples from 
cultural evolution to highlight some of the broader challenges that the use of evolutionary 
explanations to account for cultural practices present.162  
Though evolutionary psychology represents one-third of evolutionary explanations of 
culture, I have chosen not to engage with this literature. My decision to omit evolutionary 
psychology from the following discussions is based upon the differentiation proponents of 
evolutionary explanations of culture, including cultural evolutionary theory, are careful to 
maintain between themselves and those, like many within evolutionary psychology, who purport 
that genetics is the primary processual mode of inheritance.163 Whilst it is widely accepted that 
genetics has a hand in the development of cultural practice, this study is not concerned with 
identifying specific psychological adaptations or evolved cognitive mechanisms which 
evolutionary psychologists attribute to the development of certain social behaviours.164 Thus, in 
keeping with the aims of cultural evolutionary theorists, within this study, discussions are limited 
to those which pertain to human behavioural ecology and cultural evolutionary theory. 
 With the aim of crafting sufficient scaffolding for subsequent chapters, here I first 
provide some background on the general development of evolutionary explanations of culture 
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and the basic tenets of Darwinian Theory. To flesh out this brief introduction, I follow with an 
analysis of some of the more popular usages of cultural evolutionary theory, including dual-
inheritance theory, niche construction theory, and meme theory. My aim in exploring these 
popular cultural evolutionary theories is to draw attention to some of the difficulties and 
limitations posed when employing evolutionary explanations to account for cultural practice, 
even in their most prevalent applications. Trailing these discussions is a short introduction to 
human behavioural ecology with the intent of situating costly signalling theory within its 
theoretical tradition. The outline of human behavioural ecology is followed by an overview of 
costly signalling theory, intended to preface my later critique in Chapter Three of the Cisco case 
study in which the application of costly signalling theory is presented as a viable explanation of 
Māori tā moko. 
 Since the Enlightenment, scientific explanations of culture have been sought. The 
supremacy of individualised rationality, as introduced by minds such as John Locke and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, who was actually one of the first to employ the term social, has been extoled 
for paving the way for thinkers like Immanuel Kant to develop compelling channels for the 
cultivation of scientific approaches to the social (what is more often called the social 
sciences).165 Kant’s awareness that knowledge is both objective and subjective, since to know the 
                                                 
165 Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Finn Sivert Nielsen, A History of Anthropology (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 12-6; 
Alexander Moseley, John Locke (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2007), 170; William Bristow, 
“Enlightenment,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/enlightenment/; Geoffrey Hawthorne, Enlightenment and 
Despair: A History of Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 28, 33-4. Although Rousseau, 
Locke, and Descartes emphasize the significance of rationality, in his own way, each remains critical of science. For 
Rousseau’s original critiques, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts (New York: Modern 
Language Association, 1946). For an English translation, see Ian Johnston trans., Discourse on the Arts and Sciences 
(Adelaide, AUS: The University of Adelaide Library), last modified December 17, 2014, accessed August 15, 2015, 
https://ebooks.adelaide.edu. au/r/rousseau/jean_jacques/arts/. Commentary on this critique is available from Jeff J.S. 
Black, Rousseau’s Critique of Science: A Commentary on the Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts (Lanham, MD: 




object requires that the subject must have an awareness of itself, generated a certain self-
reflexivity within his work.166 As Thomas Eriksen and Finn Nielsen clarify, Kant believed that 
“to study ‘the world out there’ is to study the encounter between the world and myself.”167 
Kant’s recognition that the external world shapes us, influenced later encounters with the social 
which sought to find more objective means to explain human phenomena in hopes of better 
understanding the relationship between the individual and the collective.168  
Building upon Kant and Enlightenment foundations, enquiries into the social have 
continued with scholars pursuing more and more precise ways to isolate cultural variants and 
measure human activity. One promising avenue in the quest to more accurately measure human 
phenomena revealed itself through the work of Darwin, who developed a framework which 
ultimately divorced creation processes from gods and supernatural agents. By introducing the 
processes of natural selection, Darwin was able to account for the diversity of biological 
organisms within the natural world and for the occurrence of complex adaptations without 
relying on a divine intermediary.169 
Darwin made three key observations which led to the development of the tenets of natural 
selection. Firstly, organisms vary and, secondly, fitness between organisms varies. This is known 
as differential fitness. For example, some individuals have more resources or food than others, 
which increases their odds of survival and reproduction. Thirdly, parental characteristics are 
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inherited by children through reproduction, a process which is known as heritable variation.170 
Heritable variation allows for differential reproduction, meaning that traits which increase odds 
of survival in a given environment are more likely to be inherited, and those with these 
successful traits are more likely to have reproductive opportunities. Thus, as time passes, more 
individuals will exhibit these successful traits, since those without these characteristics will 
struggle to survive and reproduce.171 The result of these occurrences is evolution by natural 
selection. 
Darwinian tenets of natural selection used to explain biological evolution appeal to those 
within the social sciences and humanities who insist that “the problem that Darwin set out to 
solve—the diversity and complexity of biological organisms—is echoed in the problem faced by 
those studying culture.”172 Indeed, human cultural groups vary tremendously and possess 
immense complexity. In light of these similarities and given the post-Enlightenment tradition of 
seeking increasingly objective means to study human phenomena, in the last thirty years, 
evolutionary explanations of culture based upon Darwinian Theory have become increasingly 
prevalent in conversations within the social sciences and humanities.173 Examples of 
evolutionary explanations of culture include but are not limited to dual-inheritance theory, meme 
theory, niche-construction theory, group and multi-level selection, costly signalling theory, 
epidemiology of representations, and cultural phylogeny.174  
Broadly, evolutionary explanations of culture, which in this study include co-
evolutionary theories, seek to build upon Darwinian Theory of natural selection to explain the 
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persistence of certain traits and behaviours to better understand how groups change through 
time.175 Early pioneers, like Luigi Cavalli-Sforza, Marcus Feldman, Robert Boyd, Peter 
Richerson, Charles Lumsden, and Wilson, turned to evolutionary explanation after experiencing 
frustration with the lack of models for explaining cultural change.176 Evolutionary explanations 
of culture are lauded for their ability to provide “ultimate explanations of human behaviour that 
help elucidate the types of proximate mechanisms that have evolved.”177 Yet, Kevin Laland et al. 
argue that caution regarding this dichotomy is warranted, as the distinction between the two is 
not always as clear as it is made out to be, particularly since stances on evolution of culture hinge 
on researchers’ “assumptions about causality.”178  
Generally, ultimate explanations account for why a particular trait or behaviour 
developed, whereas proximate explanations are concerned with how the said behaviour or trait 
functions.179 For example, babies cry. An ultimate explanation might maintain that a baby’s cry 
prompts much needed care and attention from its mother. Proximate explanations focus more on 
what causes the crying, such as being too hot or too cold, feeling hungry or thirsty, or sensing 
separation from a loved one, as well as specific physiological responses that either cause crying 
or result in its cessation.180 Yet, this dichotomy is misleading, because it “builds upon an 
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incorrect view of development that fails to address the origin of characters and ignores the fact 
that proximate mechanisms contribute to the dynamics of selection.”181 Despite their misgivings, 
Laland et al. uphold the dichotomy’s utility, citing that ultimate and proximate explanations fulfil 
separate functions and should not be viewed as “alternatives.”182 
Under the categories of ultimate and proximate explanations, Tinbergen identifies four 
major categories: mechanism, ontogeny, survival value, and phylogeny that lead to important 
questions regarding behaviour and which form the foundation for the study of animal behaviour 
that provides the backdrop to costly signalling theory.183 Ultimate explanations generate 
questions related to mechanism and ontogeny. Mechanism, also known as causation, explains 
what a behaviour is and how that behaviour is constructed.184 Ontogeny, or development, 
pertains to questions of development. Such questions are concerned with how a behaviour 
changes throughout the lifetime of an individual and the degree to which learning alters the 
behaviour.185 Proximate-level explanations relate to questions of adaptive value and phylogeny. 
Survival or adaptive value, also called function, is concerned with the current form of a 
behaviour and its utility with regard to an organism’s reproductive fitness. Specifically, survival 
value is concerned with the probability that an organism will successfully reproduce and its 
offspring survive.186 Evolution, also referred to as phylogeny, generates questions about the 
history of a behaviour. Such questions might include what pre-empted the development of a 
specific behaviour and what sort of selective pressures have resulted in its development, 
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perpetuation, and adaptation.187 Tinbergen argues that only when these four areas are considered 
together can a comprehensive analysis of animal behaviour be conducted.  
Ultimate explanations pertain to the evolution of a species, whereas proximate 
explanations focus on the individuals within a species. The causal relationships between ultimate 
and proximate explanations and the questions each generates shapes evolutionary explanations of 
culture which are frequently used to identify how individual-level processes of individual and 
social learning inform traits at the population-level, accounting for group cooperation and 
increasingly complex societies.188 However, using data mainly collected from birds and 
mammals, Eytan Avital and Eva Jablonka have argued that the transmission of information 
through social learning may lead to the development of group characteristics that are “robust 
enough” to suggest group selection.189 In fact, in recent years, group selection has become an 
increasingly popular explanation for cultural change and remains a fertile ground for exploration, 
particularly in accounting for cooperation between non-relatives, considered central to 
explaining the development of modern societies.190 Much of its success can be attributed to the 
efforts of scholars like David Sloan Wilson who introduced multi-level selection, which had the 
effect of divorcing group-selection from older versions which maintained that “organisms will 
appear to be designed to maximize group fitness.”191 Yet, despite the increasing prevalence of 
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group-selection hypotheses, it remains that much of cultural evolutionary theory and nearly all of 
human behavioural ecology focuses on individual-level selection.  
Regardless of disagreements about which level(s) of selection guide cultural change, 
proponents of evolutionary explanations of culture do agree that cultural inheritance is of utmost 
significance in the endeavour to understand how humans have evolved through time. The various 
views on the mechanisms which drive cultural evolution contribute to a growing awareness 
reflected by an ever-expanding literature that humans are products of their biology and thus, all 
parts of human existence, including culture, cannot be separated from their underlying biological 
faculties. In acknowledging the biological orientation of the cultural landscape, important 
questions are fostered about its effects on human cognition to which naturalistic models provide 
compelling responses that inform current understandings of cultural evolution. Yet, in seeking to 
explain culture, cultural practices, and their effects on human evolution, a host of theories and 
approaches have emerged which vary drastically in their application and description of 
evolutionary forces. 
Examples of Evolutionary Explanation 
Cultural Evolutionary Theories 
As previously stated, this thesis focuses on explanations from two of the three major subfield of 
evolutionary explanation: cultural evolutionary theory and human behavioural ecology. 
Generally, cultural evolutionary theories seek to explain “characteristic adaptations” of a species, 
as well as intra-species diversity, by turning to cultural inheritance with specific focus on the 
capacity to learn from others.192 Cultural evolutionary theorists are inclined to understand culture 
as “information capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they acquire from other 
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members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission.”193 
Information that is acquired culturally, is in contrast to information obtained through genetic 
acquisition, which, as Mesoudi points out, is more the individually-orientated domain of 
evolutionary and cognitive psychology.194 Cultural evolutionists maintain that both culturally 
transmitted information and biological information are products of Darwinian processes, 
meaning that they evolve in similar ways. However, there is significant variation in the ways 
cultural evolutionary theorists utilise and interpret methods from biology to inform their studies 
of the development, perpetuation, and outcomes of cultural processes.195 
In this section, I briefly explore three different types of cultural evolutionary theories: 
dual-inheritance theory, niche construction theory, and meme theory. Each of these has been 
widely employed as an explanation of cultural evolution and cultural practice. All have featured 
prominently, at one point or another, in the literature on cultural evolution and have dealt with 
numerous case studies. Yet, each has its own narrative about culture and the mechanisms which 
drive change, often leaving the perceived superior objectivity of science a victim of subjective 
interpretation. By better understanding the underlying issues present within models of cultural 
evolutionary theory, we can begin to isolate the ways in which evolutionary explanations might 
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Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson’s dual-inheritance theory remains one of the most robust and 
widely accepted cultural evolutionary explanations. Dual-inheritance theory uses population-
level transmission to argue for culture as human inheritance accumulated from genetics and 
selective, social learning. Cultural variants are believed to be transmitted from one person to 
another, but individual-level transmission is low-fidelity, meaning that individual variants are not 
replicated. However, at population-level the same variants are high fidelity. Simply put, 
individual decisions about what to copy ultimately affects what variants occur within a given 
population. 
Consider this popular example.196 Think of a hunter who has averaged the arrowhead 
lengths used by tribal elders. One elder uses an arrowhead of four centimetres, another seven 
centimetres, and another thirteen centimetres in length. The hunter averages these lengths 
together and produces an arrowhead measuring eight centimetres. Individually, none of the 
specific arrow lengths were copied, but the average of the arrowhead lengths is stored at the 
population level so as to be copied by future generations. These variations accumulate over time 
and are responsible for cultural adaptation. 
According to dual-inheritance theory, our ability to have cumulative culture is what 
differentiates us from other species, which only have fairly narrow imitation capacities.197 
Cumulative culture allows us to cultivate and maintain complex social variants, which otherwise 
would not be invented, due to the unlikelihood that a lone individual could acquire enough 
knowledge in a single lifetime to create such variants. Humans’ ability to develop cumulative 
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culture helps to illuminate why humans are able to adapt to and inhabit such a wide variety of 
environments; mainly because cultural variant accumulation increases the transmission of 
domain-specific information about local environments.198 
Cultural group transmission is affected by three biases: content, frequency-dependent, 
and model-based. For biased transmission to work, individuals must have the capacity to imitate. 
With imitation, the average fitness of learners in a given population is increased. Imitators also 
have the ability to select which transmissive channel is more appropriate depending upon 
environmental circumstances. When learning is costly, information is inaccurate, and the 
environment is not too static or too dynamic one can and should opt for imitation, but when 
learning costs are low and accurate or an environment is rapidly changing, individual learning is 
the better option.199 Our ability to imitate is what enables this choice to be made.  
The main benefit of imitation is that individuals can build upon others’ previously 
successful designs. This means that the imitator’s energy and resources can be better spent on 
improving already existing designs that have worked, versus starting completely from scratch on 
projects that may or may not be successful. Improvements to designs can then be passed down to 
future generations resulting in increased cultural complexity.  
Dual-inheritance theory cleverly and thoroughly affirms that cultural inheritance is 
inexorably bound to genetic evolution. Inevitably, what we call culture affects our environment, 
in turn altering the selection processes that determine which genes will be selected against. The 
acceptance that behavioural adaptations have resulted in human fecundity that require cultural 
mechanisms, in the form of selective, social learning which allows for effective transmission of 
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cultural data and facilitates the accumulation of such information, tightly bundles genetics and 
culture and carves out space for historical analysis of cultural change.200  
Although dual-inheritance theory is lauded for the space it provides for historical analysis 
of cultural change, the space it provides is not without its own biased directionality. Indeed, the 
model tends to favour modern, Western literate traditions and to dismiss the transmissive value 
of materiality and other transmissive means aside from writing which puts non-literate traditions, 
such as the Māori oral tradition, in a subordinate position. The result is a portrayal of non-literate 
traditions as having fewer complexities than their literate counterparts.  
Great Divide theories, which overtly favoured literate traditions through unsophisticated 
and inflated duality, were harshly critiqued by the beginning of the 1980s, so the vestiges of this 
same dichotomisation between literacy and orality that emerge within dual-inheritance 
frameworks is surprising and underscore the need for greater reflexivity within evolutionary 
explanations of culture.201 Stephen Reder and Erica Davila, who explore the literacy/orality 
dynamic through the lens of actor-network theory observe that the power attributed to literacy 
may, in fact, be a mirage stemming from the conditions generated through the process of 
institutionalisation.  
When stable states of networks become institutionalized, the static (irreversible)  
relations of power seem “natural” and the influence of the tools of the powerful  
(e.g. literacy) seem to be inherent in the tools themselves. In this way, the  
powerful influence of the people who control literacy is misassigned to literacy  
itself, thereby endowing literacy with an apparently “autonomous influence.202   
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This is not to say writing is not a significant human innovation, as indeed it is. As Jack Goody 
observes, the introduction of writing is “not simply a matter of adding a new channel, since that 
addition alters the nature and especially the content of existing channels.”203 Yet, even within 
literate traditions, orality and literacy are not mutually exclusive; they “commingle” and occupy 
the same “communicative space.”204 
Writing stores information which has semantic links to various concepts and meanings. 
What is stored in writing is a deep wealth of cultural information accessible because of the 
personal connections an individual has made to the recorded material. However, if a person does 
not speak the language in which the book or document is written, or they do not have the cultural 
or technical framework to understand what is inside the book, then the book does not contain any 
more information than any other material item. It is unclear how the conditionality presented by 
literacy differs from the way artefacts, material items, and other collective repositories of 
important cultural information function within oral traditions.  
Others seem well aware of this discrepancy. As Ethan Cochrane notes, ultimately dual-
inheritance theory is concerned with empirical records of human behaviour, so when the material 
record needs to be stressed, dual-inheritance theory is ill-equipped to handle the demand.205 Yet, 
as Robert Aunger, a memeticist, observes, artefacts are deeply significant in understanding 
cultural evolution and condemns the significant void within cultural evolutionary scholarship 
when it comes to artefacts, an absence that strikes him as strange since many modern day 
artefacts clearly have complex features that are inherited, which indicates that they, too, 
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evolve.206 Ilya Tëmkin and Miles Eldredge take this argument one step further, arguing that the 
study of material culture demonstrates that the application of biological processes of evolution to 
culture is insufficient. When considered in the context of its historicity, culture proves too 
complex for its infrastructure to be encapsulated by biological evolution which does not have the 
utility to sufficiently accommodate historical patterns.207 Tā moko proves especially unique 
within this debate, as it serves as both behaviour and artefact, highlighting the struggle of dual-
inheritance theory to account for its materiality, particularly when involved in the formation of 
semantic linkages through Māori transmissive processes.  
In the non-Māori world, the informative value of moko still largely goes unnoticed to 
those without the cultural group framework to understand that the marks express and retain 
certain information for those with the right skills and knowledge to decipher it. For those without 
such skills and contextual framework, moko can be dismissed as little different from other 
tattoos found round the world, a pretty design with little meaning. However, for Māori and those 
with the appropriate knowledge, moko held and continues to retain semantic links to Māori 
people which are integral to shaping Māori holistic reality, similar to those found in a book 
amongst longstanding written traditions.208 
As becomes apparent in Chapter Two, moko retains information that has semantic links 
to certain information, like whakapapa (genealogy), that is central to the ontological world and 
meanings woven into the fabric of Māori group life. The inability of dual-inheritance theory to 
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acknowledge the informative value of a practice like tā moko comes solely from the fact that the 
information therein, for the most part, is inaccessible to group outsiders, rather than from any 
actual deficit of information retained within moko itself. To those with the appropriate 
knowledge and specifically developed semantic network, moko and tā moko continues to 
establish and uphold semantic links to relevant concepts and meanings for Māori. 
Whilst Boyd and Richerson aptly acknowledge the role of both genes and social learning 
in the process of cultural evolution, an important part of social learning also has to do with what 
is stored in the environment which requires conservation and retrieval mechanisms, like moko, 
beyond individual cognition. In order for transmission to be effective and sustained, some sort of 
deeply embedded schema needs to be established in which transmissive contents are linked to 
information already anchored in the social and cultural environment.209 Practices like tā moko 
provide mechanisms, aside from writing, through which such linkages can be cultivated and 
maintained, a point for which dual-inheritance theory cannot adequately account. To dismiss 
these connections is to dismiss, not only the informative value and cultural significance of tā 
moko for Māori, but it is to diminish the complexity of Māori culture and to perpetuate a climate 
of alterity beneath the guise of objective science.  
Niche Construction Theory 
A different problem arises if we examine niche-construction theory, an offshoot of dual-
inheritance theory. Niche construction theory maintains that when organisms alter their 
environments, selection pressures within their own and the surrounding environments are 
affected. John Odling-Smee, Kevin Laland, and Feldman contend that the introduction of 
ecological inheritance into the dual-inheritance model provides another, often overlooked, way 
                                                 




for culture to alter genetics. Attention is drawn to the idea that selection pressures, resulting from 
the construction of human niches, generationally cause certain genes to have greater frequency in 
a given population. This assertion is then used to argue that the evolution of culture cannot be 
understood until the genetic effects of human behaviours which alter selection processes are 
isolated. 
Niche construction theory maintains that for culture to be inherited “non-genetic” means 
of transmitting information must exist so that information central to the group can be passed 
down. However, this information must be able to be broken down into smaller “chunks” of 
information to make transmission easier. Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman further their stance, 
arguing that artefacts and “other ecologically inherited resources” are by-products of niche 
construction which, aside from affecting biological selection pressures, also affect social learning 
and influence cultural traditions. However, challenges arise when the authors introduce their 
example of exactly how artefacts and other ecological by-products function. 
 Citing Jarrod Diamond, Odling-Smee, Laland, and Feldman build upon the example of 
how the development of larger human settlements (i.e. cities) results in the creation of new 
threats to health (i.e. more germs and disease).210 Response to this threat happens in three ways: 
culturally, ontologically, and/or genetically. Genetically, selection pressures will likely favour 
those who are genotypically resistant to the threat. Ontologically, humans’ immunity to the threat 
will increase through the creation of antibodies; culturally, new human constructions, like 
hospitals and medicines, will emerge. 
What is fundamental to niche construction theory is that it is the cultural development of 
larger human groups which causes environmental repercussions that affect humans on a cultural, 
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ontological, and genetic level. In turn, these effects feed back into the human group, forming a 
constant loop between humans and environment. The following example of the West African 
yam farmers demonstrates how niche construction works. 
Yam cultivation in West Africa has led to an increase in frequency of the allele that 
triggers sickle-cell anaemia. After yam farmers clear rainforest areas for farming, more pools of 
standing water form. More standing water allows for more mosquito breeding habitats, which 
may also be carrying malaria. Because the sickle-cell anaemia allele lowers one’s susceptibility 
to malaria, as the mosquito population increases, selection for the protective allele increases.211  
However, if we consider a cultural practice like tā moko within the model, difficulties in 
its application begin to emerge. For example, niche construction theory demands a change in 
environment which, in turn, changes selection pressures. Although the historical and 
ethnographic evidence substantiates changes to selection pressures, particularly during 
colonisation, tā moko does not fit the environment-selection pressure change pattern.  
Consider once pre-contact Māori groups settled Aotearoa (New Zealand) and developed a 
thriving culture of carving and art resulting in the development of tā moko. The case could be 
made that, as tā moko began to thrive, new spaces needed to be delineated as areas for the 
procedure; or, as the demand for tā moko increased, pressure was placed upon those natural 
resources required for the procedure, such as the albatross whose bones were used for uhi and the 
kauri tree sometimes used for ink.212 Yet, that is where the chain of causation ceases. It cannot be 
proved that there were ontological or genetic ramifications caused by the development of or 
changes to tā moko. Niche construction theory is not able to add to our understanding of tā 
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moko, because there is no evidence that tā moko altered environmental selection pressures 
resulting in the feedback loop that epitomises niche construction. Not only does one have to 
establish that tā moko directly affected environmental selection pressures, but one also has to 
prove that the shift in selective processes, in turn, changed biological selection causing certain 
genes to appear more frequently amongst pre-contact Māori people. At this point, there simply is 
no supporting data. Although niche construction theory has proved an effective model for sickle-
cell anaemia and lactose intolerance, its utility appears to falter when confronted by other 
cultural practices like tā moko.213  
Meme Theory 
Meme theory is one of the first, robust cultural evolutionary theories. Meme theory contends that 
humans are the vehicles for their genes, which drive both humans and culture. A gene’s goal is 
persistence via replication, a process that favours selfishness. Dawkins maintains that the gene’s 
selfishness spills over into human behaviour, causing it to be mostly selfish and only limitedly 
altruistic in nature.214  
Since culture is fundamentally human, Dawkins believes there must be a cultural 
equivalent to the gene and seeks to determine what that cultural counterpart might be. His efforts 
led to the development of the meme, which operates as a cultural replicator in much the same 
way genes within humans do.215 A meme is “a unit of information residing in a brain,” that takes 
on whatever structure the storage mechanism of the brain uses to hold information.216 The 
success of a meme is dictated by how much it affects one’s behaviour. Behavioural effect 
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depends upon the environmental circumstances of the meme and is affected by both the genetic 
composition of a population and the types of memes already present within the group.217 Like 
genes that travel through human lineages via reproduction, memes are transmitted between 
brains via imitation.218  
Meme theory has proven to have tools that other cultural evolutionary theories do not, 
specifically in its ability to account for the role of artefacts within cultural evolution.219 For 
instance, in attempting to explain why groups from similar natural environments develop 
different behaviours and beliefs, Aunger argues that derivations result from each group changing 
their surrounding environments in substantially different ways, hence culture. Although this view 
is similar to niche construction theory, a point that Aunger himself notes, the similarities stop 
with his assertion that the adoption of cultural traits via social learning happens through 
relationships and exchanges with artefacts passed down through the generations, rather than 
through interactions with people.220 Because artefacts do not themselves evolve, Aunger believes 
that “the making of artefacts” is an instrumental part of niche construction and an activity that 
deeply affects cultural selective processes.221  
One of Aunger’s key observations is that the development of “complex artefacts,” 
enables humans to have cumulative culture. To Aunger, artefacts are central to group selection 
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pressures because they often endure much longer than the organism itself, in this case the human, 
does.222 In Aunger’s own words, ““big culture” is not necessarily a function of big brains per se 
but rather of the ability to produce complex artifacts.”223 This realisation prompts Aunger’s 
proposal of a cultural niche which takes into account that human culture is “is also defined by 
material adaptations: our physically constructed environment as a storehouse of cultural 
information,” with the artefact as the “mediator” of transmission, instead of social learning.224  
The absence of artefacts in discussions of cultural evolution prompts Aunger to ask 
questions of niche construction theory, like why there is no investigation into the feedback loop 
from artefacts into culture; why are genetic consequences only taken into account.225 From this 
realisation, Aunger proposes a meme/artefact co-evolutionary theory to explain cultural change, 
which maintains that memes and artefacts are equally important in the way a cultural group 
evolves. 
  Although Aunger extends meme theory to introduce a novel and key assertion that 
artefacts play a central role within cultural evolution and are instrumental in the evolution of 
cultural groups, a point which is echoed by actor-network theory, meme theory suffers from a 
lack of clarity on a number of points which challenges its explanatory power for certain cultural 
practices, like tā moko. One such criticism is that it proves difficult to isolate what unit of culture 
is comparable to the gene, which contributes to general scepticism about meme theory’s 
utility.226 Maurice Bloch argues that culture does not “normally divide up into naturally 
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discernible bits.”227 To this, Kate Distin counters that although memes are subject to mutation, 
this does not differ from the threat of mutation which exists in the process of genetic 
replication.228 Yet, this rebuttal does not really resolve issues of unit of selection in real, cultural 
examples. 
Again, I turn to Māori tā moko to illustrate this concern. As the exploration of tā moko 
narratives in Chapter Two reveals, tā moko is comprised of many parts and processes that work 
together under the label of tā moko. The ink, implements, and designs differ from region to 
region, time period to time period, tohunga to tohunga, and mau moko to mau moko. Pākehā 
understandings of tā moko differed from Māori views. Yet tā moko, regardless of these 
numerous variations, is considered a single meme. Is a moko from the Gisborne area the same as 
one from Te Tai Tokerau (Northland)? Is a pre-contact moko the same as one acquired today? 
Certainly the designs and tohunga-tā-moko implementing the designs differed; so what meme is 
being replicated—facial tattoo? Facial tattoo as the meme is also problematic, because facial 
tattooing is practiced in other areas throughout the world; so how does the facial tattooing meme 
of Māori cultural groups differ from that found elsewhere? For memes to be a unit for measuring 
culture akin to the gene, the exact unit must be able to be discerned, and, though Distin argues 
that discrete units of information are discernible, the case of Māori tā moko leaves me sceptical.  
According to many proponents of meme theory, the meme is the agent and humans are its 
hosts. Dan Dennett and Susan Blackmore go so far as to deny that the mind has “intentionality 
and consciousness.”229 The implication is that humans are niches memes create. However, the 
concept of the meme as its own agent is difficult to grasp and is not really explained by a 
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majority of memetics literature. How can an idea be its own agent? What, if not the human, 
drives the idea? Who, if not humans, “invents” the base phenotypes for memes? According to 
many memeticists, humans have no direct say in whether information will be passed on or not, 
rather memes and genetics determine our evolutionary course.230 
Consider the following example provided by Aunger. Aunger encourages us to think of a 
wagon and imagine that we do not know what it is or what it does, and no one is there with us to 
explain it. According to Aunger, the wagon, even without explanation, conveys a great deal of 
information to the bystander. It signifies motion, something all humans are accustomed to 
because of our innate ability to move. If the wagon transports either people or things, it conveys 
to the onlooker information about how goods and/or people are moved from one place to another 
in that area. It signifies that it was built in order to carry things; suggesting that perhaps loads are 
too cumbersome to carry by hand. All of this information and more is stored in the wagon and is 
transmitted from wagon to onlooker. To explain this phenomenon, Aunger uses memetics, where 
“the very act of perceiving the wagon alone causes the meme to leap off the wagon and into the 
perceiving mind.”231  
Despite the need for further clarification, Aunger’s stalwart position of the integral role 
artefacts and storages play in the construction and evolution of culture directly conflicts with 
dual-inheritance theory’s view of cultural evolution which hinges upon selective, social learning 
taking place between individuals and within human groups. Simultaneously, meme theory builds 
upon niche construction theory by extending feedback loops to interactions between humans and 
artefacts. Specifically, Aunger provides a counter argument to Boyd and Richerson’s dismissal 
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of the transmissive value of artefacts and other cultural means of transmission, aside from those 
within literate traditions which overlaps with the integration of inanimate and non-human agents 
in actor-network theory. There is no question that selective, social learning is an integral part of 
cultural groups, but learning does not lend itself to quantitative analysis, because it is not a 
readily “observable” phenomenon. Though meme theory has potential to address facets of 
cultural evolution, particularly within non-literate traditions, by taking into account the role of 
artefacts in the construction and dissemination of culture, to realise the full scope of its utility 
would require that the issues outlined above be addressed.  
Lombros Malafouris, offers an alternative to Aunger’s memetic treatment of artefacts, 
one which prefaces later arguments made in Chapter Four. Specifically, Malafouris diverges in 
his view of causal agency. Instead of maintaining the dichotomy between agent and object, 
Malafouris, who has coined the term material agency, upholds that “if human agency is then 
material agency is, there is no way that human agency and material agency can be 
disentangled.”232 To go deeper into the brain limits our understanding of “causal agency,” which, 
instead, exists in “the interface between brains, bodies, and things.” Thus, to Malafouris, the 
“ultimate cause of actions” transcends any agent, human or non, but, rather, “is the flow of 
activity itself.”233  
Malafouris’ stance anticipates the introduction of transmissive assemblage in Chapter 
Four of this study, which employs actor-network theory, indigenous ontological perspectivism, 
and Kaupapa Māori as a means to encourage us to forgo our preoccupation with causal agency so 
prevalent throughout evolutionary explanations of culture and, instead, focus our attentions on 
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the networks formed between agents when associations are traced.234 Tracing associations allows 
us to honour the fluidity of agency without being bound by the parameters of the agents 
themselves. As Malafouris argues, “agency is in constant flux, an in-between state that 
constantly violates and transgresses the physical boundaries of the elements that constitute it.”235 
Thus, it is in our best interests to seek out or develop alternative evolutionary explanations of 
culture which are not, themselves, bound to static conceptions of agency which ultimately 
undermine the inherent dynamicity of culture. 
One might expect that enquiries into the biological facets of human culture might 
facilitate a more holistic portrayal of culture. Instead, more often, we are left with a view of what 
we call culture that is individualised and human-centric, rather than integrative and holistic. 
Indeed, what remains is a sense that evolutionary explanations of culture have the power to 
identify specific mechanisms and selection processes by which cultural practices are shaped, yet 
which remain unidentified within the group from which the practice derives—that it is only 
through science that we can understand the reality of culture, both its development and evolution.  
However, as demonstrated above, when specific case studies are introduced, important 
questions about the explanatory power of evolutionary explanations of culture begin to arise, and 
frameworks praised for their simplicity actually seem to complicate matters. In part, the 
difficulties presented by the trail of remaining questions are a result of the ahistorical tendency of 
evolutionary explanations. Generally, evolutionary explanations tend to place greater emphasis 
on the plasticity of cultural variants because of their need to accommodate rapid environmental 
change in order to be successful; yet, evolutionary explanations frequently have atemporal or 
fixed orientations. When case studies involving a particular cultural practice are used, I often 
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find myself confused about which time period is being referenced, as many cultural practices 
span centuries, and we are left unclear on which selective mechanisms resulted in the origination 
of a practice and whether those also shift through time. 
To further elucidate questions and issues that emerge through the employment of 
evolutionary explanations to culture, this study is devoted to an investigation of tā moko through 
the lens of yet another evolutionary explanation: costly signalling theory. I chose this example 
because it clearly illustrates concerns, especially those of a politico-ethical nature, that arise 
when evolutionary explanation is confronted with a multi-faceted, indigenous cultural practice 
that spans centuries. Moreover, it illuminates the conflict between scientific and indigenous 
narratives of cultural practice, in this case Māori tā moko. However, it is first necessary to 
contextualise costly signalling theory within the framework of human behavioural ecology. 
Human Behavioural Ecology 
Costly signalling theory is rooted in the theoretical tradition of human behavioural ecology. 
Human behavioural ecology involves the application of the theory which underlies animal 
behavioural ecology to humans with the aim of determining the extent to which a behaviour is 
adapted to suit a given environment.236 As Smith explains, human behavioural ecology is based 
upon five primary assumptions, including ecological selectionism, the piecemeal approach, 
modelling, an emphasis on “decision rules or conditional strategies,” and the phenotypic 
gambit.237 Ecological selectionism is the analysis of a given behaviour by inquiring as to what 
“ecological forces” cause that behaviour to be selected for. The piecemeal approach maintains 
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that “socioecological phenomenon” are best understood utilizing a reductionist (or piece by 
piece) strategy, as opposed to a holistic approach.238 Within the piecemeal approach, complex 
issues are reduced into a specific “set of component decisions and constraints such as the female 
preferences for mate characteristics, male preferences, the distribution of these characteristics in 
the population, the ecological and historical determinants of this distribution, and so on.”239 
Simple analytical models are then created to test the hypotheses generated by the piecemeal 
approach. These models tend to be designed around conditional strategies which focus on the 
covariation of socioecological environment and behaviour. As such, studies within human 
behavioural ecology typically seek to account for “behavior variation as adaptive responses to 
environmental variation.”240 Smith expounds that, by and large, human behavioural ecologists 
“assume that this adaptive variation (facultative behavior, phenotypic result) is governed by 
evolved mechanisms that instantiate the relevant conditional strategy or decision rule.”241 This 
assumption comprises part of the phenotypic gambit, as coined by Grafen in 1984, which refers 
to the idea that models and their underlying hypotheses need not take into account “genetic, 
phylogenetic, and cognitive constraints on phenotypic adaptation,” since their effects are 
minimal.242 To clarify using Grafen’s own words:  
“the phenotypic gambit is to examine the evolutionary basis of a character as if the 
very simplest genetic system controlled it: as if there were a haploid locus at which 
each distinct strategy was represented by a distinct allele, as if the payoff rule gave  
the number of each offspring for each allele, and as if enough mutation occurred to  
allow each strategy the change to invade.”243  
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The implication is that every strategy in a given population is equally successful. 
Human behavioural ecology stems from a convergence of three major theoretical 
traditions. One of those traditions comes by way of population biology and ethology which, in 
the 1960s and 70s, developed an evolutionary biological approach applied to animals.244 
Although Wilson’s Sociobiology is often accredited with the commencement of this tradition, 
characterised by a burgeoning interest in exploring human behavioural diversity through a 
Darwinian framework, his work is more accurately understood as a systematization of prior 
research.245 At the heart of this early body of research from which Wilson draws, are W.D. 
Hamilton’s theory 1963 article on inclusive fitness and kin selection and V.C. Wynne-Edwards’s 
hypotheses regarding levels of selection.246 Other papers and studies produced during this time, 
such as Robert Trivers’ work on reciprocal altruism, W.D. Hamilton’s theory on inclusive fitness 
and kin selection, and George Williams’ illumination of the levels of selection “at which 
adaptations are most likely to evolve,” resulted in the development of a corpus of theories bound 
by “a coherent perspective” that the “forces of natural selection” are also exerted upon human 
behaviour.247 Irons and Napoleon Chagnon also entered the conversation and began applying 
                                                 
244 Cronk, “Behavioral Ecology,” 26. 
245 Ibid. 
246 V.C. Wynne-Edwards, Animal Dispersion: In Relation to Social Behavior (New York: Hafner, 1962); “The 
Evolution of Altruistic Behavior,” The American Naturalist 97, no. 897 (Sept.-Oct., 1963): 354-6. Although 
Hamilton introduces the concept of inclusive fitness in his 1963 article, he does not utilise the term inclusive fitness 
until 1964. For this initial usage, see: W.D. Hamilton, “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour II,” Journal of 
Theoretical Biology 7 (1964): 17-52.  
247 Cronk, Chagnon, and Irons, eds., “Adaptation and Human Behavior,” 4; Trivers, “Reciprocal Altruism,” 35-57. 
For Trivers’ current views on reciprocal altruism, see Robert L. Trivers, “Chapter Four: Reciprocal Altruism: 30 
Years Later,” in Cooperation in Primates and Humans: Mechanisms and Evolution, eds. Peter Kaeppeler and Carel 
P. van Schaik (Berlin; Heidelberg, Germany: Springer Verlag, 2006), 67-84. For Williams’ early discussion of 
levels of selection see George C. Williams and Doris C. Williams, “Natural Selection of Harmful Social Adaptations 
among Sibs with Special Preference to Social Insects,” Evolution 11, no. 1 (Mar., 1957): 32-9 and George C. 
Williams, “Natural Selection, the Costs of Reproduction, and a Refinement of Lack’s Principle,” The American 
Naturalist 100, no. 916 (Nov.-Dec., 1966): 687-90. For an anthology of significant work in these areas during the 




evolutionary theory to cultural anthropology, integrating selectionist hypotheses into their 
extensive fieldwork involving the Yomut Turkman and Yanomami, respectively.248 Throughout 
the 1970s, others, such as Zahavi who delved into cheating to explore how honest correlations 
between observed signals and unobserved qualities could be stabilised, followed suit and 
evolutionary theory was applied to a myriad of field research, from social stratification to 
infanticide.249 
  The second tradition responsible for the development of human behavioural ecology is 
ecological anthropology. Within this tradition, researchers, such as Julian Steward, began to 
develop a connection between the environment and human groups.250 Once established, this 
linkage made for fertile grounds for scholarly exploration and resulted in the emergence of a 
group of neofunctionalist ecological anthropologists, including Roy Rappaport and Andrew 
Vayda, who were amongst the first to advocate the fruitfulness of using of concepts extracted 
from ecology and evolutionary biology to study humans.251 Other scholars, influenced by the 
work of early anthropologists, like Lionel Tiger, Robin Fox, Robert Hinde, and Richard 
Alexander, eventually shifted away from the neofunctionalists’ promotion of group selection and 
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population regulation, choosing, instead, to focus their attention to debates within evolutionary 
theory, such as “levels of selection, animal social behavior, and sexual selection.”252  
The extensive development of game theory in the 1970s, combined with anthropology’s 
more prevalent use of “actor-based, methodologically individualist approaches” which 
overlapped with the increasing advancement of individual-level selection within animal 
behaviour and evolutionary biology, account for the third tradition.253 Although Richard C. 
Lewontin is responsible for the initial introduction of game theory to evolutionary biology in 
1961, it was not until 1973 when John Maynard Smith and George R. Price published “The 
Logic of Animal Conflict” that the notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (a strategy that is 
stable under the processes of natural selection) became widespread.254 A decade later, two 
pivotal pieces emerged: Maynard-Smith’s Evolution and the Theory of Games and The Evolution 
of Cooperation by Robert Axelrod.255 Such work was instrumental in guiding the trajectory of 
human behavioural ecology by modelling the adaptive behaviour that humans exhibit in response 
to a wide variety of environmental variables. 
However, not everyone welcomed the application of evolutionary theory into other 
disciplines, particularly within anthropology. Whilst early labours paved the way for Wilson to 
collate findings from population biology and ethology to present a coherent narrative on 
sociobiology and to suggest the benefits, effects, and future of framing human social behaviour 
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with evolutionary theory, Eliot Chapple condemned Wilson’s Sociobiology as the worst book of 
the year.256 Though others, like Sahlins and Margaret Mead, were critical of sociobiology and 
generally opposed to its use, they voted against a motion presented at the 1976 meeting of the 
American Anthropological Association to “condemn sociobiology.”257 Mead, specifically, was 
reluctant to pass a motion that might regard evolutionary theory as unbeneficial in any 
circumstances, whilst Sahlins, who maintained that sociobiology was “politically dangerous” and 
“logically and empirically indefensible,” did not wish to turn sociobiologists into “martyrs.”258 
Furthermore, Sahlins objected on the grounds that the introduction of sociobiology is a 
projection of the “capitalist ethic of competition onto the natural world,” insinuating that the 
naturalness of capitalism makes it “inevitable.”259 Ironically, Sahlins’ vehement and long-
standing critique of sociobiology, which spawned much debate, furthered discussions and 
research into human behavioural ecology and evolutionary biology and resulted in the advance 
of costly signalling theory.260 
Though Sahlins’ critique spurred essential debate, Irons’ objections to his critiques of 
evolutionary biology are warranted. Claims thrust upon evolutionary explanations whereby 
selectionist thinking is portrayed as “dangerous” and “scientifically unsound” are largely 
indefensible.261 Early anti-biological determinist proponents who sided with Sahlins, claiming 
that evolutionary explanations maintain that “present human social arrangements are either 
unchangeable or, if altered, will demand continued conscious social control because these 
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conditions will be “unnatural,” were in error.262 Yet, despite the misguided nature of their 
understanding of the science behind evolutionary explanations of culture, as this study affirms, 
early objectors do make a crucial point in that often evolutionary explanations are asymmetrical 
and non-reflexive, a trend which still occurs today.  
Costly Signalling Theory 
Costly signalling theory is designed to account for the continuation of high cost behaviours 
within human groups. For example, Māori tā moko is a practice which, since its discovery by 
Europeans, has conjured deep and conflicting emotions for Westerners. Early Europeans writers 
frequently described moko as “disfigurement” or “barbarous.” 263 Laws, like the Tohunga 
Suppression Act of 1907 which banned traditional Māori practices, have been interpreted as the 
result of Pākehā repugnance toward tā moko; although, it should be pointed out that Māmari 
Stephens has argued that its colonialist aims may have been overstated.264  
However, recent cases indicate that people are still intrigued and sometimes frightened by 
moko, and mau moko, those who wear moko, still face discrimination. In 2013, an Air New 
Zealand flight attendant candidate had her interview cut short when the interviewer realised that 
she had moko on her lower arm that could not be covered by the required uniform. When 
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questioned about the incident, an Air New Zealand spokesperson reportedly described tattoos as 
“frightening or intimidating,” despite the New Zealand Human Rights Commission’s declaration 
that, “a person of Māori descent may not be denied employment, entry to premises, or declined 
service because they wear moko visibly.”265 In 2009, Mark Kopua, a practising tohunga-tā-
moko, was turned away from Christchurch’s Bourbon Bar after a bouncer identified his pukanohi 
(full male facial moko) as gang related rather than a cultural marker of identity; though the two 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, since Māori gangs played a significant role in the 
perpetuation of moko.266 These two examples illustrate the polarising nature of moko. On one 
hand, people find it off-putting and offensive; on the other, tā moko is considered to be a deeply 
significant mark of belonging and identity, admired around the world.  
However, Māori are not the only people with an intense ritualised practice like tā moko; 
groups around the world consistently engage in behaviours that appear highly costly. Many of 
these activities are deemed altruistic in nature, gauged by significant signaller costs in terms of 
lost time, money, resources, or other valued human commodities and by the valuable information 
relayed to the receiver upon which decisions are based.267 Though commonplace, the occurrence 
of costly behaviours within cultural groups is evolutionarily unpredictable, because the tenets of 
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natural selection mandate that high-cost behaviours that require varying degrees of sacrifice 
should disappear over time, since they pose a direct threat to individual survival and 
reproduction. 
According to costly signalling theory, costly behaviours are biological adaptations that 
ensure within-group cooperation.268 Cooperative adaptations determine the success of groups, 
since groups without such strategies cannot function as effectively as those with.269 Costly acts 
are perpetuated within human groups because of the vital information they communicate about 
one’s willingness to cooperate with others (commitment) and/or one’s possession of a certain 
phenotypic trait.270 Since groups rely on cooperation, certain “within group” mechanisms are 
established in hopes of revealing not only co-operators and traits that favour cooperation or 
evolutionary success but also defectors, free-riders, and others who threaten group solidarity.271 
Engagement in altruistic or high-cost behaviours has also been shown to correlate to one’s 
“within group” status.272 Specifically, signallers of high quality have been shown to have greater 
success in attracting high quality mates and in forming alliances than other, lower quality 
signallers; a trend which also helps to explain the continuation of behaviours that seem 
evolutionarily disadvantageous.273 
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 A behaviour must meet four criteria to be labelled as costly.274 The first criterion 
mandates that a signal is observable, though what the signal refers to is an “unobservable” 
quality that varies within a given population.275 Secondly, signallers must incur a cost that is 
bound to the advertised attribute.276 Thirdly, the benefits and costs of a signal come from the 
signaller’s transmission of truthful data “about variation in the underlying quality being 
advertised.”277 Benefits and costs incurred by the signaller must also vary and must correspond 
to a specific phenotypic trait the signaller possesses.278 Fourthly, the payoff for signallers and 
receivers is generated by the accuracy of the information the signal provides—its efficacy. A 
receiver must utilise the broadcast signal as a heuristic to quickly determine whether a signaller 
is competition, mate, or ally, rather than relying on more costly processes of trying to assess a 
signaller’s “abilities, qualities, or motivations.”279 Broadcasted qualities can include any number 
of characteristics that indicate the signaller’s fitness, including health, athletic prowess, 
possession of certain genetic traits, wealth, and/or numerous others. 
Zahavi, amongst others, has argued that the high costs associated with certain signals, 
either “behavioural or morphological,” is intended to ensure the successful transmission of high-
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fidelity information beneficial to both the signaller and receiver.280 Advocates of this position 
maintain that for sustained cooperation within groups, it is imperative that honest signals evolve 
to deter defectors. High costs ensure that the information signalled is accurate and hard-to-fake. 
Since only high quality individuals, those who can afford the costs, can signal, the presumption 
is that others are prevented from faking or deceiving receivers.281 However, this signaller-centric 
view, which focuses on the strategic costs or handicaps that signallers are perceived to incur, 
ignores the cost of deception; and, as James Higham asserts, honest signals lacking strategic 
costs are widely known.282  
Potential costs are also a significant component of honest signalling. According to 
Higham, “punishment of cheaters” is a key potential cost within the costly signalling paradigm. 
Individuals who attempt to cheat the signal and end up giving an inaccurate signal will 
potentially face a significant cost for their attempt at deception.283 Higham maintains that the real 
measure for honest signalling is that “there must be a cost associated with cheating that 
outweighs its benefits.”284 Thus, costs incurred for cheating are perhaps the most salient feature 
of costly signalling, because without them little exists to deter free-riders or deceptive signallers 
who wish to advertise a quality they either do not possess to the degree their signal indicates or 
that they do not have at all, both of which undermine group solidarity. 
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Utilising the specific criteria costly signalling proposes for signals, in conjunction with the 
interpretive evidence, the Cisco case study suggests that it is possible to determine what signal 
moko was intended to broadcast. By isolating signal contents and rationale, Cisco argues we are 
better placed to understand the reasons behind its perpetuation, since the information the signal is 
reportedly broadcasting can be tracked through time. Accordingly, any variations in 
informational content can be analysed to determine if and/or how the signal has been adapted to 
fit different environmental and social circumstances, which can be used to illuminate, through a 
process of reverse-engineering, what challenges Māori faced that made tā moko an effective 
solution. 
 Yet, the tā moko narrative the Cisco case study constructs is just one of many. As the 
following chapter demonstrates, tā moko has many narratives. Indeed, both Pākehā and Māori 
have their own understandings of tā moko which conflict with each other and with Cisco’s 
interpretation. However, in this cacophony, the Western voice tends to drown out Māori views of 
themselves and their own practices. Whilst science is an invaluable tool, we must be aware of the 
specific politico-ethical challenges the employment of science as a methodology to understand 
indigenous practices poses to indigenous peoples. Laurelyn Whitt cautions that “rather than the 
theft and settling of indigenous lands, the colonisation at issue involves, in part, their 
transformation through the wholesale exportation of the microworlds of western science onto 
them.”285 Indeed, a sentiment remains that indigenous peoples’ explanations of their own 
practices are not scientific enough, and thus not accurate, since they come from a “cultural” 
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background. This view, however, overlooks the fact that Western science has its own cultural 
roots which are often clouded by claims of its “universality” and “transcultural” reaches.286 
Semali and Kincheloe further add that “in the process of ascribing worth to indigenous 
knowledge, such analysis implicitly relegates it to a lower order of knowledge production.”287 
Yet, as this study intends to show, to provide more symmetrical and balanced evolutionary 
explanations of cultural practice requires that evolutionary explanations evolve into more 
integrative versions of themselves.  
The first step in this process is to cultivate an awareness that there is never a single 
narrative of a cultural practice; rather, our conceptions of cultural practice are derived from 
heteroglossia. To locate heteroglossia in the context of tā moko, Chapter Two is devoted to an 
exploration of tā moko narratives from Pākehā and Māori perspectives. Within it, I seek to 
contextualise the narratives that have shaped tā moko, paying particular attention to the conflict 
between Western and Māori views of the practice. Furthermore, I draw attention to the impact of 
Western narratives of tā moko on the perception of Māori as other and on its effects for Māori 
identity and practice. By shifting away from the linearity which homoglossia supports, we are 
able to begin affirming the dynamic contexts which frame the historicity of tā moko and set the 
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To understand why evolutionary explanations of culture, themselves, need to evolve and how we 
might accomplish this, we must first discern the ways in which they are currently employed. In 
Chapter One, I have already briefly begun to examine evolutionary explanations in their human 
behavioural ecology and cultural evolutionary forms. However, since, in this thesis, I utilise 
Cisco’s treatment of tā moko through the lens of costly signalling theory as a means to 
commence discussions on the evolution of evolutionary explanations of culture, understanding 
the narratives that inform tā moko is paramount. My approach to these narratives is 
predominantly chronological, tracing their progression from the narrative of Mataora to the 
present day. By no means are the narratives presented here an exhaustive list, but they have been 
selected either because they are sources which Cisco utilises to bracket her study of tā moko, or 
they are significant sources Cisco omitted from her treatise. My primary aim is to unpack the 
differences in the lenses Māori and Pākehā utilise to view tā moko but also to promote 
heteroglossia. Understanding these lenses will help us, in Chapter Three, to employ the Cisco 
case study to grasp the broader ramifications of the choices scholars make regarding how to 
fashion the material they elect to utilise to shape their case studies when applying evolutionary 
explanation to cultural practice.  
 Heteroglossia is a key component of decolonisation. To not incorporate Pākehā into the 
narrative of tā moko or, conversely, to only focus on Pākehā narratives, also perpetuates what 
Joy calls the “dualistic division,” between “unified subject,” whether that is the coloniser or 
87 
 
scholarly enquirer and “the object/other” upon whom these categories of difference are thrust.288 
Moreover, to rely on a singular lens denounces the power of the narrative assemblage to help us 
avoid the mirage by discovering and recognising existing narratives, rather than constructing the 
narratives that we want to be there, that we expect should be, or that are more comfortable for us. 
To fully decolonise tā moko requires that both Māori and Pākehā narratives, in their many forms, 
be allowed to speak and bring to the table whatever it is that they bring, without censorship. Like 
the terms indigenous and indigenous peoples, the categories of Māori and Pākehā are to be 
understood relationally as umbrellas encapsulating shared experiences, rather than as 
essentialising conceptual dichotomies.  
 After a brief, general introduction to tā moko narratives, the discussion transitions to pre-
colonisation tā moko narratives and, specifically, the Mataora narrative. Following this 
discussion, I explore early Pākehā narratives and their effects upon the perceptions of tā moko. I 
then turn to tā moko narratives within the 1950s-1990s time span. This was a critical time for 
Māori in redefining their identities in an early post-colonial context, yet Pākehā narratives on tā 
moko were still dominant. Tā moko narratives presented in this section reveal the dynamics 
between Māori efforts to shift from marginalisation and misrepresentation into a place of 
reclamation and renaissance and Pākehā roles in and reactions to that move. Lastly, the chapter 
ends with a discussion of the current state of tā moko narratives with particular emphasis on their 
linkage to Māori identity. 
For Māori, tā moko has continually been a way of being in the world—a living, 
ontological narrative upon the face. Korere reflects on her moko kauae: “You get a lot of 
curiosity stares…I forget sometimes until they stare.”289 As Linda Waimarie Nikora observes, 
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Korere’s forgetting of her moko kauae emphasises its lived quality. In part, the lived-ness of tā 
moko is due to its enduring nature. Tā moko shaped the experience of Māori long before the 
presence of Pākehā and continues to be integral to Māori narratives which define Māori holistic 
reality. Tā moko is part of the ritualised narrative of the Māori spiritual world, used to establish 
and preserve a continuous Māori tradition that helps to order the human experience by orienting 
the individual to his whakapapa which provides a holistic context that defines Māori existence 
and identity.  
 However, colonisation marked the end of a solely Māori narrative for tā moko. Māori 
practices became interpreted through European lenses, resulting in new narratives which both 
conflicted and blended with Māori perceptions of tā moko. Thus, whilst tā moko is a Māori 
practice and Māori have regained dominance in the discourse, Pākehā have also played a 
significant role in the shaping of tā moko narratives, largely through their ethnographic and 
historical recordings of the practice. Clifford and George Marcus remind us that ethnography 
plays a key role in the construction of, rather than merely some kind of of neutral “representation 
of cultures.”290 Of ethnography, Clifford and Marcus suggest that it “codes and recodes, telling 
the grounds of collective order and diversity, inclusion and exclusion. It describes the processes 
of innovation and structuration, and is itself part of these processes.”291 To deny the influence of 
these early ethnographers in the shaping of the tradition of moko is to deny a dynamic and 
essential component of the identity of tā moko. Such denial also disavows the power and 
adaptability of Māori to live a practice against considerable odds.  
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Tā moko is a powerful Māori narrative and has endured despite tremendous pressures to 
eradicate it and absorb it within the colonial machine. Māori were adaptable enough to withstand 
these pressures and were able to mould tā moko into the living testament of endurance, identity, 
and unrelenting will it is today.292 Māori evolved, and, in turn, tā moko evolved. Yet, without 
granting Pākehā their voices, within this evolving tradition of tā moko through which “power 
and history work, in ways their authors cannot fully control,” we cannot come to understand the 
power and adaptability of Māori nor the tradition of tā moko.293    
  That said, without exception, every work is designed in some particular way.294 The same 
is true of the following discussion of tā moko. Within Māori groups, iwi, hapū, and whānau 
maintain their own narratives about tā moko and its meaning within their specific localities. 
Although there are a vast amount of Māori narratives regarding tā moko, many of these have not 
been written down and are difficult, particularly for non-Māori, to access.  
Discussions of Māori tā moko narratives from the past, which appear in the next section, 
have been limited to the narrative of Mataora. There are four main reasons for this decision. 
Firstly, and most obviously, the Mataora narrative is the most detailed account available in 
English translation. Secondly, despite its tremendous variation, the narrative of Mataora 
underscores mātauranga and tikanga Māori which are key to understanding Māori holistic reality 
and in highlighting Māori voices in a context of heteroglossia. Thirdly, the Mataora narrative is 
one of the most common Māori narratives of tā moko in circulation, prior to Pākehā presence in 
New Zealand and, thus, gets us closer to understanding the origination point from which a 
lineage of tā moko narratives began to develop. Doing so provides a clearer picture of the 
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conflicts that arose and imbedded themselves within tā moko narratives upon Pākehā arrival in 
Aotearoa and subsequent colonisation.  
Lastly, the narrative of Mataora “sets up a series of interventions between two worlds, the 
material and the spiritual, and correspondingly between correct and incorrect knowledge, 
between permanent and impermanent designs, between old and young.”295 Such dichtomisation 
sheds light on the deep relationality for Māori between agents, human and otherwise, which 
transcends agentic limitations more common to Western perceptions of cultural practice. 
Moreover, this network of interventions helps us to begin identifying some features non-agent 
focussed, decolonised explanations of tā moko might possess.  
Tā Moko Past 
Mataora Narrative  
The past of tā moko is a complex nexus of narratives interwoven with Māori and Pākehā 
elements; yet, this has not always been so. Māori had a rich repertoire of practice and belief prior 
to Pākehā presence in New Zealand (Aotearoa), many of which survive today. Prior to the 
introduction of writing by missionaries in the early 1800s, Māori utilised orality to create 
complex and urbane narratives about “the world and their place in it.”296 Māori myth and legend 
are part of a deep lineage, derived from Polynesian origins, which comprise the core of Māori 
knowledge carried through to the present from ancient times which shapes Māori holistic 
reality.297 As Reverend Māori Marsden and T.A. Henare eloquently reflect:  
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Myth and legend in the Maori cultural context are neither fables embodying  
primitive faith in the supernatural, nor marvellous fireside stories of ancient  
times. They were deliberate constructs employed by the ancient seers and  
sages to encapsulate and condense into easily assimilable forms their view  
of the world, of ultimate reality, and the relationship between the Creator, the  
universe and man.298 
 
It is imperative to acknowledge that the sentiment reflected in this quotation arises out of what 
can be understood as the indigenisation of Christianity within Maoridom. Since colonisation, tā 
moko has occurred within, alongside, and against this indigenisation of Christianity as it 
occurred within Maoridom and Maori religion which contributes to the continual evolution of 
tikanga Maori. 
Fiona Doig and Janet Davidson corroborate Marsden and Henare’s view, emphasising 
that Māori “traditions and myths are not just stories or fantastic events cast in the mists of time. 
They are meaningful and real in the sense that they validate our existence, order our chaos, and 
help guide our destiny.”299 Today, “stories, values, practices, and ways of knowing…continue to 
inform indigenous pedagogy” and remain central to the living, Māori oral tradition still in 
place.300 
Māori traditions and narratives are also flexible. T.P. Tawhai explains that the fluidity 
and flexibility of kōrero tawhito (ancient stories) is an essential component of their very nature, 
what Michael O’Connor and Angus MacFarlane refer to as “adaptive integrity.”301 The adaptive 
integrity of kōrero tawhito is reflected in their ability to be modified to shifting cultural climates, 
the circumstances of a specific event, and also how delivery and contents vary according to 
                                                 
298 Marsden and Henare, “Kaitiakitanga.”  
299 Fiona Doig and Janet Davidson, eds., Taonga Maori: Treasures of the New Zealand Maori People: An Exhibition 
from the Collections of the National Museum of New Zealand, (Te Whare Taonga o Aotearoa) (Sydney, N.S.W.: 
Australian Museum, 1989), 17. 
300 Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies, 14-5. 
301 O’Connor and MacFarlane, “Maori Stories,” 223. 
92 
 
specific traits of the chosen narrator.302 Such flexibility is a trait for which the written tradition 
does not accommodate, since it “tends to rigidify what has and should remain pliant.”303 
Allowing kōrero tawhito to remain flexible empowers their content and delivery to adapt to 
whatever are the prevalent issues of the day and whatever is the most effective means of 
addressing these issues.304 Because of their adaptive integrity, kōrero tawhito have been 
preserved through time, maintain contemporary and historical relevance, and help to reinforce 
linkages between modern Māori and their ancestors.  
 The sustainability of Māori narratives is not an uncommon story for indigenous peoples, 
many of whom have been able to maintain their holistic realities reinforced through their 
distinctive knowledge systems. However, such sustainability is remarkable “given that retention 
prevailed in the face of major social upheavals taking place as a result of transformative forces 
beyond their control.”305 Yet, it is important to reiterate that sustainability does not, necessarily, 
translate into a romanticised version of a Māori past, as the “lived experiences” generated 
through colonial and imperialist processes are now integral to the Māori narrative.306 
Like other Māori practices, tā moko has mythological origins which are integral to Māori 
tā moko narratives. According to Mitaki Ra, “the cut of the Gods” has appeared on faces since 
the dawn of time.307 Some maintain a connection between the word “moko” and Rūaumoko, the 
son of the primordial couple Ranginui and Papatūānuku, who is often connected to volcanic 
activity and earthquakes.308 Indeed, images conjured by the thoughts of an internal eruption 
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causing molten lava to cascade through ancient channels generates parallels to tā moko, where 
the contents of an individual, in the form of genealogy and ancestral linkages, are carved upon 
the face. As the ink flows through these crevasses, an indelible mark is left, new, but ultimately a 
relief against that which has always been—continually shaped and reshaped—enduring and 
known. References also link tā moko to the lizard which, in te reo Māori, also bears the name 
moko. Though explicit connections between tā moko and the moko or lizard are relatively 
uncommon, those few who support this connection parallel the lizard shedding its skin to tā 
moko, maintaining that both are symbolic of rebirth.309 
More commonly, Māori tā moko narratives involve Mataora. Mataora was married to 
Niwareka of Rarohenga. One day, after Mataora beat her, Niwareka returned to Rarohenga. Once 
aware of her absence, Mataora reflected upon his behaviour and attempted to find Niwareka to 
seek her forgiveness. Adorned in his best clothes and sporting a coloured but impermanent 
design upon his face, Mataora journeyed to Rarohenga and found Niwareka with her father 
Uetonga. The sweat generated by the strain of the trip caused Mataora’s temporary facial 
colouring to bleed. To the people of Rarohenga whose faces were adorned with beautiful, 
permanent designs, Mataora’s scruffy appearance with pigment running out of his pores made 
him look foolish and caused them to laugh at and mock him. Despite Mataora’s shame, he was 
able to acknowledge his poor conduct towards Niwareka, asked for forgiveness both from his 
wife and her family, and, according to Ngahuia Te Awekotuku, pleaded for “knowledge” from 
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Uetonga.310 Uetonga conceded and gave Mataora the art of moko, which he later brought back 
with him to the human world.311 
The above account, commonly retold in the North Island of New Zealand, is a version of 
the Mataora narrative which explains the origin of tā moko.312 Another version of the Mataora 
narrative features a slightly different ending. According to this account, once Mataora arrives in 
Rarohenga, Uetonga wipes away Mataora’s temporary moko and explains to Mataora that in 
Rarohenga they actually puncture the skin with a chisel. Uetonga then orders patterns to be 
placed upon Mataora and gives Mataora a proper, chiselled moko. Once the procedure is 
finished, Mataora, now with moko, decides to return to the upperworld and to carry with him the 
noble ways and knowledge of moko he learned in Rarohenga.313  
Although the first account does acknowledge that Mataora acquired knowledge and was 
reprimanded for his treatment of Niwareka it is vaguer in stating, specifically, what that 
knowledge was. The second account places greater emphasis on Mataora’s acquisition of tikanga 
Māori. Connecting tā moko to tikanga Māori is significant because the linkage facilitates the 
emergence of the holistic qualities of tā moko. Tā moko ceases to be limited by its practical form 
and must be considered as integral to and reflective of a code of living for Māori “which 
exemplifies proper or meritorious conduct according to ancestral law.”314  
 Other Māori narratives describe how Mataora disseminated tā moko upon returning from 
Rarohenga. After leaving Rarohenga, Mataora created “Po-ririta, a whare-tuahi” (house for 
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teaching arts), where he developed tā moko.315 Mataora’s first moko was placed upon a man 
named Tū-tangata. However, Mataora’s initial attempt at tā moko was unsuccessful and, from 
then, Tū-tangata was called Tū-tangata-kino, meaning ugly Tū-tangata. Despite his rough start, 
Mataora continued tā moko; his skill grew and his fame spread far and wide.316  
These Mataora narratives centre on the transmission of tā moko via the Po-ririta, a whare-
tuahi, which reiterates the use of tā moko as a means of teaching and transmitting right conduct. 
Uniquely, these accounts further connect tā moko to proper conduct and Māori ontology by 
revealing the imperfection of Mataora’s first attempt. Mataora initially failed and had to practice 
to acquire his renown skills. If we reconnect this to tikanga Māori, Mataora’s initial struggles to 
translate what he learned in Rarohenga to the human world serves as a useful reminder to 
humans that proper conduct must be consistently worked on.  
I have specifically chosen to focus my research on the Mataora narrative, due to its 
emphasis on the lived aspects of tā moko. By stressing the linkage between tikanga Māori, 
mātauranga Māori, and tā moko, this narrative, in its many forms, is a key starting point to 
developing a coherent narrative assemblage which reflects Māori perspectives of tā moko and 
how Pākehā interpretations of the practice were integrated into tā moko narratives. For Māori, 
narratives express beliefs and values that shape social structures and inform identity.317 Māori 
believe in holistic well-being where mind, body, and spirit are interconnected and framed by 
whānau and whakapapa, what Mason Durie calls the whare tapa whā model.318 This conception 
of well-being is what James Irwin calls ‘wholeness,’ and narrative helps to communicate how 
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this ‘wholeness’ can be achieved.319 Thus, to analyse tā moko through the lens of the Mataora 
narrative, particular attention must be paid to the information it transmits about the pre-contact 
Māori, holistic reality. 
 Central to this information is the emphasis the narrative of Mataora places on the 
acquisition of tikanga Māori. The relationship between tikanga Māori and moko emphasises the 
innate sociality of tā moko, which Durie observes is necessary to facilitate the relationships 
necessary for holistic well-being.320 The nexus between tikanga Māori and the collectivity 
inherent to tā moko stresses that moko transmits a message of a particular way of being in the 
world which relates to social identity, indicated by Mataora’s shame at the reaction of others 
toward his impermanent face paint. This linkage is important not only because it implies that tā 
moko is innately social but that the functionality of tā moko must be understood in relationship 
to tikanga Māori which governed and regulated Māori society and informed social identity.  
Knowledge of tā moko is not simply guidance on how to perform it, as that is reserved 
for tohunga-tā-moko; rather, the knowledge Mataora acquires is about noble conduct and 
community, tikanga Māori and tradition.321 When Mataora returns from Rarohenga, he not only 
brings moko but an entire code of conduct embodied within the process of tā moko.322 Only 
through the acquisition of moko was Mataora able to enter into this sacred lineage and learn how 
to suitably conduct himself as a member of this community. Mataora’s acquisition of moko took 
place inwardly, in the form of Māori tikanga, and outwardly through the expression and 
validation of his social identity.  
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To borrow Irwin’s language, Mataora’s “wholeness” was dependent upon this process of 
integration into the legacy or tradition of moko which allowed him to re-integrate into Māori 
society as a “whole” person, meaning having a balance between taha wairua (the spiritual side), 
taha hinengaro (thoughts and feelings), taha tinana (the physical side), and taha whānau (family), 
a transformation made visible both by moko and through his right conduct.323 However, to be 
whole required the social affirmation provided by tikanga Māori. The year-long process of 
learning tikanga Māori demonstrated Mataora’s commitment to the group, whilst moko 
outwardly conveyed his adoption of a set of norms that formed the basis for a Māori way of 
life.324 Moko is the means through which Mataora’s transformative experience is externally 
expressed and preserved and commences a tradition, not only of tā moko, but of a distinctively 
Māori way of living. In the sense of Irwin’s “wholeness,” as humans acquired moko and learned 
Māori tikanga, they were integrated into the sacred Māori tradition of moko as part of the living 
legacy of the Mataora narrative. 
Additionally, the narrative emphasises the relationship between change and continuity 
and indicates that continuity, in the form of permanence, is more desirable than impermanence. 
To utilise the language of costly signalling theory, permanence is selected for. The emergent 
tension between change and continuity is interesting, because it suggests that this tension shaped 
the functionality and meaning of moko and, furthermore, that tā moko may have helped arbitrate 
these processes. Initially, Mataora’s facial marking was temporary, meaning it could easily 
disappear, be ruined or wiped away, and was the object of ridicule. After receiving moko, 
Mataora’s facial marking was permanent and revered. Thus, there is an apparent tension between 
permanence and impermanence or continuity and change evident within tikanga Māori, and it is 
                                                 




through the mediation of change, as reflected by impermanence, that the narrative of Mataora 
accounts for the formation of Māori tradition.  
Tā moko came with the acquisition of tikanga Māori. Permanent facial marking was new 
to humans and, thus, marked the commencement of the tā moko tradition as a lineage passed 
down from Uetonga to Mataora to the human world. Tikanga Māori is integral to the 
establishment of tā moko as a tradition, because it is through the adoption of tikanga Māori that 
Mataora’s real change took place. Tikanga Māori is an ontology which guides social 
interactions.325 The fact that tā moko is bound to tikanga Māori means that tā moko is innately 
social; it is this sociality, expressed by the acquisition of tikanga Māori and entry into the tā 
moko lineage, that facilitates the establishment of tradition and underscores the cultural 
processes of continuity and change. Mataora’s willingness to change his behaviour is what 
enabled him to enter into the sacred moko lineage of Rarohenga and to bring the custom back to 
the human world which continued the tā moko tradition. By bringing the custom to the human 
world, Mataora commences a tradition of tā moko for humans but, in this establishment of 
tradition, he continues a tradition already in existence within Rarohenga. Thus, the indication 
within the narrative is that change facilitates continuity. 
Early Pākehā Narratives – late 1700s to 1950s 
For Māori, tā moko is a lived practice, one which accompanies a strict code of conduct and 
serves to situate the individual within the collective. Though central to Māori tā moko narratives, 
these elements are absent from Pākehā conceptions of the practice. As Donald McKenzie notes, 
the 20 years prior to 1840 represent a time of transition within Aotearoa, where orality was 
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confronted by the written tradition.326 Orality was not supplanted by the written tradition but, 
rather, existed and continues to exist alongside it. The centrality of orality for Māori is 
encapsulated by the phrase kanohi kitea (seen face), which stresses the importance of face-to-
face exchange in affirming one’s position and credibility and in situating oneself within the 
group.327  
Written narratives of tā moko from the late 18th, 19th, and early to mid-20th centuries are 
largely drafted by the hands of Pākehā. The result is a Pākehā tradition of tā moko that 
significantly differs from Māori narratives. Instead of emphasising tikanga Māori and the 
transhistorical nature of tā moko, Pākehā narratives, particularly of the late 18th and 19th 
centuries, tend to revolve around the alterity of tā moko and the emotions that the practice 
evokes in Pākehā witnesses. Yet, this is not to over-simplify Pākehā narratives which are, 
undoubtedly, complex. Indeed, Pākehā found themselves in a variety of situations and roles, 
including serving as negotiators and mediators for Māori which, at times, resulted in the 
cultivation of Pākehā sympathies for Māori causes.328 
 Though personal, a number of early Pākehā narratives are patterned in the reactions to 
moko they document, reflecting disgust, shock, fear, confusion, curiosity, and a host of other 
conflicting and inflammatory emotions. Instead of tā moko being depicted as a collective 
practice that binds people together and reinforces identity, these early Pākehā narratives tend to 
describe tā moko as a signal of alterity, perceived as an affront or challenge to the Eurocentric 
perspectives that accompanied Pākehā as they began to settle and colonise New Zealand. 
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Tuhiwai Smith stresses the influence of Pākehā perspectives which governed their reception of 
Māori, remarking that Pākehā observations of Māori were fashioned according to “their own 
cultural views of gender and sexuality,” which, for instance, prohibited Pākehā men from 
conducting trade or signing treaties with indigenous women.329 Furthermore, Tuhiwai Smith also 
explains that “colonial outposts” were designed to embody and preserve a specific view of 
Western civility, notwithstanding the dissention amongst its own inhabitants who came from 
culturally diverse backgrounds and struggled with identity in this new, heterogeneous 
environment.330 By the 19th century, “European powers” had even drafted a prescribed set of 
specific rules and regulations outlining how “interactions with the indigenous peoples being 
colonised” should be conducted.331  
In keeping with the intentions of the narrative assemblage, when examining early Pākehā 
narratives, it is important to be aware of the influences motivating such stringent views on 
notions of civility, particularly since such positions directly impacted Pākehā reception of Māori 
tattooing practices. Indeed, the pressures of missionaries, as well as Enlightenment views, 
contributed to the ways in which tā moko was interpreted throughout the early literature. Many 
early missionary accounts of tā moko call for its abolition, based upon Levitical injunctions such 
as Leviticus 19:28 (KJV) which reads: “Ye shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for the 
dead, nor print any marks upon you: I am the LORD.”332 For example, John Nicholas was 
shocked by moko and “hoped that this barbarous practice will be abolished in time amongst the 
New Zealanders; and that the missionaries will exert all the influence they are possessed of to 
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dissuade them from it.”333 Samuel Marsden also openly rebuked tā moko, anticipating that his 
admonitions would inspire Māori to achieve some level of European civility.  
Thursday, September 9th.--Last evening Tooi and his brother Teranghee (Te Rangi)  
paid us a visit. Tooi informed us that his brother Korro Korro wished him to be  
tattooed. We told him that it was a very foolish and ridiculous custom, and as he  
had seen so much of civil life he should now lay aside the barbarous customs of his  
country and adopt those of civilized nations.334 
 
In describing the impact of colonisation in the mid-19th century, Arthur Thomson concluded that 
“tattooing is now going out of fashion, partly from the influence of the missionaries, who 
described it as the Devil's art, but chiefly from the example of the settlers and the numerous 
personal ornaments commerce has placed within the reach of all the industrious.”335 
In addition to the sway of Christian missionaries, certain Pākehā narratives were also 
shaped by Enlightenment thinking. Throughout the mid to late 17th and 18th centuries, 
Enlightenment thinkers contrasted the idea of “primitive” with the perceived superiority of 
colonisers and imperialists, both racially and through the cultivation of advanced cultural 
practices and technologies, which were then used to justify their political regimes through 
notions of progress.336 Augustus Earle’s recounting of reactions from a group of European 
women to men with pukanohi (full facial moko) captures the struggle some had in reconciling tā 
moko with pre-conceived notions of a culturally acceptable practice. “They would be really very 
handsome men if their faces were not tattooed,” Earle wrote.337 As John White opined, “their 
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whole countenance was much disfigured by the practice of tattooing.”338 Joseph Banks declared 
that moko makes its wearer enormously ugly and struggled to fit moko within his own existing 
cultural paradigm.339 Though, as Nikora observes, overall, Banks engaged with the aesthetic of 
moko, instead of classifying it as untoward or grotesque.340 To further accommodate European 
notions of civility, males with moko were pressured to avoid further engagement with tā moko 
and shamed into covering their moko with beards.341 Those without moko were encouraged to 
completely abstain from it.342 
 In this light, the portrayal of tā moko as a signal of alterity within some early Pākehā 
narratives comes to the fore in the social negotiations between Māori culture and the colonial 
agenda.343 As Tim Thomas elucidates, colonisation revolves around power dynamics. One 
dimension of the power struggle is power over something.344 Pākehā recognised Māori as 
different and moko put that difference literally in their faces. In order to establish control in 
hopes of re-negotiating social and political boundaries according to their own agenda, visible 
challenges to the colonial ethos, like moko, had to be eliminated. Rosalyn Diprose specifies that 
it is the sharing of meanings between people that determines “belonging” or “difference.”345 
Thus, to situate Māori within the new colonial context, social meaning and notions of right 
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conduct had to be re-configured and, to Pākehā colonisers, part of that process was to abolish tā 
moko.  
 However, certainly not all Pākehā found tā moko repugnant. Although Joel Polack 
disapprovingly declared that “several Europeans have disfigured themselves with these 
barbarous embellishments, and the contrast of the blue lines on a livid complexion in appearance 
has a disgusting effect,” he raises an important point: not all Pākehā were repelled by tā moko. In 
fact, some Pākehā chose to be involved and live as Māori during early settlement. These 
individuals are referred to as “Pakeha-Māori.”346 Not only did many of the Pākehā-Māori men 
undertake moko, they also married Māori women and had responsibilities within their respective 
Māori communities.347 Importantly, Polack draws attention to the polarity between Pākehā who 
sympathised and participated in moko, and other Pākehā who deemed such involvement 
deplorable.348  
As time passed, Pākehā narratives began to reflect changes to the collective dynamics of 
the burgeoning New Zealand nation state. Though many still focussed on the alterity of tā moko, 
more began to do so with admiration rather than disgust. Consider Earle who, whilst recounting 
an early moko encounter, wrote that the faces of a group of men gathered around a fire were 
“rendered hideous by being tatooed [sic] all over.”349 However, later in his journal Earle’s 
trepidation is supplanted by admiration. He reflects that “[t]he art of tattooing has been brought 
to such perfection here, that whenever we have seen a New Zealander whose skin is thus 
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ornamented, we have admired him.”350 Though Earle was not tattooed during his tenure in New 
Zealand, he was the first artist to reside in New Zealand and became friends with a tohunga-tā-
moko; thus, his change of heart might be the result of his regular contact with the Māori, coupled 
with his deep appreciation of art and intimate exposure to moko through a Māori tohunga.351 
However, Ronald Scutt and Christopher Gotch attribute Earle’s shift to fluctuating levels of 
acceptance, since one’s levels of “tolerance or disapproval usually depend upon the degree of 
understanding of the subject relative to the amount of information assimilated or available.”352 
Significantly, Earle’s journal captures the internal conflict tā moko could conjure within 
Pākehā colonisers and illustrates how Pākehā narratives around tā moko were affected by their 
own colonial efforts. As colonial efforts increasingly gained a foothold, simultaneously, many 
Pākehā became more entangled with Māori and more accustomed to their practices. Earle’s 
account reveals that tā moko reflected and mediated the collective dynamics within and between 
Māori groups, as well as between Māori and Pākehā trying to adapt to the effects of colonisation 
and reconcile their inherent differences, both in belief and praxis. 
Pākehā narratives of tā moko begin to shift in the mid-19th century from attempts to 
reconcile the impetus behind the foreign practice of the other to romanticised portrayals of Māori 
as noble savages from a “a once stable, essential whole.”353 As Clifford and Marcus observe, 
shifts within narrative are significant, because narrative “affects the way cultural phenomena are 
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registered.”354 As Pākehā narratives about tā moko and Māori change, so too do Pākehā and 
Māori perceptions of the practice. Forces behind this transition were guided by what Clifford 
called the “salvage” paradigm, where the perception of the Māori as a dying people whose 
traditions were rapidly disappearing served as an impetus for fervent recording.355 This sentiment 
caused a frenzied pressure to gather and record as much information as possible to preserve the 
last vestiges of Māori culture.  
During this mid-19th century period, tā moko began to decline. In part, this decline was 
due to the efforts of missionaries that gained a foothold amongst Māori groups. However, 
modifications to Māori social structure that resulted in iwi taking on greater responsibility for the 
governance of the Māori social and political body, where previously hapū had assumed this role, 
also contributed to changes to Māori cultural practice.356 The decline of moko is followed by the 
last re-emergence of pukanohi during the New Zealand Wars of the 1860s, which was then 
followed by its disappearance.357 Nikora is aware of this pattern, maintaining that as colonial 
powers gain a stronger presence any practice that threatens that power faces significant 
censure.358 
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Akin to accounts prior to the 1840s, moko is still largely described in terms of its alterity, 
and tensions that arose as Māori and Pākehā navigated new spaces of social meaning, generated 
through colonisation, made tā moko fertile ground for the expression of conflict between these 
two factions.359 When Māori and Pākehā were juxtaposed, Pākehā were frequently portrayed as 
the epitome of civility. Māori, on the other hand, were construed as the primitive other and 
“stamped with a romanticised identity based on pacified sensuality and harmony with nature; 
bound to tradition.”360 
For example, Richard Taylor was sensitive to the impact the colonial agenda had on 
Māori groups and their practices. After denouncing colonial efforts, Taylor chastised the 
“civilized” man for his attitudes toward the colonised, arguing that if Māori were not so 
intelligent and did not have such an inclination towards war then they would suffer a similar fate 
as numerous other aboriginal groups. Taylor’s solution to staving off the impact of colonisation 
was to engage with Māori directly and attempt to gain an emic understanding of their lives and 
culture, including the practice of tā moko.361  
Like Taylor, James Cowan was critical of the colonial agenda and perceived moko as a 
visible symbol of the damage of colonialism on Māori groups. Not only did the colonial 
“intrusion” negatively impact the “noble” pre-contact Māori tradition, but it divided non-
                                                 
359 Nikora, Rua, and Te Awekotuku, “In Your Face.” 
360 Ibid.; John Patrick Taylor, Consuming Identity Modernity and Tourism in New Zealand (University of Auckland: 
Department of Anthropology, 1998), 25. 
361 Richard Taylor, Te Ika a Maui, or, New Zealand and Its Inhabitants Illustrating the Origin,Manners, Customs,  
Mythology, Religion, Rites, Songs, Proverbs, Fables, and Language of the Natives; Together with the Geology,  
Natural History, Productions, and Climate of the Country, Its State as Regards Christianity,Sketches of the  
Principal Chiefs, and Their Present Position (London: Wertheim and Macintosh, 1855), 151-3. For Taylor’s 
detailed critiques of colonisation processes, see Richard Taylor, The Past and Present of New Zealand with Its 
Prospectus for the Future (London: William Macintosh, 1868). See also J.M.R. Owens, “Taylor, Richard,” in The 
Dictionary of New Zealand Biography, Te Ara: The Encyclopedia of New Zealand, last modified March 4, 2014, 
accessed May4, 2015, http://www.teara.govt. nz/en/biographies/1t22/taylor-richard. 
107 
 
Māori.362 Cowan romantically lamented the intrusion of Western powers which had the effect of 
removing pre-contact Māori group customs, like tā moko, from mainstream life, instead placing 
them on the periphery to be absorbed into an indistinct mass of outmoded knowledge attributed 
to a general and vague New Zealand past.363 Christopher Hilliard expounds upon Cowan’s 
observations, asserting that many Pākehā existed as “cross-cultural intermediaries” who played 
key roles mediating negotiations between Pākehā and Māori.364 These liminal roles facilitated 
complex reactions to colonisation which manifest themselves in Pākehā narratives of Māori 
practices replete with “nuances and complications as well as blind spots.”365  
Consider Elsdon Best, whose views of Māori initially aligned with Taylor and Cowan. 
Both Taylor and Cowan were critical of colonisation and its impact upon Māori people and 
customs; yet, simultaneously, they colonised tā moko by construing it as the dying practice of a 
weakened people drowning in the murky mire of colonial impact.366 Early on, Best supported 
this view, upholding that any cultural shifts or “adaptations” within Māori cultural groups served 
only to corrupt what had been a fluid and unadulterated cultural tradition.367 As Edward Said 
reminds us, the view of tā moko as a static practice, which exhibits a strong Orientalist slant, is a 
fairly common bias of the late 19th and early 20th centuries when Best was writing.368 Yet, Best 
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later recanted this view and his work was actually instrumental in fuelling the Māori 
Renaissance.369 
Even Cowan’s account proves more complex than at first glance. Despite his critique of 
what he saw as negative changes to Māori practice, he praised Māori adaptability. Cowan drew 
specific attention the shift in tā moko technologies when recording the tattooing of Waikato 
chief, Pātara Te Tuhi, with steel chisels in 1842.370 His report suggests that Māori malleability 
was responsible for the relatively easy integration of new technologies into existing practices; 
ultimately increasing the chances that tā moko would survive the pressures of new cultural 
inputs. Frances Del Mar’s narrative, composed later than those by Taylor and Cowan, helps to 
substantiate this view, by recording the opinions of a tohunga-tā-moko who lauded the European 
tools of iron and steel, for both carving and moko, which gave the practitioner greater control 
and allowed for more elaborate designs.371 
H.G. Robley also contributed to a small, but significant, portion who recognised Māori 
adaptability.372 Significantly, Robley attained a level of intimacy with the practice that is 
unachievable by later scholars who investigated and wrote when the practice of moko kauae was 
uncommon and pukanohi had subsided. Robley witnessed tā moko at a time of cultural tumult 
and confusion within the newly forming nation of New Zealand, resulting in the decline of the 
practice. Robley’s commentary continues to inform the way the continuity of moko is perceived 
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today, since it is his account that shapes many contemporary understandings of moko and its 
transitions during the social and political upheaval Māori groups experienced during early 
colonisation.  
Like Best, Robley attempted to locate tā moko within the framework of the pre-colonial 
Māori social structure which colours discussions about the role moko played within pre-contact 
Māori society and how that role transformed as Māori groups adapted their practices to withstand 
colonial pressures.373 Unlike Best, Robley emphasised Māori adaptability, rather than viewing tā 
moko as part of a continuous, uninterrupted tradition. Additionally, although at times Robley’s 
enthusiasm may have bordered on obsession, his intense treatment of moko helps us to begin 
thinking about moko as an agent.374 Indeed, it seems that moko, itself, inspired Robley to begin 
studying, acquiring, and “recreating” Māori art.375 Timothy Walker expounds upon this 
influence, observing that “in seeking to preserve, to perpetuate, to record the patterns and designs 
of the Maori he [Robley] became aware of a life within them which was (and is) essentially 
provocative of an infinite range of further forms and motifs.”376 
Adding further complexity to the Pākehā accounts of this period are debates over the 
meaning and function of tā moko, though such discussions are shaped by the narrators’ own 
assumptions about moko. Edward Shortland denounced any connection between moko and social 
rank and argued that the only relationship between moko and rank was that social position was 
made apparent in the amount that an individual could pay a tohunga-tā-moko for the procedure, a 
contention echoed in the work of Taylor.377 Any differences in moko designs and motifs 
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Shortland ascribed to the personal tastes and artistic license of the tohunga-tā-moko.378 In 
addition to his refutation of any connection between moko and social status, Shortland also 
rejected arguments that moko was integral to differentiating between different pre-contact Māori 
groups, a view which openly challenges the association between moko and belonging. 379  
  Shortland’s apprehension to make any claim of a relationship between moko and social 
position did not preclude him from speculating about the reasons behind tā moko. Like Cowan, 
Shortland maintained that moko was about making men more desirable to women and about 
affirming one’s masculinity.380 However, Shortland is distinct in his isolation of a specific social 
motive behind tā moko, one that portrays moko as a culturally relevant aesthetic signal important 
in establishing social ties through sex and marriage, two inevitable social products of 
attractiveness and desire. This shift is particularly poignant, because it situates tā moko within 
the biological realm where signals are associated with mate selection and fecundity, a point 
which becomes key in the next chapter throughout discussions about tā moko and costly 
signalling theory. 
Akin to Cowan and Shortland, Robley also rationalised the functionality of tā moko in 
terms of aesthetics. Specifically, Robley stated that full facial moko made men more attractive to 
women. However, Robley extended this functionality into the realm of warfare, purporting, in 
much the same way as Polack, that moko increased one’s ferocity in war.381 Yet, Robley offered 
nothing further in the way of support. 
                                                 
378 Edward Shortland, Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders: with Illustrations of Their Manners and 
Customs (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans and Roberts, 1856), 18 
379 Shortland, Traditions and Superstitions, 16. 
380 Ibid., 17. 
381 Robley, Moko, 22, 28. 
111 
 
Likewise, most of John Macmillian Brown’s account centreed on linking the 
functionality of moko to warfare. Like Shortland, Cowan, and Robley, Brown appreciated moko 
as an aesthetic signal but only secondarily as a by-product of warfare. Brown claimed that tā 
moko was about privileged fame, and warriors added onto moko to reflect their achievements in 
war; yet he recognised the inconsistency in this statement by referencing that this did not mean 
that the greatest warriors had the most amount of moko.382 Del Mar shared this opinion and, like 
Brown, conceived of moko as not just a mark of identity but “a token of distinction.”383 
However, contrary to Del Mar, Brown stressed the use of moko as an aid for warriors to generate 
more fear in their opponents by looking more menacing and powerful. 
Edward Tregear also presented tā moko as a within-group signal connected to warfare 
and which broadcast desired aesthetic traits. Specifically, Tregear acknowledged a relationship 
between warfare and tā moko, stating that moko provided the male with a “look of 
determination.”384 Characteristic of literature from this period, Tregear cited a connection 
between moko and attractiveness, alighting upon the consensus that a papatea or unmarked face 
was not desirable to women.385   
The narratives of this period, consistently bind the functionality of tā moko to its 
operation as a signal of warrior prowess, attractiveness to women, social distinction, or to 
minimise signs of aging.386 The association between tā moko and these more biologically-
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oriented traits proves helpful as a reference point in later discussions of tā moko as presented by 
Cisco but also emphasises the influence of Enlightenment thinking upon indigenous practice, 
whereby European researchers sought to separate themselves from all “corrupting influences,” 
aside from those that were rational and grounded in provable, scientific fact. Herman expounds, 
explaining that “only that which could be validated empirically or proven mathematically fell 
into the realm of science and reason.”387 The effect was that rationality fractured culture, science, 
and nature, leaving little room for Māori explanations of their own practices which were holistic 
manifestations of an integrated way of being and did not suffer from such a divide. Spirituality, 
nature, imagination, emotion and all other aspects of being have continually been a part of being 
Māori. Yet, with the introduction of new Pākehā perspectives, many of which were shaped by an 
overpowering scientific discourse, Māori were no longer as free to define themselves as they had 
been prior to Pākehā presence. Merata Mita laments: “We have a history of people putting Maori 
under a microscope in the same way a scientist looks at an insect. The ones doing the looking are 
giving themselves the power to define.”388  
Tā Moko Narratives: 1950s-1990s 
If we shift forward, yet again, to the period spanning the 1950s-1990s to further trace narratives 
on tā moko, Pākehā authors begin to further recognise the impact of their Western discourse in 
developing and perpetuating misperceptions about Māori; concurrently, Māori were working to 
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re-develop their own narratives around tā moko and Māoridom in general. Doniger predicts the 
profound effects of colonisation on tā moko narratives during the period, explaining that as 
narratives are retold they are also reinterpreted, thus, narrative becomes a dynamic platform upon 
“which a number of meanings may be modelled.”389 In part this renegotiation of narrative is due 
to the status elevation of those of Māori descent to “full citizen,” which took place in the 1950s 
and 1960, resulting in the push for “one nation two cultures.”390 The transition from distinctly 
separate groups into a single citizenry commenced a time of nation building, where race was no 
longer thought of as synonymous with culture.  
Taylor avers that, “culture becomes a non-biological set of social norms,” as presented in 
the Maori Affairs Act of 1953, which defined Māori as “a person belonging to the aboriginal 
race of New Zealand and included half-caste and a person intermediate between half caste and a 
person of pure descent from that race.”391 However, this official change was not necessarily an 
entirely positive step for Māori, whose expression of cultural customs and traditions were limited 
and also even more mythologised as an effect of the absorption into the burgeoning New Zealand 
identity constructed upon a single, Pākehā dominated nation state.392 Still, the transition from 
18th century racial identity to one based upon ethnicity and the emphasis on personal identity, as 
opposed to biology, overturned out-dated notions of higher and lower racial categories based 
entirely upon biological consideration.393 Through the creation of a “pan-Māori identity,” 
individuals of Māori descent began to explore and develop a common cultural inheritance 
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grounded in cohesion both in experience and belief. This general Māori identity was specifically 
anchored in a more generic, traditional worldview that emphasised union with the land in a way 
that any individual with links to a Māori heritage could understand and appreciate, regardless of 
individual affiliation to any specific hapū or iwi, and was also accompanied by the re-emergence 
of traditional Māori art forms, including tā moko.  
There is not an abundance of tā moko narratives from this period from either Pākehā or 
Māori. One Māori scholar, Te Rangihīroa (Sir Peter Buck), who wrote on tā moko, shared the 
tendency of some Pākehā during the mid-20th centuries to construe changes within Māori cultural 
groups as tainting what was once an uninterrupted flow of cultural group traditions.394 Te 
Rangihīroa punctuated his account of tā moko with methodical research into the practice. Not 
unlike Cowan, Te Rangihīroa fixated on the relationship between carving and moko, paying 
particular attention to the development of whakairo (wood carving) in the North Island.395 
Whakairo and tā moko, in Te Rangihīroa’s estimation, borrowed motifs from each other, though 
he posited it more likely that the spirals and other design techniques were first attempted on 
wood before being applied to the skin.396 Te Rangihīroa also suggested that tā moko implements 
were adapted to better mimic those used by carvers. 
The narrative supplied by Te Rangihīroa mainly outlined the procedure and practice of tā 
moko. Although he did not argue for moko as a cultural signal of any sort, Te Rangihīroa did 
acknowledge that the practice allowed for the emergence of greater expertise amongst practicing 
tohunga-tā-moko, suggesting the emergence of a sort of elite class of tohunga signalled by the 
amount they were paid for their work. This view resonates with that of Tregear who observed 
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that moko could signal social position to the extent that it exhibited the amount one was able to 
pay for the practice. Mostly what Te Rangihīroa accomplished was to question a certain aspect of 
the Europeanisation of tā moko by challenging the position that moko works in similar fashion to 
the English heraldric system, a notion that Te Rangihīroa found ridiculous, yet which still 
appears on occasion in contemporary sources.397 Nonetheless, as McCarthy points out, it is 
misleading to think of Te Rangihīroa as a “post-colonial saint.”398 Rather, in light of McCarthy’s 
actor-network theory analysis, evidence seems to indicate that although Te Rangihīroa’s 
approach to cultural development was sometimes Māori-centred and, thus, arguably pre-empted 
the ontological turn in anthropological analyses, he was more inclined to utilise anthropology to 
further his own gains.399  
Correspondingly during this period, Pākehā and Māori narratives and involvement with tā 
moko began to blur. Pākehā and Māori authors writing at this time were aware of Māori efforts 
to renegotiate cultural boundaries and redefine identities within the context of post-colonial New 
Zealand, and Māori ceased to be written about as a dying race. Instead, Māori tradition and its 
meaning in a more contemporary context underscores these discussions, and can largely be 
attributed to post-World War Two, Māori urbanisation and the attempted integration of Māori 
and Pākehā groups into a single nation.400 Specifically, proponents of tā moko were fighting a 
battle to divorce the practice from the gangs and criminals who had adopted the tradition as their 
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own.401 Whilst it is clear that by the 1970s gangs were incorporating elements of moko into their 
“gang insignias,” it is unclear when, exactly, they began this practice.402   
However, though a tā moko renaissance was sought, there was a lack of Māori tohunga-
tā-moko. This dearth required that certain willing Pākehā tattooists, like Merv O’Connor and 
Roger Ingerton, step in and continue this long-standing Māori tradition.403 Te Awekotuku recalls 
that:  
ta moko endured almost two decades of decline; the last kauae moko, by 
the needle technique, were done in the 1950s. Almost twenty years later 
thanks to the courage and commitment of individual women and the visionary 
 talent of two professional tattoo artists, Merv O’Connor and Roger Ingerton,  
the kauae moko was seen, blue-black, crisp and beautiful, on the marae once  
again, just as the last of the Kuia mau moko were passing on.404 
 
More commonly, revival efforts were, instead, aimed towards other areas of Māori culture. For 
instance, land rights became a focal issue for Māori. In the 1970s, Ngā Tamatoa, protested 
against Māori land and culture loss. Thousands of Māori were mobilised by Dame Whina 
Cooper in 1975 to walk the length of the entire North Island in protest of “ongoing land 
alienation.”405 Such awareness prompted scholars to begin asking different questions about 
Māori practices than were petitioned in prior decades, which revealed certain inconsistencies and 
inaccuracies in the material but also began to weave the first strands of the tā moko narrative 
assemblage.406  
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At the beginning of the 1970s, Pākehā historians were pressured by Māori “radicals” to 
spend substantially more time addressing concerns relevant to Māori culture.407 Michael King 
responded to the call and began a mission to tackle some of the pressing social affairs affecting 
the Māori. Though King was Pākehā, he was instrumental in the effort to challenge many of the 
misnomers about Māori culture that had wedged their way the New Zealand historical discourse, 
such as invalidating the notion of the Great Fleet Migration that served as the theory explaining 
the early settlement of New Zealand by pre-Māori cultural groups.408 In attempting to better 
address Māori needs, King began to blend Māori and Pākehā narratives. Throughout his work, an 
effort was made to acknowledge the autonomy of pre-contact Māori groups prior to Pākehā 
presence and colonisation. King emphasised this point by stressing that there was no such thing 
as Māori prior to colonisation and by looking at the commercialisation of moko through 
photograph.409 King bolstered his argument through his research into the effects of colonisation 
on moko such as the waning of tā moko, shifts in moko technology, and the negative impact of 
mokamōkai trade.  
Much of King’s research on tā moko is contained in his book, Moko: Maori Tattooing in 
the 20th Century, a historical account of tā moko that focuses on the reasons behind the practice’s 
decline. Primarily, the book attributes the decline of tā moko in the 1950s to a deficit of 
traditionally trained tohunga-tā-moko, followed by a complete lull in the practice in the 1970s, 
though women with moko kauae could still be found.410 Evidence supporting a decline in tā 
moko, due to a lack of sufficiently knowledgeable practitioners, is ascertained by the emergence 
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of standardised moko patterns and motifs, which differed significantly from design diversity in 
the early 19th century.411 
King also attempted to bridge Māori and Pākehā narratives by addressing both the 
individual and collective aspects of tā moko. On the individual level, King presented moko as a 
signal of identity, expressive of individual traits; whilst, on the group level, he construed moko 
as a signal of Māori within-group belonging. To King, these parallel systems established the 
internal infrastructure for the external expression of a deep linkage between moko and identity—
moko being the external manifestation of one’s internal identity as constructed and validated 
through the Māori social context.412 
King’s contribution here is significant, because, rather than thinking of tā moko in terms 
of its alterity or as an indication of an individual attribute, like wealth, moko is made relevant on 
both the individual and group levels by articulating individual identity and also positioning the 
individual within the group collective. Thus, King acknowledged the adaptability of tā moko in 
its ability to be transformed to accommodate individuality, more characteristic of social 
orientations that develop out of colonisation, whilst simultaneously attempting to preserve the 
collective dimensions which define tā moko in a holistic, Māori context. King’s identification of 
the connection between identity and moko is significant and indicative of a shift away from the 
conceptualisation of tā moko through Pākehā lenses coloured by Christianity or positivism 
toward a more relational and associative framework shaped by narrative assemblage. 
For King, the establishment of one’s identity anchored within a larger cultural group 
context is directly related to the tohunga-tā-moko, certain technological developments that affect 
tā moko, and significant cultural shifts brought on by colonisation. The adaptability of tā moko 
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which provided an individualised outlet, affirmed through a Māori cultural mandate, afforded it 
the opportunity to re-emerge as a potent symbol that embodied Māoridom behind which Māori 
could rally and generate momentum for the burgeoning Māori Renaissance. The social nature of 
tā moko expressed through Māori belonging, allowed tā moko to be used to help foster and 
rekindle group solidarity and cooperation at a time when such efforts were necessary to 
overcome the limitations Māori groups faced from the lingering effects of colonisation. 
In addition to shifting Pākehā narratives to focus more on the endurance of Māoridom, 
and the adaptability of Māori and tā moko which enabled it to endure through the colonisation 
process and re-emerge during the Māori Renaissance, King also opened new avenues in the 
literature which helped to draw attention to the central role that women played in its preservation 
despite external pressures against it. Moko kauae was performed well into the 1950s. One of 
King’s greatest contributions to the study of tā moko is the surveys he conducted with women 
who had moko kauae and who were still alive in the late 1960s. This research enabled him to 
isolate two periods of intensive tattoo amongst Māori women in the 20th century which helped to 
preserve tā moko.413 One event that King unearthed consisted of 11 women who acquired moko 
between 1900 and 1914, whilst the other consisted of 14 women tattooed between 1930 and 
1942. Other women underwent tā moko both before and after these dates, but these are the most 
significant of King’s finds. The resurgence of tā moko which took place in the 1930s was done 
with darning needles and can be attributed mostly to the efforts of two artists: Tame Poata (Ngati 
Porou) and Ngakau (Waikato). Though the ritual surrounding tā moko had changed, as had the 
equipment, technique, and limitation on who could perform and receive moko, against all odds 
moko clung to life to rise again in the Māori Renaissance of the 1970s, and women were 
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responsible for the historical continuity of the transmission and preservation of the tā moko 
tradition.414  
King’s research is invaluable in both recognising that there was never a period when 
moko actually entirely disappeared and in giving Māori women a voice by identifying the 
instrumental role they played in the preservation of moko through the 20th century. King also 
used the continuity and adaptability moko possesses to challenge widespread beliefs about the 
devastating impact of colonisation on Māori groups. By focussing on the positives that the 
introduction of European technology brought to tā moko, King effectively challenged the notion 
that European presence negatively affected all aspect of Māoritanga which provides a platform to 
begin decolonising tā moko. In addition to moko kauae, King cited the adaptability of Māori 
groups and their ability to take advantage of cultural advances that might behove their cultural 
practices, which ultimately facilitated a continuous tā moko tradition. These elements, which 
King readily incorporated into his research, suggest that the relational network of tā moko is vast 
and that the agentic delineations of Māori, Pākehā, tā moko, etc. may not be as useful as tracing 
the connections between their interactions.  
Until relatively recently, David Simmons, King’s contemporary, was considered a 
preeminent scholar on Māori tā moko. His numerous books and articles are still regularly cited 
and contribute to the foundation of the Cisco case study.415 Yet, it has come to light that 
Simmons’ invented conceptions of traditional Māori society and its impact on moko kauae are 
                                                 
414 King, Moko, 17. 
415 Higgins, “Identity Politics”; David Simmons, The Carved Pare: A Mirror of the Maori Universe (Wellington: 
Huia Publishers, 2001); Te Riria and David Roy Simmons, Moko Rangatira: Maori Tattoo (Auckland: Reed Books, 
1999); David Simmons, Ta Moko: The Art of Maori Tattoo (Auckland: Reed Books, 1997); Te Riria and David 
Simmons, Maori Tattoo (Auckland: Bush Press, 1989); D.R. Simmons, Iconography of New Zealand Maori 
Religion (Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1986); David Simmons, “Moko,” in Art and Artists of Oceania, eds. 
S.M. Mead and B. Kernot (Palmerston North, N.Z.: Dunmore Press, 1983), 245-65; David Simmons, The Great 
New Zealand Myth: A Study of the Discovery and Origin Traditions of the Maori (AH & AW Reed, 1976). 
121 
 
misleading and resemble the unbalanced narratives of early Pākehā ethnographers and 
historians.416 Of particular concern is his unsubstantiated attribution of moko kauae as indicative 
of status and personal whakapapa.417 Moreover, the moko designs posited in his work are never 
ascribed to a source and “were not commensurate with the technology of the time.”418 Rather 
than paving the road to decolonised explanations of tā moko, Simmons, once again, recolonised 
tā moko by ignoring significant aspects of tā moko central to Māori and the Māori Renaissance, 
such as “the cultural significance of moko kauae becoming the face of the hapū on the marae 
during the 19th century.”419 
Instead of linking moko to identity and belonging, Simmons tied moko specifically to 
status within Māori hapū or iwi. Relying on his informant, Te Riria (Te Ariki Taiopuru Ko 
Huiarau), Simmons described Māori cultural groups in the 1800s as divided into eight separate 
social levels based on ancestry, a social system that began in 1816 “when the impetus to fully 
unite the tribes was first promulgated.”420 Te Riria alleged that Māori groups were working 
together and were led by one leader, the taiopuru. Historical evidence quickly undermines this 
claim, as the primary unit of Māori social structure until the 18th century was the hapū, and it was 
only during the 1800s that the iwi took on a greater social position.421 Te Riria also offered a 
framework which implied that an individual has a social rank reflected by moko that is 
determined by genealogy.422  
Where King spoke more generally about tā moko as indicative of identity and provides 
evidence indicating that the practice functions as a signal on both individual and group levels, 
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Simmons predominantly implied that tā moko functioned as a signal on the individual level by 
indicating the rank of the individual upon whom certain patterns appear. Where King’s work was 
more relational, Simmons’ proved to have greater agentic reliance. The effect is that where 
King’s narrative opened new avenues for research and discussion based upon a more integrative 
view of the historicity of tā moko, Simmons shut down channels by delimiting agents and 
possible associations.  
In summation, the period between 1950 and 1990, surveyed above, represents a time 
when tā moko narratives shift and blend and their fluidity comes to light. Māori and Pākehā were 
now actively writing about the practice, and Māori and Pākehā were coming together in an effort 
to revive tā moko within the wider context of revitalising Māoridom. As narratives began to have 
more crossover, a path was paved for a renaissance where tā moko is once again practiced but 
also where Māori narratives once again come to the fore, delivering a more holistic view of 
Māori practice.  
Tā Moko Today  
The 1990s ushered in new tā moko narratives which began to employ narrative assemblage to 
seek out more balanced accounts of tā moko. Enquiries into tā moko are now largely led by 
female scholars of Māori descent which reflects a broader social phenomenon in which Māori 
are attempting to re-appropriate their own history and heritage from the Pākehā scholars who, 
until recently, had dominated discussions of Māori culture. Generally, scholars since the 1990s 
have worked to challenge, amend, and expound on the historical and ethnographic record. The 
presence of Māori scholars has resulted in an effort to re-educate both Māori and non-Māori on 
the practice. Efforts include rewriting the history of tā moko to rectify misunderstandings and 
oversights in the ethnographic and historical record, using these early and other primary sources 
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to support and compliment new arguments, and contributing to an expanding corpus of literature 
on tā moko by providing an emic perspective on the practice which has, until recently, been 
significantly underrepresented.  
For example, Pita Graham emphasises a link between moko and identity via the sociality 
of moko as expressed and validated by tohunga-tā-moko. Specifically, Graham claims that 
tohunga-tā-moko likely possessed their own system of moko signals interpretable only by 
experts who transmitted them to each other by choosing specific patterns and symbols for the 
moko. Whether a moko was from the hand of a deft practitioner or someone significantly less 
talented was evident from the calibre of the design engraved upon the faces of the mau moko 
which were visible and able to be interpreted by individuals both inside and outside the group(s) 
to which a mau moko belonged.423 
Much of the current tā moko narrative, present in the academic narrative, also focuses on 
its enduring linkages to Māori identity and belonging. Though a focus on the innate sociality of 
moko in the form of Māori belonging remains, increasingly moko is discussed as an individuated 
expression. In a study of the meaning of cultural tattoos, some respondents cited moko “as an 
extension of one’s personal self,” an opinion which does not factor in the group.424 Likewise, 
Puawai Cairns discovered that for many mau moko, moko was related to a personal life story 
which blurred the lines of its group associations.425 Additionally, efforts are still being made to 
divorce moko from its association with gangs, inmates, and other marginal groups, which may 
also account for its more recent individuation. However, despite these attempts, it is still 
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acknowledged that these marginal groups played an integral role in preserving moko by 
practising tā moko when it was not commonplace within Māori culture.426  
The emic nature of this work reflects the integrative nature of tā moko for Māori, 
stressing its centrality to Māori identity and its ties to tradition and ancestry. Mead describes 
contemporary moko as, “a validating symbol for persons wanting to emphasise their identity as 
Māori.”427 Putaringa emphasises this point: “what they don’t realize (is) that this moko was here 
before them or before their forefathers.”428 To non-Māori, this extreme sense of continuity may 
be confusing, and may lead to the perception that there is no understanding moko; that, in many 
ways, moko is what it is and much of the “it” that tā moko is proves inaccessible. However, for 
Māori this could not be further from the truth.  
 Nikora elaborates, explaining that for Māori “our lives are lived through our bodies and 
those elements that adorn them. Our bodies, clothing, material possessions, roles and 
communities, all mediate the meanings we, and others, have of ourselves.”429 Yet, modernity and 
the endeavour to establish a post-colonial New Zealand have resulted in more individualised, 
outward articulations of moko, which stand out against its enduring collective threads. Tā moko 
is instrumental in “self-identity and expression.”430 Within Cairns’ research, a significant 
percentage of mau moko report the acquisition of moko as bound to a significant, personal life 
event, such as the death of a spouse or child, or as representing an individual life story.431 
Likewise, both Gordon Toi Hatfield and Hans Neleman et al. have attempted to capture the 
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connection between moko and personal identity by offering photographic anthologies dedicated 
to mau moko.432 
Tuhiwai Smith explains that “imperialism frames the indigenous experience.”433 With 
colonisation, tā moko became increasingly pan-Māori and politicised, perceived as a staunch 
statement against colonisation, proclaiming: “I am Maori.”434 However, as “Skin Stories” 
explains, “while moko are no longer fully understood in their original capacities by the general 
population, they still hold much meaning for the individuals and contribute to the construction of 
identity and self-image.”435 Simultaneously, this “self-identity and expression” are intimately 
related to collective membership and belonging.436  
Thus, despite an increase in its perceived individual orientation shaped by colonial 
influences, tā moko has managed to retain its collectivity and must be understood within the 
decolonised context of collective identity and Māori holistic reality reinforced by whakapapa. 
For instance, Te Mairiki Williams attributes the right side of his moko to whakapapa, just as Pera 
Rangitaawa-MacDonald attributes her moko kauae to her Ngāti Maniapoto ancestry.437 As Mary 
Douglas observes, the social or collective body regulates how “the physical body is perceived”; 
it “is a microcosm of society.”438 
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Rangi McLean’s description of his tā moko journey further illustrates this point. At the 
age of 18, McLean went to his elders for permission to wear moko. His elders said no; he could 
not have moko until they had the opportunity to instil proper tikanga into him. Upon 
consideration, McLean understood their logic since he had been on both sides of the law. Only 
many years after he had learned proper tikanga and shown himself to be worthy of moko was he 
given permission to undergo the procedure.439  
According to McLean, his moko reflects his bloodlines and is tied to being Māori. Not 
only is his whakapapa embodied within his moko but his transformation and acquired knowledge 
is as well. McLean reports that the right side of his moko indicates his Tūhoe ancestry, whilst the 
left reflects his Ngāti Porou and Waikato heritage. The top of his moko which covers his 
forehead is recognisably in the shape of a cross and indicates his baptism into the Presbyterian 
Church. As the design moves down and across his face, it is indicative of his re-baptism into the 
Māori faith. Part of the designs on his nose reveals the knowledge that was passed on to him, and 
part of his chin suggests his marae. McLean says that the chin design is associated with his 
marae and reflects his belonging to “a new generation coming forward,” which is a motto the 
marae has adopted to describe him and his other cohorts. It is each of these elements within the 
context of the whole that informs his belonging and identity.440 
What Kopua shares of his moko further impresses the individual and collective duality 
that characterises the tā moko tradition. Kopua speaks of his own moko as progressive; meaning, 
that, in the tradition of pre-contact moko, his moko has many empty spaces that will only be 
filled once he has accomplished certain things. Although he is not very forthcoming about the 
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specific details of his moko, he does admit that his designs began with his local history, 
specifically from where he comes and also includes his personal history. From there, he added 
designs that mirror how he is viewed within his community.441 Of his moko Kopua affirms that, 
“it’s my heritage, where I’m from, who my ancestors were, it’s everything about me.”442  
Likewise, Hohepa Hei echoes Kopua regarding the role moko assumes in reflecting the 
individual by situating him within the context of his whakapapa. Hei reports that his moko 
embodies his genealogy including the tribes of Whakatōhea and Te Whānau ā Apanui in Eastern 
Bay of Plenty, down to Ngāti Porou along the East Coast and south to Te Aitanga ā Māhaki near 
Gisborne. Throughout the process, Kopua, Hei’s tohunga-tā-moko, asks questions about his 
genealogy and family history. Kopua then incorporates the answers into the moko, bringing 
together Hei and the collective influences that shape and define him.443 
George Nuku isolates two criteria for tā moko, both of which reinforce how, despite some 
increase in its reported individuation, belonging and collective identity still define the practice. 
Firstly, “it comes from your lineage. It defines who your parents and grandparents [were] from 
the beginning of time.” Secondly, Nuku refers to the significance of whanaungatanga which 
focuses on sustaining balance within relationships.444 “Moko is reinforced and validated by your 
commitment to the group. And the group owns you. You are the group and the group is you. If 
you don’t have those things, then it’s not a moko.”445  
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Rawinia Higgins views the current state of tā moko in terms of identity or reclamation of 
identity through whakapapa.446 Though individuality is still contextualised by the groups to 
which one belongs, today it is often in a more general sense. Douglas reminds us that “the style 
appropriate to any message will co-ordinate all the channels along which it is given.”447 As 
Māori groups shifted to adapt to new cultural inputs, so too did cultural belief systems like 
whakapapa and practices like tā moko. Today, collective identity and individual identity exist 
side by side, with individual identity largely being utilised to provide an interpretable means of 
expression intelligible to non-Māori in an increasingly Westernised world; whereas, in pre-
contact times, collective identity was individual identity. However, as Nikora remarks, in the 
small towns and rural areas of Aotearoa, mau moko are more commonly viewed as “people 
imbedded in family and friendship networks.”448  
Nikora’s work with mau moko further impresses that “the decision to take the marking is 
about continuity, affirmation, identity, and commitment. It is also about wearing those ancestors, 
carrying them into the future; as their moko become a companion, a salient being with its own 
life force, its own integrity and power, beyond the face.”449 Aside from the nexus between moko 
and identity, Nikora stresses its continuity with the past, which makes moko part of an unbroken 
tradition. Whilst moko is still bound to identity, Nikora impresses that beyond its ties to identity, 
moko is important to the establishment of tradition within Māori cultural groups.  
Nikora’s linkage between moko and tradition is further supported by Alfred Gell who, 
though non-Māori, also argues for tā moko as integral to the perpetuation of historical continuity 
for Māori groups. Specifically, Gell contends that tattooing was instrumental in developing and 
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enforcing a group mentality, meanwhile supporting a framework upon which individual 
identities could develop, and both of these functions were central to the “reproduction of specific 
types of social and political regimes.”450 To Gell, the sociality of tā moko frames the identities of 
individuals within Māori groups.451 Gell’s proposal implies that the temporal continuity of Māori 
collective social structures is facilitated by social practices like tā moko which express important 
cultural information that encourages group solidarity by stabilising social structures.452  
Juniper Ellis, another non-Māori, also recognises the relationship between tā moko and 
Māori society. She posits that genealogy is central to tā moko because of the linkages it reflects 
between the individual, the collective, the land, and the atua. It is through these connections that 
a Māori person is provided a place to stand and is integrated into the community,” meaning that 
the externalisation of belonging moko broadcasts ultimately positions the individual within a 
group.453 Following Ellis’ logic, it is only through securing the individual within the group that 
the individual’s identity is anchored and legitimised. 
Higgins elaborates upon Māori sociality as a means to understand the current state of 
moko, citing the “correlation between Māori movements towards maintaining their group 
identity, and the survival of moko kauae into the 20th century.”454 Higgins’ study of women with 
moko kauae reveals that, as these women journey through life struggling to make sense of who 
and where they are, whakapapa takes a central role. By exploring and embracing their 
whakapapa, these women found they could “reclaim elements of their past as a means of 
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understanding the source of their identity.”455 Tā moko is one means through which this process 
happens, affirming that moko retains information that can be used to bridge the gap between the 
past and the present and around which individual and social identity is authenticated and 
expressed. It is this meeting of past and present which tā moko provides internally for the mau 
moko and externally for whānau and group members that perpetuates tradition. In associating 
moko to the maintenance of Māori group identity, Higgins suggests that moko must somehow be 
linked not only to identity but to a historical continuity embedded within the tradition that is 
capable of stabilising group identity even in rapidly changing cultural circumstances. 
Significantly, by stressing these inherent connections, Higgins alludes to the need to examine the 
associations between agents involved in tā moko. To access what it is that may stabilise identity 
in shifting environmental contexts, requires that we first have a broader picture of the 
connections that feed into identity and tradition.  
Higgins also offers criticism of Simmons’ work, challenging Te Riria’s claims that the 
eight levels of Māori society were solely grounded in ancestry rather than “achieved mana” 
which has historically been important in determining social position and leadership.456 Higgins 
draws attention to Simmons’ contradictory claims, including his position that by the 1900s moko 
designs were standardised, yet he overturned this by detailing specific moko kauae designs 
indicative of differences in rank.457 When looking at these patterns, the vagueness of Simmons’ 
assertions becomes particularly evident. At no point does he support these suggested motifs with 
historical data, and there is no mention from where his knowledge of these designs and patterns 
comes.458 Higgins rebutts Simmons’ stance that moko kauae reflects status and whakapapa, his 
                                                 






oversight and/or inattention to the reality that moko kauae was “the face of the hapū on the 
marae during the 19th century,” his error in not considering the role that individual female facial 
structure played in determining moko pattern and design, his lack of addressing the existence of 
design standardisation, and most importantly the rigid conception of social structure Simmons 
presents based upon unsubstantiated claims of an eight tier ranking system within Māori cultural 
groups.459  
In comparing the work of Simmons to King, Higgins argues that King gives a more 
accurate depiction of moko kauae which revolves around the skill of the tohunga-tā-moko and 
the changes in technology.460 However, Higgins diverges from King by making the argument 
that standardisation arose from the fact that patterns used for moko were dictated by tohunga, 
whereas King sees standardisation as responsible for the demise of the practice resulting from a 
lack of variety. Yet, following in the footsteps of King and her own contemporaries, Higgins 
likewise sees a deep connection between moko and identity. Disappointingly, despite Higgins’ 
substantial and compelling research, Simmons’ assertion, which staunchly defends a relationship 
between rank and tā moko, still appears in anthologies about tattooing.461  
Te Awekotuku recognises the central role that women played in the persistence and 
perpetuation of moko throughout the 19th century and staunchly argues for the recognition of the 
continuity of the moko kauae tradition.462 As time passed and fewer traditional features of Māori 
cultural groups remained visible, moko kauae stood not only as a testament to the endurance of 
Māori identity despite the cultural suppression experienced at the hands of the colonising 
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majority.463 To Te Awekotuku, challenging the colonial agenda still present within New Zealand 
requires links to be forged between moko, memory, and identity. Te Awekotuku’s primary focus 
is not a historical enquiry about tā moko, rather she is concerned with utilising the historical 
context into which tā moko is situated to validate its transhistorical nature and to situate the 
practice within living Māori culture.  
Nikora, Higgins, and Te Awekotuku continue the linkage between moko and belonging 
and identity. Nikora and Te Awekotuku seek to locate tattooing, within a paradigm of meaning 
determined by the participant. Anchoring meaning to the participants’ own perceptions allows 
group mediums, like moko, to act as expressions of personal identity often related to social or 
cultural group membership and belonging.464 Thus, though moko is increasingly individualised, 
it is still only within the Māori social context that that individuation is validated. However, to 
further our understanding of tā moko demands that we further expand our knowledge of the 
channels that feed into this social context and the ways in which these channels are interlinked. 
Identifying these channels in a modern context proves particularly challenging, since 
more and more channels have opened as a result of colonisation and globalisation, each of which 
contributes to the expansion of the tā moko network. For instance, as tā moko becomes 
increasingly mainstream, more public measures, such as the development of kirituhi and 
educational outreach, are being taken to protect moko and its accompanying narratives.465 
Kirituhi, meaning “skin art” or “skin writing,” is a form of tattooing based upon Māori designs 
and motifs but which lacks the traditional Māori cultural elements, such as whakapapa, contained 
in moko. For many Māori, kirituhi is the only respectful way for an individual outside of Māori 
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culture to honour the tattooing tradition within Māori culture since tā moko is bound to Māori 
sociality and affirms individuated belonging within that social context. According to the Te 
Whāriki website, “only .05% of moko is about tattooing,” the rest is about belonging and 
whakapapa.466 Thus, kirituhi protects signals important to those of Māori descent by affording 
cultural group outsiders a similar means of expression without it being laden with signals 
significant to members of Māori groups.  
Articles like Hudson’s, on the widely read about.com site, are regularly featured and not 
only introduce the reader (presumably non-Māori) to moko and kirituhi, but stress the disrespect 
and insulting nature of copying moko designs.467 The emergence of a global education initiative 
about moko and kirituhi for non-Māori is indicative of the thriving nature of Māori culture and 
the universal reach of its influence. In fact, a large portion of current tā moko narratives can be 
understood through this idea of education. Like kirituhi, education on moko is intended to bring 
awareness to those outside of Māori groups of the intimate nature of tā moko and to deter them 
from giving misleading and disrespectful signals by acquiring an identity-based cultural mark 
from a group they cannot be a part of because they lack the appropriate whakapapa needed to 
claim such a right. Indeed, this small example demonstrates how complex the associations 
between Pākehā, kirituhi, and Māori identity are, and, yet, represent only the tiniest portion of all 
of the connections that comprise tā moko. 
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Tā moko narratives are many and varied. Over the years, they have shifted from Māori specific 
codes of conduct and ways of being in the world, to staunch reactions against tā moko, to 
narratives crafted around the idea of Māori as an all but extinct people whose practices were in 
need of salvation. However, in one way or another, each shapes a part of Māori identity.  
In addition to conveying in-group/out-group dynamics, moko maintains linkages to 
establishing proper tikanga and group solidarity. Although tā moko does not reinforce social 
structure to the extent it once did, it continues as an external reminder to group members of 
shared commonalities that help to maintain cultural stability by identifying recurrent patterns of 
existence that are bound to tradition and continuity. Thus, as Gell suggests in his emphasis on 
moko as a by-product of the Māori social landscape, the collective context of moko within the 
Māori collective landscape articulates and defines identity.468  
 As Māori work to reinstate their own narratives about tā moko, grounded in tikanga 
Māori and mātauranga Māori, all other narratives remain, creating a confluence. Whilst this 
confluence generates a host of valuable material about tā moko and stresses its continual 
significance for Māori identity, simultaneously, it opens the door for further mythologisation and 
romanticisation of tā moko. Instead of interacting with this myriad of narratives, which can prove 
daunting, some researchers choose to ignore certain narratives, opting instead for outdated 
information that is more easily packaged but which omits many of the associations which shape 
tā moko.  
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 In the next chapter, I analyse a case study primarily shaped by 19th and 20th century 
Pākehā sources as a representation of a contemporary tā moko narrative shaped by evolutionary 
explanation. This thesis delves into the issues that emerge from Cisco’s cultural evolutionary 
evaluation of tā moko which is incongruent with more recent narratives, reviewed above, which 
are enriched with Māori ontology and epistemology. In seeking to explain tā moko through a 
costly signalling framework, Cisco reinvents an inaccurate and romanticised version of Māori tā 
moko which refutes Māori narratives and, in fact, re-colonises them through the denial of 
narrative assemblage. I utilise the Cisco case study as a foil to highlight broader issues, 
especially those of a politico-ethical nature, when evolutionary explanation, and, in this case, 
costly signalling theory, is applied to culture.  
 The following chapter reveals how case studies, even when seemingly backed by credible 
research, can serve to reinforce the long-standing, negative impact positivism has had on 
indigenous practice, generally, and tā moko, specifically. My analysis of the following case 
study highlights the need for scholars to actively and continually strive to decolonise indigenous 
practices. As scientific explanations become more prevalent within the social sciences and 
humanities, it is imperative to draw attention to the dangers and misnomers generated from a 












Introduction and Background 
Chapter Two revealed the complexity and depth of tā moko narratives. The relational narrative 
complexes that both Māori and Pākehā have contributed to the development of a narrative web, 
interwoven with innumerable associations and linkages central to the development and 
perpetuation of tā moko. Yet, this web is also falls victim to Sober’s mirages and fogs. At times, 
tā moko narratives were shown to be clouded; we simply could not see the full picture. It is 
doubtful we will ever be privy to the picture in its entirety. I am thinking, specifically, of the 
mystery that envelops pre-contact tā moko and the inaccessibility of many of the intentions and 
motivations which lie behind the fashioning of tā moko narratives. With deeper exploration, 
undoubtedly we would find that certain connections present within the narratives seem apparent 
but remain untraceable.  
More concerning, however, and more relevant to the present study, are the many mirages, 
like those the case study I analyse in this chapter reveals, which engender inaccurate perceptions 
of tā moko but which have now imbedded themselves in the tā moko narrative web. I think of the 
gross reactions of early Pākehā to tā moko, the unattributed connections between tā moko and 
various aspects of Māori groups, such as the idea that it serves as an indicator of rank, and the 
colonial rhetoric which frames many tā moko narratives and has, only relatively recently, been 
challenged and overturned through the strenuous efforts of Māori scholars. One might expect 
that once the mirage is seen for what it is, or, rather, for what it is not, that others might not be 
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drawn to it. However, the danger of the mirage is that it appears to be real and continues to entice 
by virtue of its possibility. 
This chapter is framed around the pursuit of a mirage. It commences with a critical 
analysis of one application of costly signalling theory to Māori tā moko intended to illuminate 
underlying issues when employing evolutionary explanations to explain cultural practice. 
Importantly, this chapter underscores the need for costly signalling theory to evolve into a 
decolonised, reflexive approach which incorporates emic perspectives of Māori and indigenous 
practice.  
For this discussion, I rely on a thesis by Cisco. Whilst I recognise that utilising a master’s 
thesis within a doctoral dissertation is unorthodox, I turn to her work solely as a foil to illustrate 
some of the challenges that occur when attempting to use evolutionary explanations to account 
for indigenous cultural practice and to specifically highlight ways that the deep politico-ethical 
concerns her research generates could be at least partially remedied by relying on a more 
inclusive and integrative approach which incorporates much of the research already presented in 
Chapter Two. This analysis provides sets the foundation for Chapter Four where I present an 
updated model for Māori tā moko which is both integrative and symmetrical.     
I demonstrate that Cisco’s warfare hypothesis is based on questionable and disputed 
evidence from early Pākehā accounts. These sources are subject to a “mythology of violence,” 
prevalent throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries.469 Utilising narrative assemblage as an 
approach to analyse other sources, both early and contemporary, I aim to illustrate that Cisco’s 
warfare hypothesis has been tailored to fit an erroneous historical view of Māori culture which 
raises broader questions about the utility of costly signalling theory when applied to culture. 
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The Cisco case study seeks to apply costly signalling theory to account for what she calls 
“traditional” Māori tā moko. She clarifies this “traditional” label as referring to Māori tattooing 
practice prior to the mid-20th century. Within the case study, the development of moko is 
attributed to three main components of the Māori world. One of these parts is the stratification of 
Māori society, which Cisco maintains is comprised of three tiers and three social classes. The 
second part is rampant warfare, which Cisco argues is affirmed by cannibalism and the existence 
of pā (Māori fortified village). Social rank accounts for the third component, which, according to 
Cisco, informed marriage practices and achievable status.470 After attempting to detail features of 
Māori society that generated the need for tā moko to develop, Cisco explores two ultimate-level 
explanations of moko derived from costly signalling theory. 
In this chapter, I specifically focus on the first part of Cisco’s ultimate-level explanation 
of male moko, which she refers to as the warfare hypothesis. The warfare hypothesis is 
comprised of two sub-hypotheses: 1) the ally hypothesis and 2) the enemy hypothesis. Each of 
these sub-hypotheses is comprised of four predictions, which frames the case study evaluation of 
moko as a costly signal. 
 For the ally-hypothesis, Cisco firstly predicts moko to be permanent and to overtly 
identify one’s affiliation to a group. Secondly, Cisco posits that moko should foster cooperative 
behaviour between group members by demonstrating one’s cooperative intent, particularly 
during war. Thirdly, Cisco predicts that moko should serve as a painful expression of one’s 
“bravery and willingness to sacrifice for the group.”471 Lastly, “to the extent that they were 
added prior to battle,” Cisco expects moko to advertise one’s commitment to his allies.472 
                                                 





 The enemy-hypothesis firstly predicts that moko provides intimidating information about 
the mau moko for the enemy. Secondly, Cisco forecasts moko to advertise the identity of mau 
moko, which she identifies as tribal or clan. By expressing one’s affiliation, moko allows allies 
to be easily differentiated from enemies. Thirdly, “to the extent that they were added prior to 
battle, male moko should be intended to intimidate enemies in battle.” Finally, for moko to be a 
costly signal of enemy quality, Cisco asserts that Māori should confirm that moko was used in 
warfare “to intimidate enemies.”473 
 After utilising ethnographic and historical sources to “test” her hypotheses, Cisco 
concludes that “historical” moko served as a costly signal, indicating “the individual’s quality as 
a potential ally and enemy.” One’s cooperative intent, willingness to sacrifice, and commitment 
to the group was signalled by the permanence of moko, the pain associated with the process, and 
its use as a quick heuristic for identification purposes. Furthermore, Cisco observes moko to 
broadcast individual enemy quality, by expressing certain traits such as “bravery and ferocity.”474  
 The chapter commences with a discussion of tikanga Māori which sheds light on some of 
my initial politico-ethical concerns by engaging with Cisco’s disengagement with tapu (sacred or 
set apart), mana (power, authority, prestige) and whakapapa.475 Secondly, I delve into the issues 
that arise as a result of Cisco’s delimitation of “the tradition of moko” as chiselled moko and its 
effect on the linkage she attempts to forge between moko and tradition. I then analyse Cisco’s 
treatment of Māori warfare and social structure which anchor her warfare hypothesis. Lastly, 
after critiquing her endemic view of Māori warfare based upon questionable assumptions about 
pre-contact Māori social structure, I highlight further implications from the application of costly 
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signalling theory to cultural practice as revealed through my analysis of the Cisco case study. 




This section focuses on tikanga Māori, including tapu, mana, and whakapapa, in order to stress 
its significance when investigating any feature of Māori culture and to reveal certain 
shortcomings that arise as a result of its absence. Within the Cisco case study, the development 
of tā moko is attributed to three main components of Māori society, including social 
stratification, rampant warfare, and social rank, which she then utilises to support her argument 
for tā moko as a costly signal. However, Cisco does not include a discussion of tikanga Māori or 
mātauranga Māori which form the backdrop of Māori society. Thus, the Cisco case study 
demonstrates the deleterious effects when an enquiry lacks the necessary emic framework which 
must be incorporated into any investigation of Māori society and its practices if we hope to avoid 
the trap of the mirage. This dearth is especially apparent in her presentation of tapu, mana, and 
whakapapa, where she makes only limited references to these massively important components 
within tikanga Māori. By not engaging with the complexities of tikanga Māori, it becomes 
evident that Cisco’s argument lacks the necessary Māori framework to support her interpretation 
of tā moko. Without acknowledging the deeper conceptual undercurrents of the social context in 
which tā moko exists and was developed, certain misunderstandings about the practice arise 
which diminish the accuracy and impact of any argument.  
 Any Māori cultural practice, including tā moko, cannot be understood without reference 
to tikanga Māori, which Cisco neglects to mention. Tikanga Māori is formed through the 
accumulation of generations of mātauranga Māori, and encompasses many aspects of life. In 
141 
 
addition to its other conceptions, tikanga Māori offers mechanisms for control over social 
relationships and notions of individuality, provides a sense of Māori ethics, and can be used as a 
normative system which provides Māori with guidance for correct behaviour, conduct, and 
reconciliation processes when those guidelines are breached.476 Mead, however, argues for a 
broader perspective of tikanga Māori which situates it within mātauranga Māori.477 In describing 
the active and outward nature of tikanga Māori, Mead further elaborates upon this systemic 
relationship: “Tikanga Māori might be described as Māori philosophy in practice and as the 
practical face of Māori knowledge.”478 In adhering to the reflexive aims of narrative assemblage, 
it is essential to note that, whilst Māori have a shared tikanga and mātauranga, regional 
variations do exist in the outward expression and understanding of related concepts.479 However, 
it is Mead’s generalised presentation of tikanga Māori as contextualised within mātauranga 
Māori that frames the following discussions of tapu, mana, and whakapapa. 
Tapu 
  
Though Cisco seems unaware of the full scope of tikanga Māori within Māori culture and its 
contemporary relevance, tapu, mana, and whakapapa do appear in her work. Cisco defines tapu 
as “sacred.” No discussion of how that definition translates within a Māori context is provided. 
Cisco’s specific focus is on the role tapu played in delineating social status and associated 
activities. For example, she states that the special status of tohunga allowed them to engage in 
tapu activities, such as cutting the hair of an ariki (chief) and dealing with the resultant 
bloodshed of tā moko. Citing Robley, Cisco also uses tapu to explain why tohunga and puhi (first 
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born daughters of high-ranking chiefs) reportedly did not wear moko, since their “special status” 
did not permit them to. 480  
One reason why Cisco’s limited employment of tapu is ineffectual is because she does 
not understand its pervasiveness for Māori which simple examples and static applications do not 
convey. Metge and Irwin observe that tapu is difficult to translate into Western languages 
precisely because of its pervasive, lived quality, which translations like “holy,” “sacred,” 
“prohibited,” and “taboo” fail to capture. 481 These are the same definitions of tapu Cisco puts 
forth.  
Although we struggle to translate tapu into English, its role within tikanga Māori can be 
better described and must be for any study pertaining to Māori practices. In part, tapu is the 
power and influence of the gods; since everything was created by the gods, including man, 
everything has tapu.482 Father Catherin Servant maintained that no other concept was more 
frequently used by pre-contact Māori groups; tapu regulated religion, natural resources, animals, 
people, politics, and governed every facet of life.483 In reflecting upon the pervasiveness of tapu, 
Tiaki Mitira maintains that “tapu affected the lives and actions of all members of the tribe, 
according to their social scale, and it had a far-reaching effect on all social life and individual 
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481 Metge, Rautahi, 58-9; Irwin, Māori Religion, 24; Edward Shortland, Traditions and Superstitions, 101; Adrian 
M. Leske, “The Role of the Tohunga-Past and Present,” Religious Studies and Theology 26, no. 2 (2008): 137; Jean 
Smith, “Tapu Removal in Maori Religion,” The Journal of the Polynesian Society 83(1974): 39. Michael P. Shirres, 
“Tapu,” in Customary Concepts of the Maori: A Source Book for Maori Studies Students, ed. Sidney Moko Mead 
(Wellington: Department of Maori Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 1984), 72. 
482 Cleve Barlow, Tikanga Whakaaro: Key Concepts in Māori Culture (South Melbourne, Victoria, AUS: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 128. 
483 Father Catherin Servant, Customs and Habits of the New Zealanders, 1838-42, trans. J. Glasgow (Wellington: 
A.H. and A.W. Reed, 1973), 34. 
143 
 
behaviour.”484 For pre-contact Māori, tapu pervaded every aspect of the social and environmental 
landscape and had numerous worldly and cosmic associations, many of which endure today. 
Reflections by Michael Shirres and Te Awekotuku also reveal that the context dependency of the 
meaning of tapu allows it to have a wide range of interpretations, making it highly adaptable to 
contemporary circumstances.485 
Where Cisco individuates tapu, Mead focuses on its social quality. Mead draws attention 
to the important role social identity plays for Māori as expressed through the social nature of 
tikanga Māori which is expressed by tapu. To appreciate tapu with regards to humans, Mead 
states that it must be understood as the expression of a personal attribute within the context of its 
social establishment, public recognition, and group affirmation.486 Mead elaborates, stating that 
“the idea of tapu works best when” it “is recognised, known and accepted by the community at 
large. To be somebody is to know one’s identity, be aware of one’s personal tapu, and be known 
to others within the group.”487 Thus, whilst Mead acknowledges an individualised aspect of tapu, 
it is only within the wider context of the group and tikanga which binds the group together that 
tapu is affirmed. 
Cisco’s focus on an individualised conception of tapu highlights costly signalling 
theory’s individuated orientation.488 Yet, to divorce tapu from its tikanga Māori underpinnings 
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and to ignore its social aspect reveals how cultural practices frequently require a flexibility that 
evolutionary explanations which hinge on individual-level selection struggle to accommodate. 
Instead of acknowledging the difficulties posed in trying to reconcile the individual and group 
connotations of tapu, Cisco chooses to mould her tā moko case study to better fit costly 
signalling theory. This raises a serious global concern in the juncture where costly signalling 
theory meets cultural practice. Indeed, if an explanation of tā moko is to have real explanatory 
power, it is essential that it has the appropriate mechanisms to function on multiple levels which, 
at minimum, appeal to both the individual and the group and which is relevant to its lived form.  
Mana 
 
This concern bleeds into Cisco’s portrayal of Māori beliefs and practices as derived from a static, 
fixed, and individually-orientated theology continues with her investigation of mana which she 
also divorces from tikanga Māori. From the outset, this disconnect is problematic, because, as 
Metge asserts, tapu is so interdependent with other aspects of the Māori cosmos, especially mana 
and whakapapa, that we cannot even understand it as separate from the underlying spiritual 
system from which it comes.489 Irwin clarifies that everything within the Māori cosmos is bound 
together; thus to understand Māori spirituality, one must look at each variable not as 
independent, but as interdependent and part of a holistic worldview in which everything is 
related.490 Even the humans and the gods (atua) are linked through a spiritual contract which 
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binds the two together and which is expressed through the conceptual underpinnings of Māori 
spirituality.  
 Mana is first mentioned in Cisco’s discussion of social stratification, where she maintains 
that it is “obtained through acts of generosity and bravery” and equates it to status. Though mana 
is periodically referenced throughout Cisco’s work, and more so than tapu, it is almost 
exclusively mentioned as a means to argue for moko as an acquired expression of individual 
status. Once again, the deep social dimensions of mana reflected in tikanga Māori and their 
impact on individual expressions of mana are overlooked, though there is a literature to support 
and expound upon this relationship. 
Cleve Barlow describes mana in the pre-contact Māori world as “the enduring, 
indestructible power of the Gods,” emphasising that, like tapu, mana relates back to primordial 
origins. He suggests that mana’s meaning shifted over time to still include the power of the gods 
but also to incorporate the “power of the ancestors,” the “power of the land,” and the “power of 
the individual.”491 Barlow identifies two key types of mana: mana tūpuna and mana tangata.  
Mana tūpuna comes directly through whakapapa. It is power or authority inherited 
through one’s family line. Thus, its manifestation depends entirely upon one’s position within 
the group as determined by his or her whakapapa. This type of mana requires maintenance and 
certain rituals and obligations are required to sustain it.492  
Mana tangata is individual power gained through one’s willingness and ability to acquire 
skills and knowledge within particular areas. This is the type of mana that is referenced within 
the Cisco case study, likely because it better aligns with the individuated tendencies of costly 
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signalling theory.493 For example, a Māori male might acquire mana tangata through superior 
weaponry or combat skills. A Māori woman might acquire hers through child-rearing skill, 
marae duties, and by attending to visitors.494 However, this is only a small part of the role of 
mana within Māori society. 
Mead explains that mana is about the place of the individual within a social group, and 
both types of mana Barlow presents depend upon a deeply embedded sense of sociality which is 
missing from Cisco’s portrayal of mana. For mana tūpuna it is the position of the individual 
within the group as determined by whakapapa. Mana comes from one’s ancestors, which 
provides a power “socially founded upon kinship, parents, whānau, hapū, and iwi.”495 Every 
person inherits a certain amount of mana which depends upon his ancestors’ social position, 
parents’ achievements, how the family has been regarded by others, and what contributions the 
family has brought to the group.496 In fact, a person’s life potential greatly depends upon their 
parents and what sort of “legacy” was inherited.497 For mana tangata it is individually expressed 
traits that have wider group benefits. Mead provides a useful analogy in which she equates mana 
to a lake into which various streams flow. Though the streams themselves express individual 
traits, like excellence in warfare or particular artistic talent, these traits serve the wider group. 
For instance, having skilled warriors ensures safety for the group if and when an external threat 
arises.  
Mead stresses that the personal mana of mana tangata is based upon contributions to the 
group that an individual makes over time. Thus, for a person to acquire his or her personal mana 
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requires public recognition. In fact, mana is often increased through public events and 
performances, where one’s achievements and skills are recognised by the outer community.498 
Seemingly, those events which cause individual mana to increase only do so because the group 
affirms these traits and sets up a socially endorsed framework for the expression of mana. Any 
behaviour that increases mana on an individual level does so because of the merit it brings to the 
group. Individual acts that increase individual mana, simultaneously, benefit the group and 




As Mead emphasises, mana and tapu cannot be understood aside from whakapapa; they are 
essential to Māori holistic reality. Thus, all of these concepts are imperative to any discussion of 
moko and particularly to the link Cisco mentions between moko and tradition. Whilst, Cisco 
barely mentions whakapapa, it serves as the foundation for Māori worldly and cosmic 
conceptions and articulates social structure by situating both the group and its members into the 
cosmos through ties to ancestors. 499 Every living thing has a whakapapa passed down from the 
gods to the present.500 Thus, any discussion of Māori should also incorporate whakapapa.  
Whakapapa literally means to “lay one thing upon another,” specifically one generation 
upon another.501 Āpirana Ngata expounds: “Whakapapa is the process of laying one thing upon 
another. If you visualise the foundation ancestors as the first generation, the next and succeeding 
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ancestors are placed on them in ordered layers.”502 Te Awekotuku echoes this, referring to 
whakapapa as the “literal making of layers of descent.”503  
Whakapapa is intended to be traced back to the beginning of time, in order to anchor the 
present individual in his Māori history and tradition. The layering effect of whakapapa, as 
generations through time, produces a multi-directional ancestral continuity that enables Māori to 
trace their genealogical ties backward to their ancestors and forward to their children.504 The 
effect is one of infinite, multi-directional transmission. 
For Māori, whakapapa has continuously been one of the highest forms of knowledge and 
it is imperative to preserve it. Barlow stresses the significance of its conservation since it is 
through genealogy and kinship that economic alliances were formed and the social mechanism 
through which chiefs gained and legitimised their power, which today is used to authenticate 
identity and belonging within Māori groups.505 Due to its deep social resonance, Irwin refers to 
whakapapa as the “axel of strength” for Māori groups.506 To keep groups strong, even today, 
group members are expected to know their genealogy and to transmit their whakapapa to their 
children to ensure “that they, too, may develop pride and a sense of belonging through an 
understanding of roots of heritage.”507 
Unquestionably, tikanga Māori is woven with complexity. Tapu, mana, and whakapapa, 
though integral to any enquiry into Māori culture, represent only a fraction of tikanga Māori. 
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Yet, by not engaging more fully with these terms and by relying on narrow and individuated 
conceptions that better coincide with the costly signalling framework, Cisco’s argument reads 
more like the 19th and early 20th century ethnographic accounts upon which she relies that 
rudimentarily portray Māori as the other, rather than a contemporary, historical investigation of 
tā moko which at least attempts to incorporate a deeper understanding of Māori groups in their 
own right. Said states that “ideas, cultures, and histories cannot be understood or studied without 
their force, or more precisely their configurations of power, also being studied.”508 By not 
understanding the power dynamics between coloniser and colonised that play out in the sources 
Cisco draws from in her discussions of tapu, mana, and whakapapa, she, presumably 
inadvertently, ignores Māori cultural mandates over Māori history, despite the fact that there are 
any number of sources which would have afforded her the opportunity to equally honour Māori 
authority on Māori topics.  
“Tradition of Moko”: A Comparison with New Zealand Scholarship 
Cisco’s failure to incorporate tikanga Māori in her analysis of tā moko seriously impairs her 
account, not least in the link to tradition she attempts to forge. Traditional facial moko is the 
term Cisco uses to refer to Māori facial tattooing practices prior to the mid-20th century. 
Although she admits prior incarnations of tattooing, Cisco’s study includes only the chiselled 
moko as the “tradition” of moko.509 However, moko existed both before and after its chiselled 
form, so an entire lineage of moko exists which is not accounted for in Cisco’s reference to the 
“tradition” of moko.510 As Pacific curator Sean Mallon explains, often tradition is problematic 
because the terms of its employment insinuate “an evolutionary linear progression from the past 
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to the present,” alongside a sense of “timelessness” which contributes to static portrayals of 
dynamic practices.511  
By identifying chiselled moko as its only traditional form, Cisco paints a fractional 
picture of moko which undermines its whakapapa. Tā moko is the traditional Māori tattooing 
practice and chiselled moko part of that lineage. However, I find it specious to limit discussions 
of the entire moko lineage solely to chiselled moko, when there were other forms of moko prior 
to the chiselled moko, such as moko kurī, and different forms after the chisel technique faded 
away, like the needle method and contemporary tattoo machine.512 In fact, in the last couple of 
decades, chiselled moko has experienced a resurgence.513 The words of Mallon capture the 
colonial overtones and etic context of Cisco’s delimitation. 
 For the uncritical writer, the arrival of Europeans in  the Pacific disrupted the  
“traditional” societies of its peoples. Around this “moment of contact” with  
Europeans, everything before their arrival is “traditional” and all that follows  
is degeneration and deviation from a life more constant and coherent. As Pacific  
 historians will tell you, in reality the “moment of contact” with Europeans extended  
over long periods of time.514  
 
Indeed, Cisco’s presentation of moko gives the impression that moko before and after the 
chiselling technique is not part of the tradition of moko (she even labels these as non-traditional), 
when, in fact, moko has its own whakapapa which would comprise what Cisco labels as the 
tradition of moko. 
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Cisco goes on to state that “the traditional nature of moko also made it a reliable signal in 
ways usually not included in discussions of costly signaling theory.”515 After citing some 
differential costs of moko based upon variations in “traditionally ascribed statuses,” which Cisco 
uses to determine that only persons of certain rank could have moko, she then proposes that the 
“traditional regulation” of moko is what enabled it to be “read,” thus ensuring its honesty.516 The 
specifics of Cisco’s assertions and the wider implications they point to are dealt with in greater 
detail in following sections. Here, my focus is to stress that when trying to analyse this 
discussion, one is left bewildered about what Cisco means by tradition and, moreover, how it is 
applicable to Māori tā moko.  
Undoubtedly, Cisco’s point about integrating discussions of tradition into costly 
signalling theory is novel and interesting. However, Cisco undermines her own suggestion 
through the delimitations she has imposed on the tā moko tradition. Had Cisco turned to more 
contemporary sources on Māori moko, she would have found support for her position but also 
realised that this connection is already explicitly developed within the current literature on moko, 
albeit without the costly signalling framework. 
Nikora emphasises the link between moko and tradition for Māori by conceptualising 
Māori ancestors as embodied within the whakapapa moko encodes. 
the decision to take the marking is about continuity, affirmation, identity, and 
commitment. It is also about wearing those ancestors, carrying them into the  
future; as their moko become a companion, a salient being with its own life force,  
its own integrity and power, beyond the face.517 
 
The power and life of those ancestors is perpetuated through the living tradition of tā moko. Like 
King who acknowledges a deep and continuous association between moko and Māori identity, 
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Nikora utilises the cross-chronological aspects of moko to emphasise the resonance of 
whakapapa both forward into the future and backward into time, which anchors the mau moko in 
a multi-directional lineage of belonging essential to an individual’s self-definition within a Māori 
context. Nikora conceptualises moko as having continuity with the past, underscoring that moko 
is part of an unbroken tradition.518 
Whilst Nikora still attributes moko to individual identity anchored within the larger group 
vis-à-vis whakapapa, she simultaneously stresses that moko is important to the establishment of 
Māori tradition. Rather than solely operating as a within-group signal to affirm identity, Nikora 
suggests that by reinforcing historical continuity moko may serve an integral role in creating 
“tradition” and sustaining cultural information essential to cultural continuity, whilst, 
simultaneously, demarcating Māori from non-Māori. Ellis explains that moko reflects “the 
genealogies that link the individual to the extended family and the tribe, and to the land and the 
divine,” which “make the individual part of the community and give her or him a standing place 
in the world.”519 Moko publicly validates the connection between the mau moko and his 
whakapapa by serving as a visible representation of the relationship of the individual wearer to 
his past and future by binding him to a specific group via his ancestors and descendants. Orbell 
reports that families even retain their own special moko designs which solely belong to and are 
transmitted from father to son.520  
As previously noted in Chapter Two, Higgins suggests that moko is bound not only to 
identity but to a historical continuity embedded within the tradition that is capable of stabilising 
group identity even in rapidly changing cultural circumstances. Like Te Awekotuku, Higgins 
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makes an important correlation between maintaining Māori group identity and the survival of 
moko kauae in the 20th century.521 Higgins stresses the current state of moko as identity or 
reclamation of identity through whakapapa.522 The self-reflection provided by the women 
consulted in Higgins’ fieldwork supports this view.523 All women from Higgins’ doctoral 
research attached immense significance to the acquisition of moko as a reflection of their 
individual and social identities. Whakapapa anchored these women as they traversed life, 
attempting to gain an understanding of themselves and the world in which they live. Through 
exploring and embracing their whakapapa, these women found that, despite the vast tumult 
which typified their lives, they could rediscover their identities through the reappropriation of 
specifically Māori elements.524  
 Te Awekotuku stresses the linkage of moko to Māori tradition as a space for the 
decolonisation of Māori cultural practices. To Te Awekotuku, moko serves as an “enduring 
emblem of Māori femininity and strength, visible and uncompromising in an era of political 
conflict,” and signalled an “enhancement of Māori women’s beauty on Māori terms.”525 As time 
passed and many traditional elements were lost, moko kauae remained as an affirmation of 
Māori endurance and continued to serve as an anchor for Māori identity.526 Te Awekotuku lauds 
moko as a means to empower Māori by visibly opposing colonising powers that sought to 
obliterate Māori traditions which challenged their agenda. For Te Awekotuku, to challenge the 
colonial agenda still present within New Zealand, Māori must forge new associations between 
moko, memory, and identity. 
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This sample of current literature offers substantial backing to establish a connection 
between moko and tradition. Had Cisco engaged with current discussions about the relationship 
of moko to tradition vis-à-vis whakapapa, her link between moko and tradition could have been 
better defined and further explicated. However, Cisco diminishes the impact of her own work by 
delimiting her definition of “traditional facial moko,” since a singular focus on ethnographic 
presentations of chiselled moko of the late 19th century does not grant space for the inclusion of 
current discussions about the tradition of moko which are present in contemporary, Māori 
sources. 
Warfare and Social Structure 
 
Cisco’s decision to delimit the tradition of tā moko to its chiselled incarnation is not without 
benefit, as it allows her to more effectively establish the nexus between moko and warfare so 
central to her warfare hypothesis. Most of us cannot help but shudder when thinking of having a 
chisel driven into our faces. The perceived “violent” associations with such a practice easily and 
naturally blur into “violence” of war. Yet, this is an etic perspective of an emic practice which 
neglects its underlying, indigenous interpretations, opting instead for an essentialised, “violent” 
other.  
 Rampant warfare and Māori social structure comprise two of the three components of the 
tri-partite backdrop of Cisco’s warfare hypothesis. Since Cisco utilises Māori social structure as 
support for her understanding of Māori warfare, I will explore the two in tandem throughout this 
section. Cisco substantiates her claims of the prevalence of Māori warfare upon early explorer 
and ethnographic accounts and archaeological evidence, a number of which were presented in 
Chapter Two. Her presentation of social structure is based upon these same early accounts, as 
well as the work of Simmons. However, Cisco does not stop to question or critically engage with 
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these. It is the aim of this section to utilise the Cisco case study as a foil for further exploration 
and critique of the consequences that erroneous assertions about Māori warfare and social 
structure have on claims about moko as a costly signal.  
Two main issues emerge from Cisco’s focus on Māori warfare to construct her 
hypothesis of moko as a costly signal: 1) Māori warfare has likely been over-exaggerated and 2) 
warfare has been used to perpetuate the idea of Māori as noble savages. These issues point to a 
notable weakness in Cisco’s attribution of moko to warfare, particularly since tā moko may have 
developed and certainly has been perpetuated during non-warfare periods. Cisco’s understanding 
of Māori social structure also warrants further attention, as confusion arises regarding her 
presentation of pre-contact Māori social structure and its relationship to warfare and tā moko.  
As evidenced by Cisco’s research, it is not difficult to substantiate a connection between 
moko and warfare from the early sources. Recall from Chapter Two that the connection between 
moko and warfare is prevalent throughout literature from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century. 
Polack argues for a connection between moko and war, asserting that moko served as a 
preparatory tool to help Māori warriors cope with the pain of injuries they might sustain during 
war.527 Similarly, Robley off-handedly links moko to ferociousness in war but offers no 
substantiation for this claim.528 Brown ties moko to making a more powerful and intimidating 
impression on enemies.529 In questioning the civility of colonisation, Taylor lauds Māori 
inclinations toward war as the primary reason they were able to withstand colonial pressures.530 
Here, Taylor depicts a Māori propensity toward warfare as a type of salvation for Māori groups, 
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which is indicative of the tendency of colonial writers to perpetuate romanticised notions of 
Māori. 
Mythologised and romantic views of Māori were propagated throughout the 19th and 20th 
by the perception of Māori as a dying people whose traditions were rapidly disappearing and, 
thus, needed to be recorded as quickly as possible.531 As Peter Bellwood cautions, we must 
remember that during this time “writers like Smith and Best were taking Polynesian traditions at 
their face value, without taking into account the fact that many of these traditions were collected 
a century after initial European contact.”532 Bellwood’s warning necessitates an awareness that 
some of the information collected and collated by early ethnographers and historians is suspect 
and may have led to erroneous ideas and claims about pre-contact Māori groups.533 Yet, Cisco 
seems unaware of this, aside from a single reference toward the end of her thesis in which she 
exhibits a sentience of these biases. For instance, citing Tregear, Cisco generates further support 
for her hypotheses, quoting that “war was the only pastime that in his heart of hearts the Māori 
truly loved.”534 This unfortunate result of this Red Savage view, as labelled by Belich, is an 
essentialising of Māori akin to the rhetoric of “dominant colonial ideology” in which the Māori 
other is portrayed as “native and primitive.”535  
More recently, scholars have worked to overturn some of these colonial assumptions 
about Māori violence as related to warfare, and the incorporation of these counter-positions 
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would have infused the case study with greater symmetry and allowed for decolonisation. 
Current research indicates that the prevalence and significance of pre-contact Māori warfare has 
been exaggerated into what Thompson calls a “mythology of violence.”536 Sheilagh Walker 
writes that “colonisation is also a discourse of war.”537 Walker goes on to compellingly describe 
the viciousness of the colonising process, explaining how all too often Māori have been lauded 
for their physical prowess viewed as a by-product of their constant pre-contact warring, yet, 
simultaneously, denounced for their ineptitude. Nevertheless, aside from one single passing 
reference to a source from William Ahrens which challenges the view of Māori as cannibals, 
Cisco seems unaware of the controversies surrounding the portrayal of Māori as blood-thirsty 
war mongers whose only pastime is war.538  
The narrative assemblage offers further insight into the etic, selective processes which 
define Cisco’s research. According to Doniger, when recounting a narrative, we select certain 
elements as real. Those elements we select are generally based upon patterns that we deem 
significant because they align with what we have been taught or what “we invent for 
ourselves.”539 In terms of the selective mechanisms of the narrative assemblage, Cisco’s lack of 
familiarity with tikanga Māori and mātauranga Māori means that she will select more familiar 
material. Based upon Doniger’s assertions, as a Western non-Māori whose research lacks certain 
concepts fundamental to Māori ontology, we might predict Cisco to gravitate more toward 
Western narratives, which she, in fact, does.  
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Unfortunately, these Western narratives of tā moko, upon which Cisco’s research 
scaffolds, are largely shaped by a colonial ethos which tended to “pathologise, criminalise, or 
marginalise tattoo wearers.”540 Such marginalisation caused moko to be viewed as a negative 
signal both within and without Māori cultural groups in New Zealand. To Nikora, viewing moko 
in this way caused misidentification of what moko actually conveys within an indigenous group 
like the Māori where tattooing is instrumental in “self-identity and expression.”541 Douglas 
supports Nikora, suggesting that the conception of moko as intimidation, is likely a European 
interpretation of tā moko, based upon preconceived notions of tattooing outside of the relevant 
Pacific context.542  
 The support to which Cisco turns for her linkage between tā moko and warfare is not 
limited to anthropological and historical accounts. According to Thompson, the idea of a 
“normal warrior-type” evolved from 18th and 19th century European literature about New 
Zealand. The negative stereotype of Māori as violent and aggressive is an attempt by colonial 
powers to exploit damaging imaging to help displace the Māori who represented a much larger 
and more powerful presence within New Zealand.543 This same negative stereotyping is now 
being supported by scientific research.  
In 2006, a “warrior-gene” was discovered and used to justify the assumption that Māori 
are more prone to violence than other groups. Hook cautions that turning to science to explicate 
romanticised, Māori characteristics is indicative of a nascent eugenics movement, serving only to 
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reinforce existing mythologies of violence.544 Not only does Cisco rely upon sources that 
develop negative stereotypes about Māori, but, by integrating these mythologised and 
romanticised accounts into her own arguments, she perpetuates their dissemination. 
There are also influences within the costly signalling literature, particularly as it relates to 
religion, which further explain Cisco’s dependency upon the attribution of tā moko to warfare 
and which underscore the scientific directive behind such linkages. For instance, Irons isolates 
warfare as one of two major social problems demanding a solution that resulted in the 
development of costly religious behaviours.545 War tempts individuals to defect from cooperating 
in order to save their own lives. Costly rituals amongst men enforce the cooperation necessary to 
ensure that group members remain dedicated to the group during times of war even when the 
desire to defect is high.546 Each time an individual defects, it puts remaining group members at 
greater risk. Pressure to not defect is beneficial to all group members, because it instils 
confidence in them that even in the most intense conflicts fellow group members will not desert, 
leaving the rest to face the enemy alone. These findings prompt Irons to predict that regular 
warfare results in a need for enforced solidarity which demands an increase in “reliable signals 
of intra-group commitment.”547  
In addition to utilising Irons to shape the connection she develops between Māori moko 
and warfare, Cisco turns to Sosis to further augment her position. Sosis maintains that the degree 
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of visibility of a marker of belonging is dependent upon what type of warfare pervades a given 
group. Thus, we see a new connection between social structure and warfare, one which is 
reflected within the Cisco case study.  
If a group engages in internal warfare, “fought within a cultural grouping,” it is likely 
also characterised by kin orientations, meaning regular “intermarriage” and the recurrent shifting 
of related individuals from group to group. This type of social structure makes the adoption of a 
permanent mark of belonging unrealistic, because one’s group identity is subject to shift at any 
time.548 However, the case is different for external warfare.  
When a group is comprised of non-related males, ritualised acts are employed in order to 
foster cooperation that would not exist without some cost ensuring it. Without a persuasive 
within-group mechanism to encourage members to uphold their commitments to the group, when 
an externally warring group experiences internal strife, there is nothing to prevent members from 
leaving one group and potentially joining another. Permanent marks with high visibility are an 
effective way to diminish the chances of this occurrence.549  
Victoria Ebin offers a counter argument to Sosis, which is not referenced by Sosis nor 
within the Cisco case study. Specifically, Ebin’s work better aligns with what is known about 
Māori social structure. Ebin challenges Sosis’ internal/external delineations. Though Ebin 
acknowledges that two groups exist, one kin-specific and another, larger group that incorporates 
these smaller kin groups, her predictions diverge from Sosis’. Ebin maintains that larger groups 
of people are often comprised of smaller groups delineated by kinship or locality ties. These 
smaller groups play a key role in social organisation.  
                                                 




Often, these smaller factions delineate themselves by developing a specific type of body 
adornment practice, like moko, which makes their affiliation and identity quickly discernible.550 
Ebin predicts permanent markers to be found in groups with kinship ties, instead of non-kin 
based groups as Sosis claims. The larger group, then, is comprised of these smaller kin groups, 
each with its own permanent marker. Ebin’s predictions better align with pre-contact Māori 
social structure which had more to do with whānau and hapū than larger iwi affiliation, which 
only became more prominent as an effect of Māori urbanisation following World War Two.551 
The reliance on 19th and early 20th century sources throughout the Cisco case study, in 
conjunction with her usage of costly signalling theory, results in the study being founded upon 
misleading information which over-emphasises the role of the iwi in pre-contact Māori society 
and ultimately undermines any argument for a link between moko and warfare. For a moment, 
let us set aside the issues surrounding the mythologisation of Māori warfare and accept the 
attribution of moko to warfare. Even with gratuitous acceptance of this connection, difficulty still 
presents itself in trying to discern the exact social structure of pre-contact Māori groups which 
translates into problems utilising Sosis’ specific criteria for costly signals and the differences 
between internally and externally warfaring groups.552 This is mainly because there is little 
consensus on how the social structure of pre-contact Māori groups functioned, aside from hapū 
and whānau.553 Yet, Cisco’s argument does not hinge on hapū and whānau delineations but upon 
a view of Māori society influenced by Simmons.  
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Cisco abides by the depiction of Māori social structure as comprised of the whānau, hapū, 
iwi, and waka, with iwi representing the highest level of social organisation. Yet, numerous, 
contemporary sources overturn this conception, arguing that the shift to iwi as the major political 
body did not occur until the mid to later 18th century.554 Angela Ballara disassembles the fixed 
notions of Māori social structure upon which Cisco’s argument depends. According to Ballara, 
“this image of tribal structure derives from a long history of superficial observations of Māori by 
Europeans. More immediately, it derives from the rigid and static structural models created by 
the ethnologists of the late 19th and early 20th century.”555  
In light of Ballara’s conclusions and the contributions from recent scholars regarding 
Māori warfare and social structure, it becomes apparent that we must exercise caution regarding 
pre-contact Māori warfare and its relationship to pre-contact Māori social structure; Cisco 
exercises no such caution. Rather than acknowledging the controversy surrounding the issue of 
pre-contact, Māori social structure which undoubtedly informed wartime configurations, Cisco 
reports a confident and fluid account of Māori social structure to frame her hypotheses. Yet, 
Cisco’s fluid narrative is based upon accounts that are heavily colonised and skewed by the fact 
they are largely derived from Europeans reporting 100 years or more since Cook’s first voyage, 
not to mention that they have been meticulously scrutinised and overturned by contemporary 
researchers. 
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 Similar issues arise in Cisco’s treatment of Māori status/rank which features in her sexual 
selection arguments but which also present themselves as undertones in her warfare hypothesis. 
Though we can be confident that some sort of relationship existed between moko and status, we 
cannot assert exactly what that relationship entailed and certainly not to the degree that the Cisco 
case study implies. Despite the fact that moko has consistently been linked to the establishment 
and enforcement of political and social hierarchy amongst Māori groups throughout the historical 
and ethnographic record, such views are conflicting and controversial. In 1807, John Savage 
made mention of moko as indicative of social class within Māori tribal communities.556 
Shortland, however, contended that the amount one can pay for moko was the only way in which 
the custom suggested rank.557 Thomson, in 1859, reported that every tribe had six social 
classes.558 Best argues against Thomson’s view, saying that the idea of six social classes is 
preposterous.559 Simmons clarified Thomson’s argument in the late 1980s, alleging that it was 
evident Thomson was referring to rank, not class, a distinction central to Māori social structure. 
In that case, Thomson’s assertion, for the most part, aligns with accounts provided by Te 
Riria upon which Simmons relied.560 Later, Simmons extended his view that Māori society was 
incredibly hierarchical, citing at least eight different societal strata reflected through moko 
patterns and designs, which frames the Cisco case study.561 Again, Cisco seems unaware, not 
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only of the conflicting nature of the 19th century sources on Māori social structure as it informed 
status, but also of Higgins’ work which has illuminated a number of fundamental problems in 
Simmons’ research. 
Understandably, Simmons’ work is desirable because it provides specifics about moko 
and pre-contact Māori social structure that other sources do not. However, Higgins has used 
linguistics to challenge and discredit Simmons’ assertions about Māori social structure, as well 
as many of his contributions concerning moko.562 Higgins argues that the “traditional Māori 
society” Simmons describes never existed.563 Utilising linguistic and historical documentation, 
Higgins discovers that, aside from the last three male rank titles Simmons lists and only two 
female titles, there is no evidence to indicate “that any of these titles existed in the form 
Simmons describes.”564 Higgins also shares scepticism with other Māori scholars, pertaining to 
Simmons’ supposed informant Te Riria who perhaps did not even exist.565 Further questions also 
emerge with Simmons’ treatment of moko. 
When compared with moko in photographs or paintings, the designs Simmons presents, 
“which allegedly highlight the differences between individuals of rank, as well as depicting tribal 
variations of moko kauae,” seem out of place.566 Furthermore, as Higgins notes, King maintains 
that by the 20th century moko designs were standardised, characterised by limited variation; yet, 
Simmons provides a host of designs for moko kauae with a wide array of patterning. Simmons 
never explicitly delineates when these designs were in circulation or from where these designs 
come. Moreover, he diminishes the significance of the tohunga-tā-moko in the moko kauae 
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process, ignoring their role in both execution and style.567 Thus, Higgins concludes that more 
information about an individual’s social class can be gleaned by observing their dress and 
jewellery in the artistic renderings, by artists like Goldie and Lindauer, than by the moko upon 
their faces, and expresses doubt that much information about rank or social status is conveyed by 
moko, especially after 1840 when the designs were more standardised.568  
Further Issues with Costly Signalling Theory: Agentic Limitations 
 
In the above sections, I utilised the Cisco case study to illuminate problems, especially those of a 
politico-ethical nature, that arise when attempting to tailor a case study to fit a theory. Indeed, 
Cisco’s argumentation reads more like an attempt to make her moko case study fit costly 
signalling, than a critical enquiry into moko as a costly signal. Yet, aside from the recurrent 
politico-ethical issues the Cisco case study exhibits with regard to her analysis of moko and 
Māori culture, the above critique also reveals deeper global issues that are of concern when 
applying costly signalling theory as a framework to analyse cultural practices. These include 
difficulties identifying what, exactly, is the signal, as well as who is the signaller and who is the 
receiver. Concurrently, questions about the effectiveness of analysing tā moko independently of 
the oral narratives which shape its meaning for Māori are raised.  
Such difficulties are, in part, due to Cisco’s reliance upon agents, as opposed to 
interactions. As the next chapter reveals, agent-centred approaches place strict parameters on 
who can do the acting which results in severe restrictions on which interactions are included in a 
study. The effect is one of re-colonisation, since the existing heteroglossia is narrowed to reflect 
an environment designed by the researcher which accommodates only the voice(s) he or she 
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deems worthy of inclusion. This approach is in direct opposition to narrative assemblage, which 
depends on self-reflexive and self-conscious interpretations of the narratives which frame 
cultural practice. To effectively decolonise evolutionary explanations of culture, and, specifically 
costly signalling theory, requires the lens of narrative assemblage which “allows a tradition to 
make innovations without cutting down its roots.”569 Moreover, it demands a framework which 
encourages heteroglossia and mobilises emic perspectives through an integrative approach. 
However, to better understand what a decolonised, integrative approach might look like, we must 
first have a clearer picture of the limitations of agentic orientation. Again, I turn to the Cisco case 
study. 
Signallers and Receivers 
Animal Signalling 
 
Within animal signalling, costly signalling’s forebearer, the roles of signallers and receivers are 
perceived to be relatively straightforward. For instance, a common go to example within costly 
signal is the stotting behaviour of Thomson’s gazelles. When faced with a predator, instead of 
selecting the biologically rational option of fleeing, Thomson’s gazelles, stott; meaning, they 
repeatedly jump into the air, taking all four legs off the ground. Stotting signals to the predator 
that it is not worth the predator’s time and energy to chase a gazelle that has an excess of energy 
to spend on such a costly behaviour in lieu of running away. Rather than chasing the gazelle who 
stotts, the predator will seek other prey that automatically run away or hide. In this example, it 
seems relatively straightforward that the gazelle signals and the predator receives. 
Yet, even within animal signalling, the interpretation of the signal and the intended 
signaller/receiver are not as clear-cut as they are often presented to be. For instance, the common 
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costly signalling interpretation of the stotting behaviour as an honest signal to the predator that 
the gazelle has an excess of energy and that the predator’s time/energy would be wasted on a 
chase has a number of alternate explanations that have been suggested but are never really 
mentioned in the costly signalling theory literature. However, these alternatives change the 
contents of the signal and challenge signaller/receiver dynamics.  
John Alcock offers a number of alternative explanations for stotting that challenge the 
prevailing costly signalling theory account. One of his suggestions explains the stotting of 
gazelles as a strategy to avoid ambush. By jumping high into the air, Alcock maintains that 
gazelles are better able to see predators which might be lying in wait. Alcock’s proposal 
challenges gazelles’ stotting as a signal at all, since there is no receiver to receive a gazelle’s 
signal and no signal (i.e. no informational content) being broadcast by the gazelle. Stotting, 
according to Alcock’s explanation, is simply an effective anti-ambush strategy.570  
Another of Alcock’s suggestions is that stotting serves as an alarm to the rest of the herd 
when a predator is nearby. Alerting the group to predation increases the survival rates of its 
members and, thus, increases group-level fitness. In this scenario, the gazelle’s stotting is the 
signal but the receiver(s) are fellow group members.571 A related suggestion, also of the group 
selection persuasion, is that gazelles’ stotting is a coordination strategy intended to confuse a 
predator. Coordinated stotting may make it incredibly challenging for a lone predator to single 
out a group member as prey.572 Once again, the gazelle is the signaller, but there are two 
receivers: the rest of the gazelle herd and the predator who is dazed by the coordinated stotting. 
Although researchers have, for the most part, come to a consensus that stotting serves as a signal 
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to a gazelle’s predator not to waste time giving chase to prey with an excess of energy, these 
alternative explanations begin to suggest that the signaller/receiver relationship and signal 
interpretation may not be as basic within behavioural ecology and animal signalling as they are 
often construed within discussions of the application of costly signalling theory to human 
behaviour.  
 The idea that the signaller/receiver relationship for animals may be more complex than is 
often presented is not surprising. In fact since the push for decolonisation, animals have, in some 
ways been thrust into the role of the modern primitive, falling into many of the same 
dichotomisations that occurred between Westerners and indigenous groups. For instance, as 
Aaron Gross points out, the man/animal binary has a particular bias toward certain forms of 
Protestant Christianity which causes religion to be limited to man, and, moreover, construes 
religion as “a nonanimal part of the human.”573 Though the dichotomy between animals and 
humans is prevalent within the ontologies of many groups, it certainly is not reflective of the 
beliefs of all groups. As Chapter Four illustrates, the symmetry proposed by actor-network 
theory and indigenous ontological perspectivism offers a unique ontological context which is 
equipped to encapsulate man and animals by suggesting that though we differ in form, we may 
not be so different after all. 
Moko—Signal or Signaller? 
 
A similar lack of clarity arises when costly signalling theory is applied to human examples. 
Throughout Cisco’s work, moko as a noun is presented as the costly signal. Cisco presents moko 
as observable and correlated to an “unobservable” trait, such as status, rank, bravery, and wealth, 
which varies throughout pre-contact Māori society. Mau moko incur a cost, in terms of pain, 
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money to employ a tohunga-tā-moko, as well as donning a facial tattoo which is highly visible. 
Thus, Cisco deduces that the benefits and costs of moko honestly indicate one’s commitment to 
the group. Moko benefits the signaller and receiver by reliably broadcasting information about 
the legitimacy of one’s commitment, wealth, status, bravery, athletic prowess, health, or any 
number of characteristics related to the fitness of a mau moko.  
A significant issue with focusing on moko (the noun) as the signal is that in a pre-colonial 
context it cannot be separated from the person on whose face it is carved. I emphasise this 
inability to separate moko from the mau moko when used as a signal prior to Pākehā presence in 
New Zealand, because there are instances after colonisation where moko may have been able to 
be considered apart from its wearer. Specifically, the use of moko as a signature implies that it 
could stand apart from the individual upon whose face it was. We know of its use as a signature 
from Marsden’s accounts recorded in the early 1800s which cite that rangatira (chiefs) signed 
documents by drawing out their moko.574 The use of moko as a signature is also present on land 
deeds, like that of the Ngāi Tahu chief of Otago whose moko appears on an 1840 land grant and 
other significant documents, including the Treaty of Waitangi also signed in 1840.575 However, 
as Sarah Gallagher notes, the application of moko outside of “its original context (the wearer’s 
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face)” is only a product of colonisation, where Māori moko were drawn on legal documents 
where Europeans’ signatures appeared.576  
Because moko is worn by a person, we simply cannot eliminate other signals that a 
human physically communicates, particularly about commitment. For instance, someone keyed 
up about an impending battle may present an active package of signals indicating their fitness 
and warrior prowess aside from moko, such as an overtly aggressive whakatū waewae (war 
dance).577 Within Māori culture whakatū waewae was a selective mechanism utilised by Māori 
elders to select which warriors would go into battle. Should a warrior not appear to be battle-
ready, they would not be selected whether a mau moko or not. Arguably, the whakatū waewae 
would have provided an opportunity for someone to defect or to confirm their commitment to the 
group, aside from any perceived commitment moko broadcast. Hyisung Hwang and David 
Matsumoto suggest that, like animals, humans have a physical, dominant threat display even 
after victory over an opponent which may involve elongating the body and puffing out the chest. 
Such a display may be equally as informative about another’s prowess in battle as the 
information moko provides and, if performed after battle, may be retained for future use.578 
Another consideration is the way that war parties configure themselves before engaging in battle. 
Pre-European Māori were typically led into battle by a chief, and the physical positioning of the 
chief/warriors would give good indication of one’s status.579 Also, as already mentioned, Higgins 
says a great deal is able to be gleaned about a Māori person’s rank/status from the jewellery or 
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dress they wore.580 These discrepancies do not present themselves as readily in the gazelle 
example, where the stotting (verb) is the signal. 
The recognition of multiple signals and multiple modes for signal expression is present 
within signalling theory literature, though it is typically quarantined to animal examples.581 Rowe 
maintains that the advantage to multicomponent signals is that the information receivers glean 
from the signal likely is more reliable and signallers will adjust signals to make them easier for 
receivers to receive.582 Indeed, the incorporation of multicomponent or multimodal signals may 
have the potential to enhance applications of costly signalling theory to cultural practices by 
integrating additional elements into the signalling paradigm, such as tattoo (moko) and dance 
(whakatū waewae). Yet, the addition of more signal components or more modes does not resolve 
many of the tensions in signal reception that occur within the example of Māori moko where, as 
a result of colonisation, Pākehā receive signals differently than Māori, making contextual 
considerations paramount.  
This is not to imply that certain limitations do not exist with regards to interpretation of 
moko. Certainly not every signal a human conveys relates to moko, nor can signals be 
interpreted as such. Inevitably, some interpretations of what a signal conveys are what Eco refers 
to as “blatantly unacceptable.”583 The implication is that moko, regardless of its perceived form, 
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does constrain the amount of possible interpretations that it can have.584 Yet, the interpretation 
gleaned from the Cisco case study, precisely because of the delimitations that are imposed on 
moko, many of which are arbitrary, becomes too narrow and indiscriminant to have any real 
explanatory power.  
Ivan Mladenov offers beneficial elaboration by way of semiotics. In choosing to focus on 
the objective form of moko, as opposed to the associations to which it is linked, Cisco conceives 
of moko as a sign. Mladenov explains that whilst a “sign relates to a particular object,” in this 
case moko, its objective form “can never exhaust its meaning because…a sign is endlessly 
interpretable.”585 This endless interpretation assumes the form of an “internalized dialogue,” 
where the interpreter shoulders the role of “the other.”586 Yet, though this cycle of self-reflexivity 
is construed as just one of many possible translations within unlimited semiotics, when 
interpreted within the Cisco case study, it is what contributes to many of the limitations which 
undergird her argument. 
 By assuming the role of the other, Cisco’s case study is colonised by her own 
interpretation of moko which prohibits any voice, other than her own, from contributing to the 
dialogue on moko. Furthermore, in refusing the narrative assemblage, Cisco denies the visage of 
Western culture made visible through the mirror of her own narrative. However, as Chapter Four 
reveals, more reflexive models are able to utilise and extend this dialogue to transcend the 
limitations of the sign itself and any singular interpretation by focusing on the relationship 
between agents. In the words of Mladenov, “the question about the identity of a sign arises again 
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but as already mentioned, it is to be sought neither in the interpreted sign, nor in its object, nor in 
its interpretant, but in the circulation field between them.”587  
Who is the Signaller? 
 
The necessity of looking at the holistic signalling environment in the form of a “circulation field” 
becomes even more apparent when examining Cisco’s treatment of signallers and receivers. 
Specifically, the Cisco case study sheds light on the difficulty of discerning the signaller within 
cultural employments of costly signalling theory. Whilst it is true that the mau moko wears the 
moko, the tohunga-tā-moko is actually responsible for applying the moko and encoding 
information into the design. With tā moko, the tohunga-tā-moko is the originator of the signal, 
since it is ultimately he who determines what information is encoded in the moko. King was one 
of few to recognise that the cultural framework needed to fully understand moko was not absent 
but inaccessible.588 Thus, moko cannot be understood aside from the social context in which it 
exists.  
King and his predecessor, Theodore Schoon, discovered that male moko patterns 
operated on two different levels: standard design and free adaptation. Standard design is believed 
to have developed out of a moko rules system that dictated which motifs an individual might 
wear. For instance, Schoon identified specific areas on the forehead and in front of ear as unique 
to each individual. The rules system indicates that it was not an individual decision as to what 
moko would be worn, but rather a pre-determined socially constructed set of guidelines.589 These 
designs, though standardised, are what allowed an individual to be recognised via the moko he or 
she wore but only within the Māori cultural context which reinforced its meaning. Free 
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adaptation was, presumably, regulated by the tohunga-tā-moko, who had the knowledge to 
develop a parallel system of symbols that extended the meaning and interpretation of the design 
but represents information which the lay person has no ability to access without the assistance of 
a trained specialist.590 Similarly, Graham suggests that the nature and number of curves in a 
moko pattern have a special meaning available only to those knowledgeable in Māori symbolism 
(i.e. tohunga-tā-moko).591  
  Furthermore, since it is ultimately left to the discretion of the tohunga-tā-moko to 
determine what is being signalled, he must be included as a signaller, as it is only through his 
handiwork that the moko signals at all. The mau moko is both the recipient and conduit of that 
signal. Yet, once the moko is applied, it is the face of the mau moko which signals the 
information encoded by the tohunga-tā-moko. The non-conventional signalling structure that 
moko presents requires us to consider that signalling may be occurring on a number of levels 
within cultural groups and cannot be as simply understood as the gazelle-predator example, nor 
as the Cisco case study implies.  
Additionally, whilst developments within signalling theory are allowing for signals with 
multiple features, signalling models do not exhibit the same latitude when it comes to multiple 
signallers. Predominantly, signalling models are based upon “one-to-one or transaction-specific 
communication” which requires that models be simplified to a single dyad in which one signaller 
and one receiver communicate one signal.592 Such simplifications cannot accommodate the 
multi-level signaller dilemma that Māori tā moko presents. 
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 Although Cisco desires the communicative model to involve a single signaller, it is not 
that simple. In fact, the case study of moko indicates that the limited nature of the signaller/signal 
relationship is an artificial construct delineated from within costly signalling theory. There are 
numerous signallers involved in tā moko with different signals attached to each. Furthermore, 
innumerable interpretations of the signaller/signal relationship and meaning therein exist. 
Perhaps the language of semiotics, once again, describes it best: “the signifying channel is 
deconstructed, and instead of a channel there is a flood: every signifier may also be signified, and 
every signified is itself the signifier of yet another signified.”593 To honour tā moko, requires that 
we begin to embrace the reflexivity promulgated by the narrative assemblage by deconstructing 
these artificial boundaries which actually inhibit our ability to understand an emic practice in its 
symmetrical and reflexive form and by constructing new models that better accommodate 
multiple signallers. 
Who is the Receiver? 
 
A similar lack of clarity emerges when we examine the receiver within cultural examples. Again, 
Cisco presents this relationship as relatively straightforward: receivers of the moko signal are 
allies or enemies. Cisco claims she is referring to pre-contact Māori society, and discussions of 
pre-contact social structure, her focus on the chiselled technique, and the perceived relationship 
between moko and social status confirm this. Though we cannot say much about pre-contact 
Māori society, Cisco’s conclusion that the receivers of moko would either be allies or enemies, 
even when divorced from a context of warfare, is acceptable. Other groups did not dwell in 
Aotearoa in pre-contact times, so signal receivers would either be in-group or out-group Māori. 
Incorporating other human groups, based upon the evidence we have today, would be, to return 
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to Eco, blatantly unacceptable. However, the clarity of this distinction disappears when we shift 
to examining moko in a colonial context, which is also the period from which much of our 
knowledge of moko is derived and which (somewhat) overlaps with the time period Cisco 
identifies as pertaining to traditional moko. 
What happens to a signal when a group unfamiliar with local customs begins to inhabit 
the same areas? This is precisely the question we are faced with when exploring moko. For 
argument’s sake, let’s agree with Cisco that in a pre-contact Māori setting moko was a costly 
signal that broadcast wealth, status, and overall physical health. When selecting a mate or ally or 
sizing-up an opponent, this information is critical and made available through moko. In this 
scenario, the receiver, whether friend or foe is able to receive moko as a signal and make an 
informed decision about whether to cooperate, mate, fight, etc. A problematic assumption when 
applying costly signalling theory to culture is that we assume that all receivers are privy to the 
same information. However, we know that all receivers could not access the same information in 
a pre-contact setting, particularly since the sources discussed above seem to indicate that 
tohunga-tā-moko had access to more of the informational content moko possesses than lay 
people or even mau moko. This problem is compounded with colonisation. 
 Throughout the colonising process, mau moko are still signalling, but who is the recipient 
of that signal and what are they receiving? Although Māori still had in-group and out-group 
dynamics, Pākehā were present who did not have the cultural framework to interpret moko as a 
signal in the same way. They would not be able to utilise moko as a heuristic to assess one’s 
willingness to cooperate or viability as a mate. However, this does not mean that they were not 
signal receivers; in fact, the early literature chronicles visceral reactions to moko. 
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White likened moko to disfigurement.594 Nicholas “hoped that this barbarous practise will 
be abolished in time amongst the New Zealanders; and that the missionaries will exert all the 
influence they are possessed of to dissuade them from it.”595 Where the literature indicates that 
moko served as an aesthetic signal or one of wealth or even self-identity, simultaneously, it 
confirms that for many Pākehā the signal was one of intimidation and fear. Clearly Pākehā were 
receiving a signal, but because they did not have a shared cultural framework to interpret the 
signal, the message they received was drastically different from what Māori received. There 
simply is no consistency in the information that could be retrieved from the signal moko 
broadcast. That moko broadcast some information is not in question, what that information was 
is unclear and depends upon the group in question. Thus, the signal becomes part of a signalling 
network through which receivers interpret meaning.596 Whilst multicomponent and multimodal 
signalling may address multiple signal components, they still cannot overcome the tumultuous 
signalling and receiving environment that is presented when tā moko meets colonising 
influences, making the delineation of signaller and receiver an inordinately complex, if not 
impossible, task. 
  There is an additional layer to this signaller/receiver dilemma unique to the Māori case 
which increases the complexity a model would need to possess to accurately identify signallers 
and receivers within the tā moko system. Within Māori culture time is cyclical, creating a 
holistic view of the universe characterised by continuity with ancestors, history, and the future.597 
Andrea Morrison supports this position, stating that “whakapapa also means that a person’s 
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ancestors populate space through historical time and present time.”598 Deceased ancestors are 
referred to in the present tense and are credited with transmitting knowledge and ways of being 
to those who are living.599 Thus, it stands that within Māori culture, since ancestors are still 
present, they can still signal and receive and must be considered as viable signallers and 
receivers within a Māori context.  
Additionally, the Māori ontological context allows us to raise questions about the 
origination of signals in an unprecedented way. The enquiry into the origination of signals is an 
interesting question that has not been pursued within signalling or costly signalling literature and 
deserves further investigation. Whilst consensus maintains that signals exist and evolved for a 
particular reason, their initial origination within evolutionary explanations is murky. Why did the 
first gazelle begin to stott? Why did moko develop in the first place? Though costly signalling 
claims to account for why a particular trait or behaviour developed, often this is conflated with 
how the said behaviour or trait functions. For example, the gazelle stotts to signal to predators 
not to waste their energy chasing after them, since it can afford to expend excess energy on the 
signal itself. This is the function of the gazelle stotting but also the reason why it stotts.  
Such confusion, however, is not present within Māori explanations of tā moko. Clear 
reasons exist for why tā moko developed, as illustrated by the narrative of Mataora presented in 
Chapter Two. The reason for the origination of tā moko, at least in part, is the same as its 
perpetuation: tā moko reinforces Māori ontology by affirming identity and belonging. This leads 
us to one final issue that emerges from Cisco’s argument of moko as a costly signal which is 
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better posed as a question. What do we gain by considering moko independently from the 
narratives that accompany its practice within Māori culture?  
Moko and Māori Narrative  
Proponents of evolutionary explanations are likely to tout the scientifically-based selective 
mechanisms their theoretical positions identify which they maintain are missing from cultural 
explanations. Indeed, Cisco concludes her argument convinced that she has extended the 
literature on moko and has provided an explanation for the development of its practice that was 
previously absent. However, after looking at Māori narratives, I am left unconvinced that costly 
signalling theory, in the form presented by the Cisco case study, has the capacity to augment 
Māori explanations of moko.  
When surveying the narrative of Mataora, it becomes apparent that though Cisco 
mentions oral narrative once, in passing, she does not grasp its explanatory power. Costly 
signalling theory is concerned with what information signals convey, how that information is 
conveyed, and how it affects a receiver’s behaviour. Questions about the informational content 
moko possesses and the meaning of the practice within Māori culture invariably lead to the 
narrative of Mataora, which, aside from archaeological evidence, is the earliest source on moko. 
As the earliest source, one expects this narrative to illuminate features of the content and 
meaning of moko that can be used to analyse its pre-contact role within early Māori society.  
Recall from Chapter Two that the narrative of Mataora accounts for the human origins of 
tā moko, but it also highlights the learning of tikanga Māori which supports the argument that 
selective mechanisms for cultural practice are already outlined within Māori sources. Linkages 
between moko, sociality, and identity, as well as connections to whakapapa prove to be of 
particular importance, since ultimately these elements frame the mythological discourse within 
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pre-contact Māori society which shaped tā moko. Furthermore, Mataora perpetuates a tradition 
of tā moko by bringing the practice to the human world which draws attention to a unique 
mechanism within Māori narrative whereby change facilitates continuity. 
This interface between continuity and change begs the question as to whether aetiologies 
require tension, since it is through conflict that solutions are generated. Tensions require that 
humans intimately interact with information from and about the past through both preserved 
material items and experiences. This interaction and selection process enables humans to 
restructure and guide the way such interactions are made relevant and manifest in the present, a 
process by which human groups develop solutions that influence culture and cultural identity. 
In the next few paragraphs, I intentionally employ the language of natural selection and 
costly signalling theory to impress that these same mechanisms are present within the narrative 
of Mataora. Mataora was a young warrior, without moko, who was in love with Niwareka, a 
tūrehu (supernatural being). Niwareka’s initial commitment to Mataora was unaffected by his 
lack of moko. Niwareka is a high quality mate, as she has status, based upon her father 
Uetonga’s position as a rangatira which signals wealth and status. Indeed, more resources equal 
higher reproductive fitness. Seemingly as a result of jealousy, which, perhaps, was due to 
Niwareka being sexually selected for and courted by other males because of her high status, 
Mataora beats Niwareka. Mataora’s decision to attack Niwareka is a behavioural cue that goes 
against tikanga Māori. Niwareka flees to the safety of Rarohenga where beating is not common 
practice, because they follow the way of tikanga. This action indicates that tikanga Māori is 
culturally selected for since Niwareka returns to a place where potential mates uphold this 
tradition. Niwareka’s decision to leave Mataora is influenced by his lack of knowledge of 
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tikanga which illustrates that this is a primary signal for Māori when it comes to influencing 
mate selection. 
Mataora decides he wants Niwareka back, so he puts on a temporary moko to try to cheat 
the signal of a commitment to the way of tikanga Māori in order to win back his mate. 
Inhabitants of Rarohenga had already selected for permanent, chiselled moko, opting against 
more impermanent designs. Thus, when entering Rarohenga, with a smeared, temporary moko, 
Mataora signalled to the inhabitants that he did not belong. His imitation moko was not an honest 
signal. Mataora’s moko was easily faked; he simply painted it on. Thus, there were no costs 
involved, such as the pain inhabitants of Rarohenga would have endured during the chiselled 
application. Neither was Mataora’s temporary moko correlated to the traits bound to tikanga 
Māori and mātauranga Māori which tā moko in Rarohenga expressed.  
Upon entering Rarohenga, Mataora’s temporary moko is smudged, its impermanence 
indicating his lack of commitment to tikanga Māori. He is punished with taunts and laughter for 
this transgression. The lack of acceptance Mataora is greeted with clearly demonstrates that 
Mataora’s attempt to fake the moko signal was unsuccessful. His contrition, willingness to stay 
in Rarohenga to learn tikanga Māori, and acquisition of a real moko demonstrate Mataora’s true 
commitment to the group and that he is willing to pass down the art of tā moko to future 
generations and offspring, thus solidifying the way of tikanga. It is of note that within the 
narrative Uetonga does not just moko Mataora and send him on his way. Mataora must prove to 
Uetonga, Niwareka, and all of the inhabitants of Rarohenga that he is providing an honest signal 
of commitment to change and willingness to cooperate with what was expected of him according 
to the path of tikanga Māori. 
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 The Mataora narrative is quite clear in emphasising what is selected for in Māori 
culture—behaviour that aligns with tikanga Māori and mātauranga Māori. Tikanga Māori is a 
code of proper conduct which accompanies Māori. Yet, it is flexible and adaptable to new 
situations, keeping Māori safe by providing a distinctively Māori solution regardless of the 
situation.600 Not following tikanga Māori leaves the group at risk by opening the group up to the 
repercussions caused by breeches of tapu.  
Mataora did not uphold tikanga Māori when he beat Niwareka. This was the first 
indication that he did not cooperate with the rest of the group in Rarohenga. Mataora’s lack of 
solidarity is further confirmed by his attempt to deceive residents of Rarohenga with a painted 
moko. It is only once Mataora engages in the costly behaviours of dedicating a year of his life to 
adopting the ways of tikanga Māori and acquiring chiselled moko that he is able to assume an 
identity which binds him to the rest of the inhabitants of Rarohenga and indicates a commitment 
to group solidarity. 
This section presents a clearer alternative to discuss moko as a costly signal than was 
available in the Cisco case study. Whilst the case study did show that commitment to the group 
was selected for, as was bravery, wealth, etc., Cisco was not nearly as conclusive about these 
conclusions as adhering to the structure of the Mataora narrative allows us to be and did not 
address the profound influence of tikanga Māori. Additionally, my deconstruction of Cisco’s 
argument revealed considerable problems and misunderstandings in her research that were so 
significant as to invalidate the claim of moko as a costly signal. Yet, the Mataora narrative 
provides robust evidence in support of that claim. Ultimately, the narrative of Mataora makes a 
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more compelling case for tā moko as a costly signal than does the Cisco case study which further 
highlights the need to consider Māori narratives when investigating anything Māori. 
Conclusion 
 
The Cisco case study illuminates a number of key concerns when attempting to analyse an 
indigenous cultural practice with a scientific lens. Cisco’s dependence upon questionable sources 
from the 19th and 20th centuries, her overt dependence on Simmons to substantiate her claims, as 
well as her tendency to avoid critical engagement with the sources upon which she relies, 
damages her argument about moko as a costly signal. The very elements of Māori culture the 
hypotheses of the case study are based upon were shown either not to exist, or to have been 
skewed in their presentation. Moreover, the lack of engagement with tikanga Māori resulted in 
the misuse of tapu, mana, and whakapapa. I have also utilised the Cisco case study to illuminate 
how definitional delimitations can diminish the impact of an argument when not sufficiently 
considered. In this case, the connection Cisco tries to establish between moko and tradition, 
which would otherwise present a new perspective within costly signalling theory, was 
undermined by the decision to delimit the tradition of moko to only chiselled moko. Cisco’s 
reliance on Māori warfare has also been overturned, because it is a view founded upon the 
mythologisation of violence so prevalent in 19th and 20th century studies on indigenous groups. 
This, combined with Cisco’s presentation of Māori social structure and the relationship of moko 
to rank/status, underscores the pitfalls of superficial and decontexualised research. Thus, Cisco’s 
argument for moko as a costly signal and, specifically, her warfare hypothesis, as it is, simply 
cannot stand. 
Although it becomes evident through my analysis of the case study that the argument 
Cisco attempts to make for moko as a costly signal and, specifically, her warfare hypothesis 
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cannot stand in their current form, I do not think that evolutionary explanations are fruitless (and 
it is not my intention to paint them as such). What I do believe is that the case study reveals some 
fundamental issues, particularly relating to politico-ethical sensitivities, which can easily occur 
when evolutionary explanations are employed as explanations for culture practice and, 
specifically, indigenous cultural practice. Frequently, Cisco’s argument cannot even be critiqued, 
because the information underlying it is so inaccurate. Moreover, she does not acknowledge 
controversies within the sources. Whilst I do not seek to claim that this is always the case within 
research, too often researchers engage in superficial case studies, taking sources at face value, 
when, in fact, there is a rich literature steeped in controversy and debate over the very sources 
they accept as truth. Indeed, the Cisco case study illustrates how a coherent argument for moko 
as a costly signal can be presented; yet, when recontexualised in light of tikanga Māori, a false, 
endemic view of Māori warfare, controversies over pre-contact social structure, and neglect of 
the explanatory power of Māori narratives, the same argument falters. 
Evolutionary explanation is often presented as though it can provide some insight into a 
group that the group itself does not have. However, the Cisco case study demonstrates what 
happens when a study lacks reflexivity, leaving me unconvinced of the ability of costly 
signalling theory to enhance Māori understandings of their own practices. Significantly, the 
Cisco case study highlights the dangers posed when a researcher stands outside of the group 
itself and applies a costly signalling framework onto indigenous practices without grasping the 
internal selection mechanisms and influences that shape them. Indigenous groups often have 
their own accounts of selective processes which may employ different language than that of 
evolutionary explanations but are no less powerful. My analysis of Cisco’s work also reveals the 
need for narrative assemblage. Throughout the case study, Cisco neglected to utilise tā moko 
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narratives, including her own, to reflect on her position within the narrative confluence and the 
ways in which her interpretation of tā moko might affect wider understandings of the practice. It 
seems a more fruitful approach would be to construct evolutionary models that take into account 
emic perspectives of cultural practices, since without an emic understanding of a practice, 
researchers struggle to make round pegs fit square holes. Afterall, what is the benefit of an 
elucidation of cultural practice that has no relevance to the group whose practice it is supposed to 
explain and which provides no reflexive narrative assemblage? Indeed, this question suggests 
that there is room for evolutionary explanations of cultural practice to evolve.  
 In the next chapter, I explore one potential avenue for the evolution of evolutionary 
explanations of culture. I present my own alternative explanation to, and modification of, costly 
signalling theory, namely what I have called transmissive assemblage, which incorporates actor-
network theory, indigenous ontological perspectivism, and Kaupapa Māori. Each of these 
approaches delivers a unique lens which, when put together, results in a symmetrical and 
reflexive understanding of tā moko which promotes heteroglossia. By stressing the need to 
examine associations over agents, I demonstrate how many of the same components revealed 
within the paradigm of costly signalling theory can be utilised within this more symmetrical 















Following the presentation and critique of the Cisco case study in Chapter Three, we find 
ourselves in a situation where the proposed analytical method seems to provide a compelling 
explanation for a cultural practice. However, as the analysis within the previous chapter revealed, 
this exegetical utility of costly signalling theory is limited and, in some ways, completely 
diminished by the choices made within the case study about which information to include, by the 
agents permitted to have a voice in the application of costly signalling theory to tā moko, and by 
the linearity of costly signalling theory itself. Cisco’s lack of reflexivity about her own role in the 
presentation of moko as a costly signal also draws attention to the mirages formed by 
asymmetrical analyses.  
 Utilising a transdisciplinary and transperspectival methodology, this chapter aims to 
develop a more integrative and symmetrical approach to tā moko, intended to show how 
evolutionary explanations of culture can, themselves, further evolve. The chapter commences by 
revisiting some of the shortcomings of costly signalling theory revealed in Chapter Three, by 
way of an analysis and discussion of the findings, and through further evaluation of the 
challenges and politico-ethical considerations posed when explanations shaped by Western 
science are applied to culture and cultural practices. Questions and further suggestions about the 
explanatory value of the term culture are also outlined.  
This brief review is followed by an exploration of the benefits generated through the 
integration of actor-network theory, indigenous ontological perspectivism, Kaupapa Māori, and 
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costly signalling theory. Throughout the assessment of actor-network theory, specific attention is 
paid to the effect of actor-network theory on selective processes and the features it possesses 
which afford it greater utility in adapting to new inputs, like colonisation. The discussion of 
indigenous ontological perspectivism further shifts our lens by introducing multi-naturalist 
ontologies which challenge the anthropocentricity of Western scientific models. Indigenous 
ontological perspectivism proves unique in its ability to highlight the non-human aspects of 
costly signalling theory by transcending the dichotomisation between human and other so 
prevalent in Western explanations of culture. Significantly, indigenous ontological perspectivism 
creates space for the exchange of perspectives through the exploration of social relationality, 
which extends beyond the human realm. Discussions of indigenous ontological perspectivism are 
followed by an enquiry into Kaupapa Māori, which introduces specifically Māori tools useful to 
further decolonise costly signalling theory’s treatment of tā moko. These mechanisms are also 
shown to generate greater symmetry in the application of evolutionary explanations of culture to 
indigenous cultural practice by cultivating the indigenous platform within a context of 
heteroglossia. Indeed, as I have argued in this thesis, the introduction of these more reflexive and 
symmetrical lenses framed by narrative assemblage suggests the need for an evolution within 
evolutionary explanation of culture. 
A significant part of this evolution requires greater reflexivity through decolonisation. 
Integrating actor-network theory, indigenous ontological perspectivism, Kaupapa Māori, and 
costly signalling theory in this chapter I present an updated model, called transmissive 
assemblage, which serves as an example of an evolved explanation of tā moko. This model 
incorporates elements of each approach to shift our focus away from an agentic preoccupation, 
toward an emphasis on the dynamics that form and demarcate the networks through which agents 
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are distributed. The chapter concludes with visual representations of the innerworkings of 
transmissive assemblage, intended to further clarify its explanatory utility. Understanding the 
dynamic interplay of the associations between agents allows us to more effectively mediate the 
social relationships that emerge in historical contexts and reconceptualise the effect of those 
relationships on the evolution of groups and their practices in a more balanced way. 
Additionally, as researchers, an awareness of these dynamics, particularly when contextualised 
by and situated within narrative assemblage, encourages us to rethink our own position in the 
formation and renegotiation of social networks. 
Review 
 
Chapter Three drew attention to the lack of openness within costly signalling theory, regarding 
who or what can act. Agents within a given situation are not allowed to assert their own agency 
or contribute to discussions about society and the variables therein, notwithstanding that it is 
they, themselves, and their social contexts and practices being evaluated.601 The issues 
illuminated in Chapter Three through the Cisco case study, regarding costly signalling theory’s 
inability to accommodate heteroglossia were further illuminated in the contrast between Māori 
understandings of tā moko and the non-reflexive interpretation of it which proved problematic 
throughout the Cisco case study. However, the tensions that arise between emic and etic views of 
cultural practice are commonplace when applying Western scientific criteria to non-Western 
culture.  
 For some scientists, once cultural variants have been analysed, they either fit the 
proposed criteria or they do not. The researcher stands aside, assuming little to no responsibility 
for the outcome, since the data speaks for itself; all the while, readily assuming credit for 
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discovering some innovative way to better describe a longstanding cultural practice or group 
behaviour, often in relation to individual cognition. Scientific researchers, it seems, claim to be 
more “objective,” than those from the humanities and social sciences because the scientific 
method prohibits researchers from “selecting, shaping, and distorting information.” 602  
The claim of objectivity implies that the data speaks for itself without the intervention of 
the scientist. Yet, what the investigation into the Cisco case study revealed is that the data is not 
speaking for itself. Rather, it is the analyst who establishes criteria (norms) into which data must 
fit in order for a model or theory to have explanatory efficacy. However, as Michel Callon 
asserts, society or culture often runs amok, undermining the very norms that were developed to 
explain culture. To this Marc Bloch adds that, “human actions are essentially very delicate 
phenomena, many aspects of which elude scientific measurement.”603 
To mitigate this tendency toward chaos, scholars who champion scientific explanations of 
culture tend toward censorship of who and what can have a voice, such as we saw with Cisco’s 
strict development of an ally and enemy hypothesis based upon mau moko as sole signallers.604 
However, reducing culture and its variants into a symbolic set that is able to exist on the 
periphery of language proves undesirable to those who accuse neo-Darwinian scholars of 
reductionism and of offering up a “skewed view of culture as a disembodied phenomenon.”605 
Accordingly, scientific explanation of culture is sometimes portrayed as a method of analysis 
that devalues culture, because, in the process of isolating certain variants, it equalises or 
standardises them, causing them to appear to be homogenous.  
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 Though the term culture is widely deployed, it is regarded by many as an “essentially 
contested concept.”606 As W.B. Gallie points out, when we analyse the employment and 
argumentation surrounding specific terminology, like culture, it becomes apparent that there is 
no standard, definable usage.607 Indeed, as was revealed in previous discussions, scholars who 
propose evolutionary explanations are hugely divided in their definitions of and approaches to 
culture. Some see culture as comprised mainly of information retained within the human brain, 
which is then transmitted from person to person via selective, social learning processes.608 Others 
see the meme, which is subject to the processes of selection and replication and serves as the 
driver of culture, as the cultural equivalent to the gene.609 Still others argue for culture as a 
bundle of representations, including “contagious ideas” and human “productions,” which 
facilitate the spread of these ideas within the “shared environment of a human group.”610 When 
not in opposition regarding approach, critiques are largely relegated to issues regarding features 
of the theories themselves, as opposed to how they are applied to cultural practice and the 
politico-ethical that arise from such application.611 Although such critiques are necessary and 
beneficial to the expansion of explanatory power and continual evolution of evolutionary 
explanations, theorists frequently take for granted that their model has universal applicability 
generated from the singular perspectival lens science provides. In other words, a multiplicity of 
scientific lenses is confused for heteroglossia. 
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Unquestionably, the advancement of evolutionary explanations of culture within the 
social sciences and humanities is hugely debateable, as is the concept of culture or “the social” as 
scholars who employ actor-network theory prefer.612 Is culture or the social the result of 
cognitive structures which direct the behaviour of group and individuals, or is it an emergent 
phenomenon external to individuals and groups unable to be predicted by underlying cognitive 
structures? Is culture the “highest form of human evolution,” as Becker suggested in 1971?613 Is 
it as Matthew Arnold suggested in 1869: 
a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters  
which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world,  
and, through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon  
our stock notions and habits, which we now follow staunchly but mechanically,  
vainly imagining that there is a virtue in following them staunchly which  
makes up for the mischief of following them mechanically.614 
 
Is culture what Tylor described in 1871 as a “complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, 
art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of 
society?”615 Can culture be understood systematically; is there any underlying pattern or 
structure? Does culture even exist? Is culture a necessary condition for the development of 
human society?616 Once it is realised that culture is no more apparent or certain than nature, all 
explanations of culture find themselves on shaky ground, including costly signalling theory.617  
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 At its core, costly signalling theory has a number of benefits. It allows us to isolate 
interactions and provides an innovative way to think about cultural practices. However, we are 
left in a lurch by costly signalling’s commitment to the signaller and receiver, who are 
represented as repetitive, static entities locked in an unchanging world. As with any theory, there 
is also a need for costly signalling to have greater reflexivity regarding its own limitations when 
applied to cultural practice and to facilitate perspectival augmentation.  
 Actor-network theory, indigenous ontological perspectivism, and Kaupapa Māori 
specifically provide us with an opportunity to address these concerns by giving us tools to study 
Māori tā moko with respect to the tumultuous nature of the dynamic historical contexts in which 
it was developed and perpetuated. These theories, particularly in conjunction, have the capacity 
to evolve evolutionary explanation precisely because they are based upon associations between 
agents that comprise social dynamics. Where actor-network theory endows us with the 
explanatory mechanisms to transcend agency in order to track phenomena between agents which 
facilitates transtemporal analysis, indigenous ontological perspectivism supplements actor-
network theory by providing specific multi-naturalist ontologies which deliver effective language 
and imagery to describe interactions between humans and other animate and inanimate subjects 
without deferring to an agent-focused or anthropocentric rhetoric. This ability affords a unique 
opportunity to expand our understanding of the world through the facilitation of heteroglossia 
expressed through an anthropomorphic lens.  
Kaupapa Māori, as employed within this study, further buttresses these lenses. Once 
associations are traced and heteroglossia emerges, Kaupapa Māori affords us the opportunity to 
highlight Māori perspectives, the significance of which was highlighted throughout the Cisco 
case study. The emergence of Māori voices is a necessary step in the effort to promote the 
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decolonisation of evolutionary explanations of culture. Although it is the aim of decolonisation 
to provide symmetrical models which allow all voices to be heard, those who have been silenced 
especially deserve the opportunity to speak and be heard. Thus, to achieve full decolonisation in 
the context of evolutionary explanations of culture, in part, requires that indigenous peoples, 
whose voices have been suppressed but whose practices have been exploited, be supported in 
creating an effective and familiar platform to articulate emic views of their own practices which 
affirm their holistic realities. Kaupapa Māori supplies an opportunity for Māori perspectives of tā 
moko to emerge within the transmissive assemblage model.  
Prior to delving into the transmissive assemblage model, it is necessary to further flesh 
out actor-network theory, indigenous ontological perspectivism, and Kaupapa Māori, particularly 
in the context of costly signalling theory and what the examination of the Cisco case study 
revealed regarding the advancement of costly signalling theory as an explanation of tā moko. I 
first address actor-network theory, prior to delving into indigenous ontological perspectivism and 
Kaupapa Māori. The introduction of the transmissive assemblage model, which I have developed 
through this research, trails these discussions. 
Actor-Network Theory 
  
Recall from the Introduction that my usage of actor-network theory, indigenous ontological 
perspectivism, and Kaupapa Māori is one of concentricity. Within the context of this study, 
actor-network theory serves as an overarching framework into which indigenous ontological 
perspectivism and Kaupapa Māori are situated. As a relational approach, actor-network theory 
establishes an effectual relational framework, constructed upon the attribution, distribution, 
circulation, and transformation of associations between entities, which allows for the formation 
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of a symmetrical network founded upon process. Specifically, actor-network theory provides a 
means to transcend limitations illuminated by my analysis of the Cisco case study.  
Costly signalling theory focuses on process, in the form of a transmitted signal. Yet, 
costly signalling does not have the internal mechanisms to expound upon these processes by 
extending beyond signaller/receiver dynamic. A signaller signals and a receiver receives. 
Paradoxically, when costly signalling is implemented to account for the contents of a signal (i.e. 
information about wealth, health, fecundity, etc.) it struggles to accommodate integral processes 
that would allow groups and their practices to be better understood. For instance, the warfare 
hypothesis Cisco develops for moko causes her to ignore other processes related to war, such as 
the whakatū waewae or the recitation of karakia. Simultaneously, aside from questionable 
treatments of pre-contact Māori marriage practices and social stratification, she completely 
ignores processes that influence tā moko outside of the context of war. Cisco’s undermining of 
the processes feeding into tā moko is also reflected by her consistent choice to refer to moko as 
moko, rather than tā moko, which inherently pays respect to its integrative, dynamic, and 
collective nature. Furthermore, it highlights the agentic facets of moko and presents them as 
superior to its interactive form, encapsulated by its conceptualisation as praxis, rather than solely 
as object.  
 Part of costly signalling theory’s struggle revolves around its reliance on agents. As the 
analysis of the Cisco case study reveals, the construction of agency in the form of signaller and 
receiver automatically restricts what processes can be included in discussions of costly 
signalling. Not only are limitations placed upon what is signalled and how it is signalled, but it 
inhibits who can signal and who can receive. Yet, as we discovered in Chapter Three and, as 
discussions of indigenous ontological perspectivism and Kaupapa Māori illustrate, holistic 
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realities are not framed by such dichotomies. Thus, for a model to acknowledge and integrate 
holistic realities, it cannot be inhibited by agentic limitations in the way that costly signalling 
theory is. 
Whether the agent in question is an individual, group, “amorphous,” “zoomorphous,” 
material, or any other configuration, “the same semiotic price” is paid; meaning, the “work of 
attributing, imputing, distributing action, competences, performances and relations” remain 
constant, though the means and outcomes differ.618 Doniger draws a similar conclusion from 
myth which she recognises is not simply a transmissive mode but an object “to be known,” one 
that describes, mediates, and alters the experience of anyone who comes in contact with it.619 
Myth has the capacity to transform the head and heart, opening universal, interpretive pathways 
that transcend agents and culture.620 Vestiges of this position also resonate throughout Ricoeur’s 
work, as he consistently reminds us of the intimate relationship between myth and ritual, where 
myth narrates and ritual performs.621 Indeed, though myths themselves differ around the world, 
consistently “the function of the myth is to fix the paradigms of the ritual that sacralize 
action.”622  
Yet, limitations placed on agents are not quarantined to the material academics engage 
with; rather, scholars, themselves, are also subject to the restrictions of agency, which leads us 
the second component of actor-network theory: “the distribution of properties among these 
entities” and the “connections between them.”623 Doniger is fully aware of the effects of agency 
upon mythologists, admitting that through engaging in processes like narrative assemblage “we 
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also learn things about ourselves by studying these stories. For as we progress, we may find that 
we are among the others in other peoples’ myths.”624 
As discussed in Chapter One, instead of construing the role of the social and scholars 
who study the social as one of ordering, Latour calls for the reassemblage of the social via 
“tracing associations,” which endows social informants (agents) with the ability to develop their 
own social realities.625 Here, by stressing the need for social reassemblage, Latour develops the 
narrative assemblage and affirms what Said seems to have been intimating when discussing 
“affiliation,” which Latour defines as “that implicit network of peculiarly cultural associations 
between forms, statements, and other aesthetic elaborations on the one hand and, on the other, 
institutions, agencies, classes, and amorphous social forces.”626 A focus on process with regard 
to cultural practice, removes us from an agent-centric perspective toward determining what has 
led us to our current state.627  
Though Geertz finds a benefit in the culture concept absent from Latour’s analysis, he 
derives a similar conclusion. Geertz maintains that “culture is an ensemble of texts,” which are 
“themselves ensembles,” he cautions that “behavior must be attended to, and with some 
exactness, because it is through the flow of behavior—or, more precisely, social action—that 
cultural forms find articulation.”628 Despite the recurrent recognition that process, in the form of 
social practice and the linkages therein, is essential to unlocking the dynamics of the social, as 
Bourdieu laments, there are very few mechanisms currently in circulation that allow such fluidity 
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which breaks with “the substantialist mode of thought” that tends to “foreground the individual, 
or the visible interactions between individuals.”629 However, Latour provides fluid mechanisms.  
By “tracing associations,” agents are no longer imprisoned by what they do. Instead, by 
honing in on the impetus behind agents’ actions, they can be recognised in terms of their 
fluidity.630 Thus, we return, once again, to the third and fourth components of actor-network 
theory: the circulation generated by the attribution of characteristics, property distribution and 
the linkages established between them; and the transformation of the entities associated to these 
circulating attributions, distributions, and connections, as well as the means through which they 
are transmitted.631  
The fluidity generated through a framework which focuses on circulation and distribution 
has further reaches into the inherent dynamicity of the human condition, specifically by 
highlighting transformation. Chambers builds upon the pervasive effect of the dynamic contexts 
that shape us, pointing out that: “Our sense of being, of identity and language, is experienced and 
extrapolated from movement: the ‘I’ does not pre-exist this movement and then go out into the 
world, the ‘I’ is constantly being formed and reformed in such movement in the world.”632 
Simultaneously, actor-network theory provides a new, more symmetrical lens that can benefit 
current conceptions of costly signalling.  
One of costly signalling theory’s strengths is its attempt to focus on single, small acts 
between a signaller and receiver (transaction-specific communication).633 However, as was 
demonstrated in Chapter Three, in the context of a practice like tā moko, the theory begins to 
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lose momentum when these small acts are then reincorporated back into the collective as an 
explanation of cultural practice. Actor-network theory approaches cultural practice in the 
reverse, instead amassing “minute elementary acts to explain the whole.”634 Through this process 
of reverse-engineering culture, actor-network theory has the tools to adapt to the intricate 
dynamics of a cultural practice like tā moko, which as the Cisco case study showed, possesses 
greater complexity than linear applications of costly signalling theory could accommodate. As 
Latour candidly observes of the Western tendency to interpret data through cause and effect 
relationships, “as soon as things accelerate, innovations proliferate, and entities are multiplied, 
one then has an absolutist framework generating data that becomes hopelessly messed up.”635 
Latour’s observation sums up what the Cisco case study revealed all too well. Indeed, as soon as 
tikanga Māori, innovations upon tā moko, and colonisation were included in the data, all of 
which affected signaller/receiver dynamics, the accuracy of Cisco’s claims diminished, as did the 
clarity of the agency which underpinned her argument.  
In addition to the four main components of actor-network theory mentioned above, recall 
that also undergirding it are a number of uncertainties, though in the natural sciences these are 
more often taken for granted as unquestionably certain. These same five uncertainties appear as 
certainties within Cisco’s research. First, is the “nature of groups.” Groups and/or agents within 
groups can be identified in any number of “contradictory ways.” Moreover, agent is an 
ambiguous term which leaves us unclear as to specifically who or what is acting.636 
The number of entities concurrently “at work in any given individual” remains a mystery. 
Conversely, no one knows how much individuality there can be in a “cloud of statistical data 
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points.”637 Second, is “the nature of actions,” wherein inevitably “a great variety of agents seem 
to barge in and displace the original goals.” Latour’s third uncertainty, “the nature of objects,” 
reveals that any number of agents can and do participate in any given interaction. A fourth 
uncertainty regards the “nature of facts,” of which Latour observes that the relationship between 
the social and the hard sciences appear to be one “of continuous disputes.” Lastly, an uncertainty 
exists regarding the empirical nature of the social sciences.638   
Each of these uncertainties readily presents itself within the Cisco case study. Indeed, in 
her investigation of tā moko, groups and agents present themselves contradictorily. For instance, 
only a single agent within the group, the mau moko, was permitted to be the signaller. To define 
moko as a costly signal required that Cisco limit her agents in ways that mimic the protocol of 
the natural sciences but which are counterintuitive to Māori who do not individuate group or 
agents. Latour clarifies that agents “are made to fit in a group.”639 In fact, within actor-network 
theory, agency (agents) and structure are not even components of the social, which is, instead, 
conceived of as a “circulating entity.”640 Likewise, Cisco’s own delimitations demanded that the 
receiver be either enemy or ally, which proved hugely problematic once colonisation entered the 
mix. The issues raised by the effects of colonisation on tā moko, as evidenced within the Cisco 
case study, “displace the original goals” of costly signalling theory and draw attention to the vast 
number of agents who play a role in interactions.641 Recall that costly signalling theory’s 
objective is to explain why certain behaviours (i.e. tā moko) are perpetuated when natural 
selection should weed them out. Yet, the execution of this objective typically depends upon 
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strictly interpreted signaller/receiver dynamics that cannot accommodate the new cultural inputs 
derived from colonisation. Actor network theory’s selective processes transcend the quest to 
determine whether there is a discrepancy between “account and reality,” and, instead, focus on 
whether an entity “travels from one network to another.”642  
Either an account leads you to all the other accounts – and it is good –, or it  
constantly interrupts the movement, letting frames of reference distant and  
foreign – and it is bad. Either it multiplies the mediating points between any  
two elements – and it is good –, or it deletes and conflates mediators – and it is  
bad. Either it is reductionist – and that’s bad news –, or irreductionist – and  
that’s the highest ethical standard for ANT.643 
 
Such latitude increases a model’s ability to adapt and evolve with new inputs.  
 The controversies between costly signalling theory and Māori holistic realities that 
swirled throughout the examination of the Cisco case study endorse Latour’s observation of the 
rampant controversies that exist between the natural sciences and “the rest of society.”644 These 
tensions are imbedded in the ontological differences between Western and indigenous modes of 
enquiry. The categories costly signalling permits simply do not afford Māori control over their 
own realities, but rather force them into an artificial, Western reality intentionally designed to 
have illustrative force generated by extruding them through pre-fabricated categories in the form 
of the signal, the signaller, and the receiver. Regrettably, as Joe Kincheloe and Shirley Steinberg 
observe, this power dynamic is commonplace when Western scientific models, which employ “a 
self-validating frame of reference” that upholds their authority above all others, are applied to 
indigenous practice.645  
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Heteroglossia allows us to question the perceived authority of Western science, by 
introducing space for Māori voices. Integrating the indigenous voice, amongst others, draws 
attention to the tumultuous territory of colonisation but does not permit the Western voice to 
dominate, either in terms of positivistic superiority or in assuming total responsibility for the 
state of Māori people today, whether positive or negative. For example, tā moko does not exist 
because Westerners permitted it to, nor, as came to light in Chapter Three, are our explanations 
sufficient to accommodate its complexities. Tā moko exists because Māori endured and put into 
place their own, effective cultural mechanisms which selected for the practice. These 
mechanisms deserve to be recognised and discussed on Māori terms, and actor-network theory 
provides an appropriate platform which mobilises symmetry by illuminating the multi-directional 
nature of power dynamics. Infralanguage within the network neutralises any power dynamic, 
allowing all voices to be equally weighted. Most significantly, colonisation and Western science 
(although significant forces) cease to be the dominant rhetoric which erodes Māori autonomy. 
Rather, Māori autonomy exists concurrently with and without colonisation and with and without 
Western science. 
Of equal significance is that focussing on tracing associations demands that scholars be 
reflexive. In a network model, biases of scholars are overt, since they will obviously skew the 
data by leaving partial or overly emphasised associations visible. Biases simply cannot be 
hidden, as they remain traceable components of a network. Moreover, the traceability of 
researcher bias, helps us to recognise the distance such partialities cause between the researcher 
and topic.  
Consider Cisco as an example. Cisco might be intimately connected to tā moko by virtue 
of her perceived expertise on the topic. However, though she presents information pertaining to 
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tā moko, when we begin examining her research, we find that she is quite far from Māori 
conceptions of the practice. Her contributions diminish in light of the obvious connections she 
does not include in her analysis of tā moko, such as the significance of tikanga Māori and 
mātauranga Māori, pushing her further and further away from other connections to the practice 
which the network reinforces. Indeed, the more remote her connections become, the less impact 
her argument has on understandings of Māori tā moko.  
Recall that within actor-network theory, the only relevant question is whether a 
connection exists, the answer to which is derived by tracing and inscribing emergent linkages.646 
The agent is inherent to the network, and it is his definition of the world that determines its 
parameters.647 Any tracing of connections that takes place within, and ultimately defines, the 
network must be conducted by the agents within the network.648 Significantly, tracing the 
associations between phenomena also facilitates group autonomy by serving as the means 
through which self-definition is promulgated.649 
 Again, this point is reinforced by the analysis of the Cisco case study. The tā moko 
network boasts a host of agents, ranging from mau moko to tohunga-tā-moko, to Pākehā who 
received and gave moko, to those who appreciate moko as an art form, to the myriad of scholars 
who study tā moko. These are only representative of a tiny portion of the connections that 
comprise the tā moko network, innumerable others exist. Within actor-network theory, each of 
these factions has the opportunity to trace their own associations between phenomena. Cisco is 
no different. If we think of her analysis in terms of linkages, the choices she made about which 
connections to bring to the fore had the effect of shifting her away from Māori tā moko and the 
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agents therein, toward Western interpretations of it. Thus, Cisco’s autonomy is facilitated 
through the definition of herself she imposes by participating in the interface between herself and 
Western views of indigenous and, in this case, Māori practices. Yet, Cisco’s interpretation of tā 
moko and ultimately her autonomy, legitimised through the Western gaze, is not indicative of or 
at the expense of any other view or another’s autonomy. Māori retain their autonomy, expressed 
through the associations they trace, just like Pākehā maintain their autonomy, legitimised 
through the connectivity they locate.  
The influence that Western science and Western interpretations of tā moko exert on Cisco 
raises the second key consequence of actor-network theory. As we learned in the Introduction, 
actor-network theory upholds that the actions of agents are provided by “actantiality,” which is 
not determined by the actions of an agent but by the impetus behind their actions.650 That which 
determines the actions of agents allows the forces behind cultural practices like moko to extend 
multi-directionally. For tā moko, this multi-directionality encompasses atua, tikanga Māori, and 
other forces that influence agents within the network, adding a dimension and depth to tā moko 
neglected within the Cisco case study.  
Finally, Latour stresses that actor-network theory does not replace the traditional, social 
scientific understandings of agency and society with the agent and network, respectively. 
Instead, the social is construed as that which circulates locally, whilst the network is the most 
precise account of this circulation. The insertion of causes or factors encourages the extension of 
the network; nothing outside of the network needs to occur to generate new components within 
it. Thus, a network serves as its own “frame of reference” and any changes within it are 
determined by the parameters of its own self-definition.651 Tracing associations makes the 
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actions of agents and the mechanisms and motivations behind these actions visible. It is through 
the tracing of these circulations that we transcend the constraints of agency which, in turn, 
facilitates far greater understanding of cultural practice.652  
As I mentioned in the Introduction, Latour declares that “it is us, the social scientists, 
who lack knowledge of what they do, and not they who are missing the explanation of why they 
are unwittingly manipulated by forces exterior to themselves and known to the social scientist’s 
powerful gaze and methods.”653 Therefore, actor-network theory helps us to settle ontological 
tensions that emerge within agent-centered models and between the researcher and subject, 
which encourages and provides an effective space for reflexivity to emerge. Actor-network 
theory is unique in that it bypasses superficial conceptions of the social, instead permitting the 
connections to determine the number of possible dimensions.654 Either an element is part of the 
network, or it is not and fades into the descriptive background.655    
Latour continues, averring that the “problem” of reflexivity transforms into an 
“opportunity” when “the epistemological myth of an outside observer providing an explanation 
in addition to ‘mere description’ disappears.”656 No entity or observer is granted “privilege,” nor 
do “a priori limits on knowledge exist,” since the environment in which the associations are 
traced is defined by the unique features of the associations themselves. Furthermore, actor-
network theory allows for the emergence of multiplicity of voices, so agents need not be 
censored, since the concern is tracing associations between them. Thus, signallers and receivers 
who emerged within the costly signalling theory framework but who were not included, due to 
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limitations imposed by costly signalling, can have a place within a more symmetrical framework 
that balances out both the natural and social worlds and the many perspectives about these 
worlds. 
To effectively present this model, I adhere to two “methodological principles” outlined 
by Callon but with one exception. Firstly, agents within the network shall not be censored. To 
attain an accurate understanding of network dynamics, all agents must be able to be present their 
interpretations of the world and to express their analysis of the environment without 
judgement.657 Like Latour, Callon asserts that no viewpoint is privileged; however, this is where 
my study diverges from more traditional uses of actor-network theory. When analysing tā moko 
through this new lens, I do not intend to privilege a single point of view; nonetheless, at the end 
of the analysis, I do intend to highlight distinctly Māori voices. Although I do acknowledge the 
need for a more symmetrical model than was presented by Cisco’s application of costly 
signalling theory, simultaneously, I maintain that it is necessary, at the end of the study, to 
reiterate the divergences between Māori ontologies and those gleaned from the Cisco case study 
as they relate to tā moko by re-situating the lens to once again focus on Māori perspectives. 
Whilst I am aware that some may view this as counter to the entire point of developing and 
applying an integrative model, I disagree. Rather, I think it necessary to advance a symmetrical 
model to remobilise Māori ontologies within a field that struggles to accommodate the holistic 
realities of indigenous peoples. Although Cisco’s model employs Māori material, Māori 
perspectives, as well as any other than her own, are shut down. The reappropriation of Māori 
autonomy within costly signalling theory and evolutionary explanation of culture by emphasising 
Māori ontologies demands acoustics that deliver a clarity to Māori voices within a public sphere, 
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wherein Māori are not in a position of alterity “but rather hold a position of being the norm in” 
their “own constructions.”658  
Furthermore, an integrative model which affords Māori their own autonomy represents an 
evolution of evolutionary explanations of culture. Through transmissive assemblage, as anchored 
by actor-network theory, Western scientific discourse becomes only one of many voices. The 
egalitarian platform transmissive assemblage supports allows evolutionary processes to be 
described, determined, and isolated in a myriad of ways. In turn, this host of approaches reflects 
a perpetual pliancy which enables evolutionary explanations of culture to continually evolve, 
alongside the practices and people whom define the networks therein. The fluidity and 
heteroglossia, which a network orientated model permits, demands that as networks and the 
agents and interactions within them evolve, the valuations of these networks also evolve, since it 
is the agents, themselves, and not those studying the networks who determine their own 
ontological expression.  
The ability of agents to articulate their own ontological frameworks is essential to 
Callon’s second assertion regarding the necessity of “free association,” which demands that “the 
observer abandon all a priori distinctions between natural and social events.”659 No distinction 
between the natural and social which inhibits agents’ ability to articulate their own ontological 
frameworks shall be made. Both the human and nonhuman are “relational effects.”660 As Callon 
observes, distinctions between the two are a product of analysis, as opposed to a “point of 
departure.”661 Agents construct their worlds and, for that matter, understandings of themselves 
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through both natural and social means. Researchers, themselves, are mobilised as relational 
effects, which acknowledges their own autonomy, yet, simultaneously, forces them onto an equal 
playing field with everyone and everything else involved in the network.  
Thus, the job of the researcher advancing a model which incorporates actor-network 
theory is not to impose a Kantian categorical imperative but to allow the agents to illuminate the 
pathways they utilise to navigate their realities which traverse both the natural and the social.662 
In order to transcend the political-ethical concerns circulating within evolutionary explanations 
of culture, which involve the treatment of researchers as proxies though they carry no cultural 
mandate or authorisation to serve in such a capacity, the dependency upon the researcher to serve 
as the mouthpiece for groups, including their practices, and relationships to the natural world, 
must be overcome. By insisting that researchers are nothing more but nothing less than relational 
effects, actor-network theory liberates researchers from the confines of their own methodologies, 
and, instead, affords them a unique and overdue opportunity to fully integrate into that which 
they study, to evolve as network constituents evolve.  
Indigenous Ontological Perspectivism  
As I explained in the Introduction, indigenous ontological perspectivism is a theoretical approach 
I use to amplify the network(s) brought to light by actor-network theory through the inclusion of 
natural world components. Indigenous ontological perspectivism allows for the expansion of the 
attribution of associations, and, specifically the attribution of social relations, to nature.663 Thus, 
indigenous ontological perspectivism can be conceived of as isolating the origination and 
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termination of network associations by providing the means to identify and discuss agents and 
products of the interactions that occur between them. 
Despite the drawbacks of costly signalling theory, illuminated through the analysis of 
Cisco’s research and reiterated above, its theoretical foundation in animal signalling affords 
costly signalling an explanatory latitude that other explanations of culture practice do not have, 
specifically when it comes to the incorporation of non-human entities. This is because costly 
signalling theory developed in a non-human context. However, what we witnessed with its 
employment as an explanation for tā moko was a certain ineffectiveness, due to stark contrasts 
between the clarity of signaller/receiver relationships in the animal world and those same 
relationships in a human context. However, indigenous ontological perspectivism challenges this 
view, offering up the alternative suggestion, that perhaps animal relationships are not so clear 
cut; that perhaps, it is the Western tendency to dichotomise between us and them where humans 
and animals are concerned, when, in fact, it is just us. Thus, the clarity of the signaller/receiver 
relationship presented so neatly within costly signalling theory may not be so tidy afterall. 
Additionally, indigenous ontological perspectivism adds further dimension to the possibilities for 
the evolution of cultural evolution presented when incorporating indigenous perspectives into an 
integrative and transdisciplinary model of cultural practice.  
 Simultaneously, indigenous ontological perspectivism allows us to apply a new lens to 
costly signalling theory, one which has hereto remained unacknowledged. Notwithstanding its 
anthropocentric tendencies, costly signalling theory is one of the only evolutionary explanations 
of cultural practice which has the mechanisms to incorporate an indigenous, multi-naturalist 
perspective. Studying human behaviour through a model intended to explain animal behaviour 
presents the opportunity to acknowledge that we may not be so separate from animals and other 
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non-human entities, and that the same justifications for animal behaviour may translate to 
humans.  
This perspective ties in well with actor-network theory, in that process becomes the focal 
point of interaction and that to derive explanation requires associations to be traced. Where 
Latour traces association between agents, indigenous ontological perspectivism traces 
associations from point of view to agent, allowing the process by which agency is ascribed to be 
mapped. In combination, we are presented with elements of a model with immense reflexivity. 
Not only are associations between entities traceable via actor-network theory, but the 
associations between agent and outcome (in the form of perspective or point of view) can be 
mapped utilising indigenous ontological perspectivism.  
Indigenous ontological perspectivism forgoes the tendency of Western scientific models 
to define themselves by the objects a subject produces, which helps the subject to foster an 
external recognition of itself—the only means by which a subject can “know itself 
objectively.”664 Because “an object is an incompletely interpreted subject,” indigenous 
ontological perspectivism maintains that complete interpretation is only possible by determining 
an object’s relational position. In part, this is because indigenous ontological perspectivism 
recognises that agents are not bound by biological constraints which means that they can only be 
understood with regards to how they are situated in a “network of social relations.”665 If we 
accept de Castro’s stance that the world is perceived or represented in the exact same way for all 
entities and that what differs is the world that is seen, then I would argue that social relationality 
is the only way to develop an accurate portrayal of another’s world since these traced 
associations also serve as channels for exchange. When opened up to exchange, not only is an 
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agent exchanged for a social relation, but perspectives of the relationships themselves can be 
exchanged.666  
To better illustrate the applicability of indigenous ontological perspectivism to our 
present case, I borrow a helpful framework from Benjamin Alberti and Yvonne Marshall who 
apply the theory to Argentinian body-pots.667 Moko is multi-faceted. On one hand, moko is an 
object, in the sense of being indelible marks inscribed upon the face, in the past preserved 
through mokamōkai (preservation of the head). On the other, these inscriptions can also be 
considered conceptual in nature, in that they are considered representative of whakapapa. 
However, one would not, necessarily, expect facial markings to carry such deep meaning with an 
intensely ritualised aspect; nor would one, necessarily, predict tā moko to be the selected means 
to convey genealogical connections. Neither moko as a thing, nor moko in its conceptual form as 
an embodiment of genealogy fully encapsulates its scope. Thus, moko transcends the 
thing/concept dichotomy.668 As Alberti and Marshall recognise, once liberated from the 
thing/concept duality, then innumerable “ontological possibilities” emerge.  
One possibility for moko is that its permanent nature is intended to buttress whakapapa 
by prohibiting it from transforming into an alternate form.669 Building upon Alberti and 
Marshall’s argument, it is plausible that the plethora of moko forms may, in fact, “not so much 
‘represent’ anything as ‘participate in’ an everyday concern with the stability” of whakapapa.670 
Consider that moko lies over or on the face; indeed is incorporated into the face. Yet, it is also 
comprised of materials, in the form of ink, flesh, blood, and all other materials that go into 
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producing the design. Moko and, presumably, the genealogy therein can stand aside from the 
individual whose face it graces in a material form. Thus, we have moko upon the face as well as 
the material concept of moko comprising the fluidity of its forms. 
The more fixed material form of moko actually inserts permanence (i.e. conceptions of 
genealogy) into a backdrop of impermanence (i.e. genealogy as manifest in an individual form 
that will die). In this way, moko is not the sum of ink, blood, and skin “added on successively to 
a fixed background of matter.”671 Indeed, as Alberti and Marshall explain, instead of moko, the 
face, and “matter being thought of in an additive sense, their forms could be seen as a 
consequence of making” genealogy permanent “from a generalized background” of 
impermanence, characteristic of the human condition.672 In this case, whakapapa, embodied by 
moko, “materializes” as the permanence that is integrated to establish an association. Although 
humans are in a constant state of flux, moko introduces a bit of stability. Moko helps to prohibit 
change by externally stabilising the inherent transformation of individuals, whether through 
acquisition of status, death, natural occurrence, or any other phenomena.673 Accordingly, tā 
moko “embodies the antimony of stability and instability, the instability of matter and the 
stabilising effects of practice, whether human-authored or not. Consequently, the question of 
agency is reversed: the question is no longer how things get movement (i.e. agency) but rather 
how they stabilise.”674  
The above example illustrates how the world both Latour and de Castro describe is 
entirely relational and open to transformation. Various ontological perspectives are also able to 
be shared. By tracing connections, including between objects and concepts, we are able to 
                                                 






integrate a universalised perspective and establish connections within the whole. Likewise, 
indigenous groups are able to disconnect elements and “particularize relationships,” in a way that 
runs contrary to the more typical universalised nature of relationships within indigenous 
contexts.675 Furthermore, a relational approach to culture and its practices carves out space to 
honour the transformative and acculturated nature of culture, a view which indigenous and 
evolutionary explanations share.  
In seeking an integrative approach to the study of cultural practice, relationality or tracing 
associations is beneficial for both Western and indigenous metaphysical and epistemological 
models. The main benefit of relationality is that it allows us to set representations and agency 
aside and focus on the transformative and accumulated nature of action, responsible for the 
evolution of culture, without sacrificing any of its complexity and without presenting “native 
peoples as helpless playthings in the grip of the all-powerful logic” of Western science, which 
leaves us “remote from human and social interest.”676 Additionally, as pointed out in the 
Introduction, tracing associations encourages us to question the idea of indigenous peoples 
assuming their current position by following a “natural evolutionary path, determined 
exclusively by [their] interaction among technology, demography, and environment, a trajectory 
then truncated by the irruption of History.”677 All paths are natural, interrelated, and, yet, self-
ascribed, as opposed a historical course determined by disconnected sources exerting influence 
onto an inert subject. By forgoing the dichotomy between nature and society, cultural 
complexities, as well as differing ontological perspectives, are endorsed through their 
connectivity. Indeed, as the examination of the Cisco case study illuminated, the full scope of the 
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complexity of any group or agent can never be realised when analysed through foreign 
epistemological frameworks which are ill-equipped to discern, let alone incorporate alternative 
ontologies.  
Relationality supports de Castro’s “phenomenological unity.” The recognition that, at its 
core, reality is the same for everyone—a series of traced associations—equalises all agents, 
whether human, animal, inanimate object, spirit, etc regardless of the form the expression of this 
unity takes.678 For all agents, this allows history in its many forms to become a process of 
symmetrical construction and reclamation that surpasses mere perception and transforms into a 
validated, holistic reality.679  
Kaupapa Māori 
Kaupapa Māori which is based upon a set of philosophical beliefs and values specific to Māori 
forms the inner circle of my concentric approach. Since this study pertains to a Māori case study 
and advances a more symmetrical and decolonised approach to indigenous practices, it is 
essential to incorporate Māori ontology and epistemology. My usage of Kaupapa Māori demands 
for and emphasises a distinctively Māori voice which allows features of the revealed network(s) 
to be defined in Māori terms.   
Relationality also creates an opportunity to discuss the paths certain associations take, 
such as Māori associations to tā moko. Also, the symmetrical nature of non-agentically based, 
relationally orientated models helps to mitigate bias in conversations about groups and their 
practices by facilitating space for narrative assemblages and heteroglossia to emerge. When 
highlighting specific networks, particularly those involving indigeneity, emic voices help to 
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develop aspects of the network that have hereto been overlooked, ignored, or subsumed into the 
dominant rhetoric of Western science. Although this practice may be seen as reverting back to 
agentic orientation, to fully decolonise evolutionary explanations of tā moko first requires that, in 
addition to understanding the involvement of Western science in the colonial process, we have 
the opportunity to discuss tā moko from non-Western and, specifically, Māori perspectives. 
Kaupapa Māori provides the necessary tools to begin decolonising costly signalling theory to 
show how, more broadly, indigenous meanings need to be treated in order to be reintegrated into 
evolutionary explanations of cultural practice.  
 Chapter Three revealed a host of discrepancies between Cisco’s tā moko narrative and 
those of Māori. To underscore these inconsistencies, the narrative of Mataora was presented. 
After relaying two different accounts of the narrative, I slightly altered its language to better 
reflect the language of costly signalling theory and natural selection. What became apparent is 
that with a minor altering of language, the narrative of Mataora offered up a more concise and 
detailed account of tā moko that integrated tikanga Māori, than was available within the Cisco 
case study. The associations revealed through my investigation into the Cisco case study are 
distinctly Western with an emphasis on the critical role Western agency plays in interpreting the 
reason for the development and perpetuation of tā moko. However, Māori narratives focus on the 
associations between praxis and identity, both internally and externally, with a particular 
emphasis on the collectivity of Māori holistic reality. 
 In keeping with the individuated tradition of costly signalling theory, the treatment of tā 
moko throughout the Cisco case study was individually orientated, which suffocated the 
collective expression so central to Māori ontologies. Though signallers may be signalling 
cooperative intent, costly signalling theory still revolves around a single signaller’s ability to 
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signal and a receiver’s ability to interpret that signal. Ultimately, costly signalling theory is 
concerned with breaking down a social interaction into its constituent parts to understand why 
“costly” behaviours are perpetuated. Yet, as Durie stresses, this approach to knowledge and 
cultural practice is vastly different from holistic, Māori thinking which is integrative, not 
analytical.680 
For Māori, “the individual has no validity of his own.”681 Mead further contextualises 
collectivity within Māori tradition as embodied by tā moko: 
We treat our artworks as people because many of them represent our ancestors  
who for us are real persons…They are anchor points in our genealogies and in  
our history. Without them we have no position in society and we have no social  
reality. We form with them the social universe of Maoridom.682 
 
Thus, any attempt to dissect an innately collective practice like tā moko into individual action 
and ascribe an individualised meaning to it misrepresents the holistic reality of Māori in a way 
that leaves tā moko solipsistic and unfamiliar.  
 The aim of remobilising Māori perspectives of their own practices through frameworks 
which articulate Māori ontologies demands decolonised modes of enquiry. Decolonisation is a 
multi-level approach which challenges colonisation and imperialism. In the words of Tuhiwai 
Smith, “decolonization is about centering our concerns and world views and then coming to 
know and understand theory and research from our own perspectives and for our own 
purposes.”683 Central to this endeavour is critiquing “underlying assumptions, motivations, and 
values which inform research practices.”684 Whilst more could be done regarding these issues 
within costly signalling theory and, certainly, critiques from Māori scholars are warranted, a 
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great deal of this critique is found throughout the analysis of the Cisco case study in Chapter 
Three of this thesis. Graham emphasises the significance of critiquing Western science and its 
explanation of cultural phenomenon, remarking that it is not about arguing against science, but, 
rather, arguing “for the development of a critical perspective on science in order to expose its 
colonising potential.”685 Thus, components of Kaupapa Māori have already been integrated into 
this study; still, room exists for its further incorporation. 
In an effort to “recover and reclaim knowledge and voices made silent by the Eurocentric 
monopoly and related privileges,” transformative methodologies which facilitate meaningful 
dialogue and exchange need to be developed.686 A number of decolonising options emerge from 
the integration of Kaupapa Māori into a pre-existing research framework. Firstly, there is always 
the matter of having the right tools for the job, and one might logically and convincingly argue 
that costly signalling theory is not the right tool for studying moko as a Māori cultural practice. 
As Tinbergen’s four complementary questions reveal, the same behaviour may have a plurality 
of explanations and costly signalling theory may not be the right explanation for tā moko.687  
Kaupapa Māori raises the question of whether costly signalling theory is a valid framework for 
studying moko.  
Indeed, within the context of indigenous studies, it is imperative to ask what is acceptable 
to study and to assume accountability and responsibility for engaging in indigenous work. The 
reflexivity required to assume such accountability was absent within the Cisco case study and 
was shown to generate a host of concerns when approaching an indigenous cultural practice like 
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tā moko. Kaupapa Māori provides the opportunity for Māori to deny the employment of 
methodologies that do not honour Māori holistic realities encapsulated by 
whakawhānaungatanga, the process through which relationships are established.688 
 Secondly, Kaupapa Māori can be applied as a mode of critical analysis. In the third 
chapter of this study, arguments were made which challenged Cisco’s presentation and 
interpretation of tā moko by juxtaposing her claims with Māori understandings. Building upon 
this juxtaposition, there is room to further utilise Kaupapa Māori as a means for critical analysis. 
Indeed, any relationality that emerges within an associative model can be revisited through a 
distinctively Māori lens. This is the way that Kaupapa Māori will be integrated into the 
transmissive assemblage model below. Once the model is presented with the aim of solely 
tracing associations inherent within networks related to tā moko, Kaupapa Māori will re-emerge 
to highlight the Māori voice regarding found linkages. Thus, whilst it is not a framework for 
transmissive assemblage in the relational sense that actor-network theory and indigenous 
ontological perspectivism are, Kaupapa Māori is essential to serving as an active voice to 
expound upon the traced associations actor-network theory and indigenous ontological 
perspectivism reveal and to reframe tā moko in a distinctively Māori way.  
Transmissive Assemblage and Tā Moko: Toward a New Model  
Within the Cisco case study, moko is portrayed as a costly signal intended to broadcast ally, 
enemy, or mate quality. Yet, as Chapter Three revealed, this understanding of moko, though 
perhaps accurate in the limited context the case study presents, lacks wider applicability, since it 
does not take into account other signallers, receivers, and meanings of moko which have endured 
from a pre-contact context and which are newly developed, as tā moko is still being practiced 
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and continues to evolve today. My goal for the rest of this chapter is to review the assertion of 
moko as a signal and to trace the network that forms from the connections between signallers and 
receivers, both social and natural, overlooked by Cisco’s application of costly signalling theory. 
From the outset, I recognise that in no way could every relational aspect be presented here; 
therefore, I focus on those that specifically pertain to conclusions presented in Chapter Three and 
trace associations from there. 
If we think of the research from Chapter Three in terms of a network, a number of agents 
emerge. Broadly, there are three: Māori, Pākehā, and tā moko/moko—all of which come to the 
fore as significant players within the network. Each of these entities has its own reality, along 
with realities within realities, which differs from the others, resulting in controversies over the 
meaning of moko today, the future of moko, and how/why it developed through time. Because 
the case study in Chapter Three focused mainly on the development of moko, I will be 
discussing these different realities in terms of the question: how/why did tā moko develop? My 
aim here is to utilise actor-network theory and indigenous ontological perspectivism, in their 
descriptive capacities, to elaborate upon the new insights that emerge from thinking of tā moko 
in terms of a relational paradigm and how we might be able to utilise this information construct a 
new model.  
Differing Realities   
Māori Perspectives 
 
I have impressed throughout this study that Māori have an inherent understanding of tā moko, 
which is lived. The narrative of Mataora asserts a deep connection between tikanga Māori and tā 
moko which illuminates that tā moko is bound to a way of living, an identity through action and 
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being, rather than a static, ascribed identity. 689 This does not mean that moko stands aside from 
genetics, as its links to whakapapa were previously outlined in earlier chapters.690 Neither does it 
mean that moko is impermanent, as I have suggested its material form helps stabilise the 
impermanence of the human body and mediate the dynamics of transformation.  
Today, Māori do not necessarily make explicit associations between moko and specific, 
static expression of identity, opting for more general and fluid references to its relationship to 
identity. Aside from its tie to identity, Nikora conceptualises tā moko as having continuity with 
the past so that it is seen as part of an unbroken tradition. To accept Nikora’s view, which is 
supported by the narrative of Mataora, in which Uetonga was already practicing tā moko when 
Mataora arrived, means that when tracing associations through a Māori optic, tā moko has no 
point of origination; it has always been. So, asking questions about how tā moko developed 
becomes counter-productive and leads us away from the inherent nature of tā moko within 
Māori, holistic reality.  
To shift the question slightly, to ask why moko developed, leads us to the same 
conclusion. Tradition says that tā moko did not develop, it has always been. Through tā moko, 
Māori are linked to a holistic reality embodied by a continuous tradition of tikanga and 
mātauranga which is historical, transhistorical, transhuman, and current. Pursuing questions like 
why/how moko, within a Māori network, collapses into a tautology: tā moko exists because it 
has always been; tā moko has always been, hence the reason for its existence.  
Pākehā Perspectives 
Connections to Pākehā also emerged in the tā moko narratives discussed in Chapter Two. In the 
early colonial period, the literature from which backed most of the Cisco case study research, 
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Pākehā were predominantly the ones recording information about Māori practices. Yet, most 
Pākehā writing at the time had not had moko or been tattooed and some had not even seen moko. 
This early literature was not only written by Pākehā but also records reactions from Pākehā who 
viewed the practice as barbaric and saw no reason to continue it.691 In response to the question as 
to why moko was developed and was perpetuated, a number of Pākehā authors attribute its 
existence to a foreign, savage nature, subversive to colonial efforts. This tension is articulated by 
George Angas who recorded that:  
many of the sons even of influential chiefs—having either adopted the manners  
of the Europeans or joined the missionary converts—have dispensed with this  
peculiar and barbarous disfigurement; which certainly does not add to their  
appearance, at least in the eyes of a civilized community.692 
 
Depite Angas’ own determination that tā moko is strange and unnecessary, he acknowledged that 
the practice may have a place within Māori society. Recall that Pākehā missionaries also 
denounced tā moko, contrasting its practice with scriptural admonitions like that of Leviticus 
19:28 (KJV).693 Thus, the question of why moko becomes one framed through the perceived 
contrast of Western and Māori practice. I say perceived, because, as we learned in Chapter Two, 
it becomes apparent that when associations are further traced not all Pākehā take stands against 
tā moko.  
In addition to Pākehā-Māori, introduced in Chapter Two, Scherzer represents yet another 
Pākehā perspective that emerges from the literature following the signing of the Treaty of 
Waitangi in 1840. Contrasting Pākehā and Māori, Scherzer wrote that “‘moko’ is one of those 
most characteristic [differences] of this remarkable people, and is worth being described in 
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detail, inasmuch as it has been almost entirely discontinued since the diffusion of 
Christianity.”694 During this period tā moko was viewed as an antiquated practice from a dying 
culture on the brink of extinction.695 Instead of documenting reactions to tā moko, authors 
scrambled to collect, report, and preserve as much information about moko and Māori culture as 
possible. An acknowledgment of pressures and disruptions from colonisation resulted in the push 
to preserve what, romantically, was considered a noble and continuous tradition at the very point 
in time when it might disappear. Thus, we see the polarising nature of tā moko for early Pākehā 
who were not included in Cisco’s research in any capacity. 
Cisco, herself, is non-Māori and interprets Māori tā moko as a signal of ally or enemy 
quality. To her understanding, Māori utilised moko to facilitate easy identification on the 
battlefield. Allies and enemies interpret moko in the same way, as a signal of commitment to 
one’s group. Cisco relies heavily on Pākehā literature and incorporates few Māori sources into 
her work. She expresses little awareness of the controversies within the literature regarding moko 
and does not include Pākehā in her signaller/receiver dynamic. When posing the question—why 
moko?—she draws from costly signalling theory and concludes that moko developed and was 
perpetuated, at least in pre and early colonial times, because it served as a costly signal, but only 
for Māori.  
Moko 
Whilst narratives of tā moko were presented in Chapter Two, in order to better grasp moko in its 
agentic form, I would like to briefly revisit those details which stress its connections to the 
natural world. Since its inception, tā moko has evolved into a number of different forms from 
smooth tattoo (moko kurī), to chiselled moko, to modern tattoo machine. In its earliest 
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incarnations, moko involved natural elements. Often albatross or petrel bones were used for uhi. 
At various times and in various locations many different substances were harvested to create the 
perfect pigment for ink, including sap, berry juice, and, reportedly, even the dead larvae of a 
certain caterpillar.696 Toward the end of the 1800s, tohunga-tā-moko had come to rely on 
producing their dyes mostly from the ashes of burnt āwheto, kauri (particularly lauded for the 
intensity of its dark pigmentation), and kāpia trees. For a time even gunpowder was used, though 
by the end of the 19th century this practice was discontinued.697 The utilisation of these natural 
substances indicates a strong connection between moko and the natural world. Indeed, natural 
substances are incorporated into the living human face which not only alters the countenance of 
the mau moko, but establishes a living link with the land and alters the natural landscape by 
using its gifts to help convey identity.  
 However, in addition to these benefits, the introduction of metal in the 1840s caused a 
change in the technique, and the uhi, once made of bone, were instead crafted out of metal. 
Around 1910, chisels began to be replaced with a group of darning needles. The needle 
eliminated the awkwardness of using a chisel and was generally a more forgiving implement to 
work with. Not only was the needle method more precise, but it also increased expediency whilst 
decreasing the amount of blood shed and pain moko recipients had to endure, as well as 
decreasing healing time. Furthermore, the needle brought with it a significant decrease in 
potential disastrous health consequences as opposed to those, such as blood infection or death, 
sometimes presented by the use of the chisel.698 
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 However, this shift in practice also further eroded Māori linkages to their land. The tools 
and ink used no longer bound mau moko directly to the land. Rather, new technologies drew 
Pākehā and Māori closer together by forging more intimate associations between the two: Māori 
practice and Pākehā derived technologies. Today, tā moko is normally carried out with a modern 
tattoo machine, though recently the chisel technique has begun to re-emerge.  
Thus, it becomes apparent that moko is a dynamic agent which, like Māori and Pākehā, 
has its own voice. Indeed, tā moko has wide reaching ramifications on an assemblage of 
technology, people, nature, and the inanimate. The pressures moko exerts on these agents, has 
profound effects on how and why they evolve through time. In fact, as becomes apparent, the 
associations generated between these agents is ultimately what paved the way for the re-
emergence of tā moko in the late 20th century. Tracing associations to moko allows us to see the 
dynamics of interaction without reliance on an agentic conveyer, in turn, tā moko can be 
decolonised since every lens and voice is equally as viable as any other. 
Discussion: Decolonisation through Transmissive Assemblage 
Background: Why Transmissive Assemblage? 
To review, the Cisco case study, reviewed in Chapter Three, asserts that the purpose of moko 
was to serve as a costly signal indicating one’s cooperative intent and group commitment for the 
warring Māori. Similarly, many early Pākehā authors relay that moko was about looking 
ferocious, although some Pākehā chose to engage with the practice and integrated into Māori 
communities. Māori tend to associate tā moko with Māori identity and the realisation and 
embodiment of mātauranga and tikanga Māori. Tā moko, as an agent, has connections to Māori, 
the environment, and even Pākehā.  
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Change is also channelled through linkages to tā moko. External change is manifest for 
mau moko and those observing him/her by the actual moko applied to the face, as well as the 
impact the usage of natural components has on the environment. Dynamics between people, 
Māori to Māori, Māori to Pākehā, Pākehā to Pākehā, Māori to other Polynesian groups, 
researcher to Māori and Pākehā, and innumerable others are also affected by their associations to 
tā moko. Internal change, in the form of how mau moko evolve as a result of their acquisition of 
moko, also occurs and fosters new associations for mau moko and those people and things with 
which they interact. 
 These associations reveal that the question at the hub of the Cisco case study about why 
moko developed and subsequent conclusion that it is because moko served as a costly signal is 
not as straightforward as it first may seem. Rather than being a simple question about the use of 
moko as a signal, it involves other, significant natural and social elements all of which are 
interrelated to greater or lesser degrees. Neither the question about moko as a costly signal, nor 
the more general question of why moko developed and was perpetuated, can be answered with a 
simple yes or no. This is because asking if moko functions as a costly signal or delving into its 
development and perpetuation, evolves into “a whole series of agents by establishing their 
identities and the links between them.”699 Indeed, these associations represent any number of 
perspectives and voices. This multi-perspectival heteroglossia is further confirmed by the 
variance that occurs between the Cisco case study research, the secondary source record, and 
Māori narrative. 
Rather than acknowledging the dynamic interplay between these networks, the Cisco case 
study reveals an attempt to control the agents who threaten to destabilise her argument. To do so, 
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the dynamic nature of tā moko is undermined. By delimiting its tradition only to the chiselled 
form, moko is only construed as an effective signal for warfare which contributes to a narrow, 
linear view of Māori as warring people. Moreover, by opting to rely mainly on Pākehā accounts 
of Māori practice which view moko through the lens of alterity, Māori are denied the possibility 
to speak for themselves. By disassociating moko from other influences, the definition of moko is 
contained and, thus, the scope of its network limited. Simply put, the style of analysis within the 
Cisco case study allows the constituents involved in a network to be cherry-picked. In turn, the 
possible associations within the network are constrained. Such criticism is not unfamiliar to 
proponents of evolutionary explanations. Quentin Atkinson and Harvey Whitehouse, in an article 
building upon Whitehouse’s imagistic/doctrinal modes of religiosity, admit that the theories 
framing evolutionary explanations largely draw from case studies that “tend to be derived from 
ethnographic, archaeological or historical case studies and field work, and are therefore 
vulnerable to the charge of cherry-picking.”700  
When Cisco presents her research to the public, including Māori, they assume that she 
has factored in all of the information related to her classification of moko as a costly signal. The 
problem is that her decision to shape the material by agent and not by association does not 
eliminate the existence of these other influences that equally affect the dynamics of tā moko and 
which could enhance costly signalling theory’s explanatory power. Neither Pākehā, Māori, nor tā 
moko are fully represented within Cisco’s research. Rather, Cisco becomes the representative 
and spokesperson for them, based upon their relationship to the criteria she has constructed.  
In essence, the cultural practice Cisco portrays does not exist. Rather, what Cisco 
describes are power relationships generated by focussing on agency. Earlier, I explained that 
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culture is framed agentically. The power relationships which comprise the notion of culture are 
the well from which Cisco draws from to shape her study of Māori tā moko; and, in doing so, 
she, herself, assumes a power position, serving as the mouthpiece for both Western science 
(specifically costly signalling theory) and Māori tā moko. The actual interactions of Māori, 
Pākehā, and other entities and forces with tā moko take a sideline to Cisco’s interpretation of 
them as static entities who simply utilise tā moko as a form of engagement with the world. The 
effect of Cisco’s study is one of recolonisation which legitimises cultural hegemony through a 
doctrine of agency and rhetoric of science. 
An Example of Transmissive Assemblage  
Callon articulates the logic behind transmissive assemblage quite well. As he explains, if A seeks 
to entice B, then A will do everything possible to eliminate any linkages that remain to other 
entities, say C, D, and E. When B engages with A, its identity and qualities change; B becomes a 
product or “result” of its connection to A.701 Now, if C, D, and E attempt to influence B, it will 
become much more difficult. They, themselves, will have to shift and adapt to Bs new identity, 
resulting in a shift in their own identities and qualities. Of course, there is no guarantee that B 
will buy into what A has to offer. Indeed, for A to engage B requires a willingness on Bs part to 
“anchor” onto A.702 Anytime A engages B, the product is the social.703  
The same process occurred between Pākehā and Māori with regards to tā moko. Say that 
A is early Pākehā colonisers and B represents Māori populations. As some early Pākehā 
colonisers engaged with Māori, they made a concerted effort to erode links to traditional Māori 
culture and practices, including moko. For instance, Henry Williams wanted to impose strict 
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protocols for Māori based upon Western and Christian ideals.704 During colonisation, Māori men 
were frequently encouraged to abstain from moko entirely and to grow beards to cover any moko 
that was already applied. Consider Robley who encountered an older generation of men and 
women with complete moko and moko kauae; simultaneously Robley saw members of the 
following generation forgo moko or display incomplete tattoos.705 So, even though tā moko was 
still practiced in some areas, for the most part, it was discouraged, and men with moko were less 
likely to get jobs.706 However, not all Pākehā supported Williams and the strictures other 
Christian missionaries sometimes tried to impose. For example, whilst the Church Missionary 
Society supported British authority over Māori, they opposed suppression of Māori practices and 
beliefs.707 Recall also that some Pākehā participated in tā moko. However, both groups’ 
engagement with Māori had profound effects on Māori practice and on the cultural and 
geographical landscape of Aotearoa (New Zealand).  
Māori involvement with Pākehā made it more difficult for Māori to engage fully with 
other entities (Cs, Ds, and Es) they had been associated with the past. For instance, let us 
consider C as the land of Aotearoa. Māori consider themselves as tangata whenua, indigenous 
people of the placenta and of the land.708 Māori are the land, a point which Mead reminds us is 
reinforced by the Māori practice of interring the whenua (placenta) within the whenua (also 
land).709 Even today, Māori commonly cite a particular feature of the land, such as a maunga 
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(mountain) or awa (river) as sacred to their ancestry and, subsequently, their identity.710 
However, as Pākehā began to colonise New Zealand, competition for land and resources 
increased significantly.711 Many Māori were displaced from their ancestral lands. Engagement 
with the land that had been so integral to their sense of well-being and identity was not possible 
in the way it was prior to colonisation. Thus, Māori involvement with Pākehā not only shifted 
associations within the network but it made certain channels less accessible. 
However, it is imperative to remember that at any point, B can choose to disengage with 
A. This is one area where transmissive assemblage differs significantly from costly signalling 
theory. Within costly signalling theory, agents are locked into their signals. Being hard-to-fake 
often demands acts that cannot be reversed, like facial tattooing or scarification. Accordingly, if 
moko is a costly signal, it cannot be taken back; one is perpetually signalling. Additionally, if 
signals are truly costly signals, receivers do not want to disengage, since they, too, can receive 
valuable information from the exchange.  
Regardless of the information being conveyed and/or how that information is received, 
within a costly signalling framework one can never disengage. For instance, Cisco’s linkage 
between moko and war leads her to conclude that one reason for the disappearance of tā moko 
was that colonisation brought an end to internal warfare amongst and between Māori groups. 
Yet, as we learned in previous chapters, moko never actually disappeared. Notwithstanding lulls 
in tā moko, there has never been a time when moko was unseen upon a Māori face.  
The association Cisco attempts to build between moko and war is a weak one. We know 
that Māori warfare has been mythologised and romanticised. Furthermore, tā moko has 
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continually been practiced, indicating that it must have other, more substantial associations 
which endured and/or were formed during and after colonisation. Moko has never stopped 
operating as a signal and, as was demonstrated in Chapter Three, costly signalling theory cannot 
effectively account for its perpetuation. 
A transmissive assemblage model encourages us to consider tā moko as a signal, 
conveying significant information to receivers, but it is not limited by the constraints of 
signaller/receiver dynamics. Rather, the signalling environment and associations between agents 
become key; whereas, in traditional conceptions of costly signalling, the signalling environment 
looms in the background. Because signallers can be identified by the content of the signals they 
convey, through association, they are not limited by the form of its external manifestation; its 
agentic form. The fluidity of interaction, permitted by actor-network theory and indigenous 
ontological perspectivism, allows signallers and receivers to readily disengage by allowing 
interactions with whomever, whatever, and whichever ways they choose. Thus, room exists to 
consider linkages between mau moko and others that do not even pertain to moko but which 
shape the signalling environment. In turn, the holistic reality of Māori is affirmed, since no one 
aspect is automatically viewed as any more or less significant than any other, regardless of how 
visible it might be, and because, whether something is animate or inanimate, it assumes the role 
of agent within the network. 
One element of Māori disengagement with Pākehā pertains to moko kauae. During the 
time of European settlement and colonisation, Māori women were more isolated than their male 
counterparts, making them less likely to engage with Pākehā. In fact, women “in general,” 
including Pākehā settler women, were often secluded both physically and also from the discourse 
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which, at the time of colonisation, was largely coloured by the lens of Pākehā male authors.712 
The seclusion of moko kauae weakened Māori links to Pākehā colonisers. Higgins sees a definite 
correlation between Māori movements towards maintaining their group identity, and the survival 
of moko kauae into the 20th century.713 Thus, the disengagement of moko kauae from increasing 
associations to Pākehā later had a significant impact on the re-emergence of Māori identity and 
practices which took root during the Māori cultural renaissance of the 1960s and 70s.  
In the 1960s and 70s, a single Māori identity began to emerge that included all 
individuals who could claim Māori ancestry. Establishing a broader Māori identity was seen as a 
much needed response to the disintegration of the traditional Māori group system which 
appeared as a repercussion of the Māori urban migration that commenced in the 1950s following 
World War Two.714 The movement gained considerable momentum from the 1980s onward and 
contributed to new, stronger sense of Māori identity.715  
Recall from Chapter Two that at this time a “pan-Māori identity” was created, prompting 
individuals of Māori descent to seek out and cultivate a shared cultural inheritance founded in a 
sense of communal experience and belief. Underscoring this movement toward a general Māori 
identity was a more generic, traditional worldview that transcended specific hapū or iwi 
affiliation by emphasising union with the land in a way that any individual with links to a Māori 
heritage could relate. Accompanying this movement was a return to traditional Māori art forms, 
like moko.716  
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Thus, transmissive assemblage helps us to see that part of the decolonisation process is to 
affirm that Māori were assertive in the preservation of Māori identity and practice. By tracing 
associations, the negative impact of 19th and 20th century is revealed as a real but non-limiting 
factor for Māori. Despite the undeniable negative impact of colonisation, Māori were able to 
endure and maintain associations to their past. These remaining connections, to some extent, 
gave Māori the means to disentangle themselves from the network of associations they had 
established with Pākehā colonisers to form new associations that helped them to mobilise and 
seek out their own voices and representations. In other words, Māori were able to remobilise 
when the signalling environment shifted enough to allow for the assertion of new associations to 
pre-existing ones.  
This aligns well with Latour’s observation that agents are constantly reforming and 
destroying groups, and represents one way that integrating actor-network theory is beneficial.717 
In many ways, costly signalling theory presents the roles as reversed. A (signaller) signals and B 
(receiver) makes the decision about what course of action to take. What costly signalling theory 
does not take into account is that although B’s decision is altered by A’s signal, ultimately B’s 
decision also affects the course of action A takes and has significant ramifications for C, D, and 
E who were involved in the interaction. The linearity of costly signalling theory, even in its 
multicomponent and multimodal forms, does not permit us to explore outside of the standard 
course of action: signaller signal receiver. Yet, when discussing culture or the social, these 
offshoots of a phenomenon have serious repercussions for the group and its members, such as the 
profound impact alienation from their ancestral lands had on Māori as a result of their interaction 
with Pākehā.  
                                                 
717 Latour, Reassembling, 46. 
232 
 
The integration of actor-network theory into an evolutionary explanation, allows us to see 
and describe how a network is assembled, thus, we are no longer quarantined to outcomes based 
on questions about “why something happens.”718 Rather, the significant component is the 
recognition that something happens—a great many somethings—which need to be taken into 
account to understand groups and their evolution. How much greater would costly signalling 
theory’s explanatory power be if the associations derived from the signal were integrated into the 
model?  
 Tracing just a few of the associations to tā moko further supports that negotiating with 
moko is not as straightforward as Cisco would have it. To engage with moko is to engage with 
all dynamic elements that can be reassembled to comprise what we might call tā moko. 
Likewise, it is also to engage with the reassemblage of Māori and Pākehā elements that feed into 
and out of tā moko. This includes anything from spiritual and religious beliefs to variations that 
occurred within pre-contact moko due to the availability of specific resources within regions of 
Aotearoa; any attempt to list individual elements could go on ad infinitum. Moreover, it is to be 
reflexive in the process of how these assemblages are portrayed and discussed. Undoubtedly, 
tracing associations liberates us from the encumberment and limitations more standard theories 
rely upon. 
Visualising Transmissive Assemblage 
Although significantly more work needs to be done with actor-network theory in relation to 
cultural practice, and specifically with tā moko, at the juncture of this thesis, based on the above 
discussions in this chapter, I would argue that our understanding of tā moko can be reshaped 
through actor-network theory along with the ontological influences of Kaupapa Māori and 
                                                 
718 Law, “Material Semiotics,” 141. 
233 
 
indigenous ontological perspectivism. Moreover, it has been established that the integration of 
actor-network theory into the realm of evolutionary explanations of culture provides us with the 
means to be reflexive and to decolonise evolutionary explanations by shifting away from agency 
and toward interaction. In order to further crystallise these arguments and to establish a clearer 
picture of transmissive assemblage, I present a new model in the following section. 
Standard Signalling 
SignallerSignalReceiver 
In the standard signalling model a signaller signals to a receiver who makes a decision based 
upon the information provided by the signaller. Whilst a receiver can become a signaller, the 
linearity of the transaction-specific communication that epitomises the signaller/receiver 
relationship is maintained. A signaller signals, a receiver receives, and this pattern continues ad 
infinitum. 
Transmissive Assemblage 
For the time being, I think it is sufficient to continue with the labels signaller, signal, and 
receiver but let us cast aside the both the individuality and the linearity with which they are 
presented in costly signalling theory. I interpret signal to mean the communication or 
transmission of information. What we are now presented with are signallers, which are 
broadcasting signals, to receivers which can be any in number. 
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Figure 1: Transmissive Assemblage Network
 
The fluidity of the signaller/receiver dynamic immediately becomes apparent. Signallers can 
send and receive and receivers can receive and send. However, they do not have to do both. 
Some agents may simply transmit information without receiving a signal and vice versa. Yet, the 
latitude exists for an agent to step into whatever role the associations generated from a signal 
entail. Thus, the labels of signaller and receiver become completely arbitrary delineations to 
demarcate the circulation of signals. They are significant, in that, they provide anchor points 
useful to locating the origination of a signal or potential places which affect the circulation of the 
signal or where changes to signal contents may occur. However, they are insignificant in that 
their definition is completely contingent upon the circulation of the information contained within 
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the signal and the associations created between signaller and receiver via the signal itself. We 
also see that neither the signaller nor the receiver is limited in the number of signals he can send 
or receive in a single instance, which further stresses the non-linearity of the transmissive 
assemblage model. Moreover, this lack of limitation means that not only is there heteroglossia 
within the network but signallers and receivers may also be polyvocal, depending upon which 
role(s) they assume to transmit and receive the signal. 
The next step is to attribute characteristics to the signaller/receivers. In accordance with 
Kaupapa Māori, indigenous ontological perspectivism, and actor-network theory, these 
characteristics can be human, non-human, or inhuman. As the graphic below indicates examples 
of human characteristic are mau moko or tohunga-tā-moko, where as non-human are agents like 
uhi and atua. Once appropriate characteristics are attributed to identified agents, the next step is 
to distribute properties among the agents which serve to establish connections between them. 
Since we are considering moko as a signal, the attributions, distributions, and connections are 
what result in its circulation. As elements circulate, then attributions, distributions, and 
connection transform, as do the few ways they are transmitted. This graphic illustrates the 
fluidity of network components of pre-contact Māori tā moko when modelled through 











Figure 2: Transmissive Assemblage Model of Māori Tā Moko 
 
This example illustrates that tā moko circulates between entities. Nature, the narrative of 
Mataora, and tohunga-tā-moko are all equally significant entities in its distribution. Again, these 
are components that were completely absent from the account of tā moko we find within the 
Cisco case study. However, it is not just a matter of adding new entities, it is examining the way 
tā moko (as a signal) is distributed and circulates between them.  
The graphic shows that certain associations are key to the distribution of tā moko, such as 
the connection between tohunga-tā-moko and nature. To understand what tā moko communicates 
requires understanding the linkages between agents. Indeed, natural elements found within 
Aotearoa differed significantly from what was found in Polynesia. Thus, the relationship 
between tohunga-tā-moko and the natural environment influenced the evolution of tā moko, 
since tohunga-tā-moko could only construct implements and ink based upon what was available 
to them. The circulation of tā moko between these two entities indicates an area where signal 
analysis may be particularly fruitful.  
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 Another significant connection is the circulation of tā moko between the narrative of 
Mataora and other entities. Indeed, as the landscape of Aotearoa influenced the ways in which 
the tā moko signal was distributed, such evolutions would be evident in the narratives of Mataora 
as bound to tikanga Māori. Different inputs, in the form of new environmental pressures, 
inevitably call for behavioural changes. Since the narrative of Mataora is integral to the 
dissemination of tikanga Māori, environmental shifts which affect the distribution and circulation 
of tā moko would be reflected in the narrative.  
 Most importantly, the graphic illustrates that elements that may not intuitively be 
connected actually are. The associations tā moko creates serve to shift our perceptions of the 
dynamics that shape tā moko and which inform its circulation. Indeed, it is evident that tā moko 
involves an entire network of linkages. When shifts occur, each association in some way is going 
to be affected. To underscore the benefits of the integrative model, let us look at how this same 
integrated signalling network is affected by colonisation and Pākehā presence in Aotearoa.  




I have kept the existing network in black and the network elements introduced by colonisation 
appear in red. The underlying pre-contact Māori network remains intact. However, we see new tā 
moko circulations between Māori men and tohunga-tā-moko. The dotted line between Māori 
women and colonisation indicates that there is a circulation but that the signal is not as strong as 
it is between Māori men and colonisation and tohunga-tā-moko and colonisation.  
Perhaps the most significant revelation from the graphic is that Pākehā connections to 
anything pertaining to tā moko must first circulate through a Māori agent. Pākehā have no direct 
connection to tā moko, except through the underlying Māori network. Thus, to exert influence on 
tā moko in any capacity requires a Māori intermediary. Thus, any change that occurs to tā moko, 
even if the source of the pressure to change comes from Pākehā, must be initiated by Māori. The 
result is the confirmation that to decolonise tā moko, the Māori voice must be highlighted and 
Kaupapa Māori provides the perfect vehicle. 
Kaupapa Māori has the infrastructure to articulate the internal Māori network. Those of 
us outside of the network can observe and discuss the changes we see happening to the network, 
but only in terms of effects. We do not have the access to the internal components of the network 
to provide a sense of how the pressure upon Māori men and tohunga-tā-moko affected the 
innerworkings of tā moko. The graphic illustrates that the pressure of colonisation was less upon 
Māori women, which likely left more connections to the underlying Māori network. In turn, the 
linkages between Māori women and the Māori network would have allowed tā moko to 
continually circulate despite the pressure exerted upon other aspects of the network. To 
understand the enactment of this requires Māori voices, since it is they who can commentate on 
the associations between tā moko and agents throughout the network.  
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Furthermore, because any systemic changes to the network had to first go through a 
Māori intermediary, the transmissive assemblage model suggests that we need to rethink 
colonisation. It is not that colonisation was not detrimental or negative for Māori, as it 
unquestionably was. However, the pressures brought about by colonisation came through Māori 
agents and, thus, Māori made choices about how best to cope with these new inputs. 
Colonisation was not a force stronger than Māori. Rather, Māori had the strength and endurance 
to withstand the pressures of colonisation by preserving associations they had to Māori practices 
like tā moko by insulating their own network. 719 According to transmissive assemblage, Māori tā 
moko endures because Māori made choices that allowed a distinctively Māori network to remain 
despite colonising pressures for mutation. This Māori network endures today and Kaupapa Māori 
is its voice.  
As the reinsertion of the Māori voice through Kaupapa Māori demonstrates, the 
transmissive assemblage model possesses the latitude to highlight a particular voice or 
connection which provides added benefit to indigenous peoples whose voices have been 
marginalised by colonisation. Furthermore, this chapter has shown that transmissive assemblage 
facilitates heteroglossia which effectively decolonises signalling theory by providing an effective 
and innovative means to trace the circulation of information as it flows between agents. In doing 
so, transmissive assemblage provides one viable example of how evolutionary explanations of 
culture can evolve into symmetrical, decolonised versions of themselves which encourage and 
support emic accounts of cultural practices, thereby increasing their explanatory power. 
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At the beginning of this study, I posed the question: how and why can a critical evaluation and 
decolonised recension of costly signalling theory enhance our understanding of cultural 
practices? This thesis utilised the contemporary tā moko narrative crafted by Cisco which drew 
upon 19th and 20th century Pākehā sources to argue for moko as a costly signal as a case study to 
illuminate politico-ethical considerations that arise when Māori ontology and epistemology are 
disregarded. My analysis of the Cisco case study revealed that by discounting the ontological and 
epistemological underpinnings of tā moko, which anchor Māori holistic reality, we are left with a 
recolonised iteration of erroneous and mythologised versions of Māori tā moko that repudiate 
Māori narratives.  
Utilising an inductive and interpretivist approach, Chapters One and Two were devoted 
to cultivating an understanding of evolutionary explanations of culture, costly signalling theory 
specifically, and relational tā moko narratives, both Māori and Pākehā. In Chapter Three, I then 
utilised insights from this material to critically analyse the Cisco case study application of costly 
signalling theory to tā moko. This investigation revealed that Cisco’s employment of costly 
signalling led to serious misinterpretations and narrow conceptions of tā moko, its link to 
warfare, and Māori social structure based on asymmetrical and colonised conceptions of Māori 
extracted mainly from early Pākehā sources. Furthermore, the analysis of the Cisco case study 
illuminated further limitations of costly signalling theory with regards to the effectiveness of its 
theoretical framework for indigenous cultural practice, such as difficulties identifying the 
signaller, the signal, and the receiver. In an effort to advance a revised model, I devoted Chapter 
Four to developing an argument for updating costly signalling theory by attending to the deficits 
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revealed through my analysis. Specifically, in a new model, I showed how elements of costly 
signalling theory could be evolved into a more symmetrical and decolonised version which, in 
turn, exponentially increases its explanatory utility for the academic analysis of cultural 
practices.  
 Recently, I came across a Māori whakataukī: Nāu te rourou, nāku te rourou ka ora ai te 
iwi, which translates into something like “with your basket and my basket, the people will 
live.”720 This proverb underscores that cooperation and solidarity provide a benefit to all and 
encapsulates findings from this study which stress the need for greater symmetry in the 
employment of evolutionary explanations. Although indigenous voices are still largely 
overshadowed by scientific rhetoric, this study has also shown that we are in a prime position to 
shift that dynamic towards one with greater integration and symmetry.  
 As Chapter Four demonstrated, integrative modes of enquiry, which leave space for 
indigenous and Western voices, have considerable and untapped explanatory potential. Not only 
did the example of transmissive assemblage, which incorporated indigenous frameworks and 
Western means of analysis, provide concrete examples of features that an integrative model 
might have, but it further demonstrated the need to move away from why questions toward 
tracing associations between entities. In doing so, the inherent presumptiveness of why 
questions, which promulgates alterity (by placing oneself on the outside peering in), is replaced 
by free association which does not limit who or what acts as a causal agent, instead allowing the 
interactions to speak for themselves. The effect is one of greater symmetry which eliminates 
restrictions on whom or what can have a voice in any given interaction. Such latitude transcends 
the conflicts that arise when Western science meets the holistic realities of indigenous peoples 
                                                 
720 http://www.maori.cl/Proverbs.htm, accessed July 17, 2015. 
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and affords an opportunity to truly decolonise studies of indigenous practice and their evolution 
by not privileging any one voice. The neutrality of the space created through the integrative 
model enables us to witness cultural phenomena as they behave naturally, fluctuating and 
evolving according to shifts that occur within given environments and amongst various peoples.  
 Moreover, such neutrality does not favour either individuals or groups. Room is left for 
either the individual or the group, or the individual and the group, to influence individual and 
group adaption. Simultaneously, by focusing on the networks formed between these causal 
agents, whomever or whatever they might be, selective processes are highlighted, leaving 
analytical space for other explanatory modes to conjecture and expound upon the innerworkings 
of those processes, their inter and intra relations within a network, and their role in shaping a 
given network. Debates over group, individual, and multi-level selection centre on the issue of 
adaptations or that which is advantageous in a particular environment.721 Actor-network theory 
allows the channels that influence a practice, behaviour, or trait to be traversed, which opens 
avenues where selective mechanisms can be more clearly identified and analysed in their own 
right, as processes rather than products.  
 Some champions of evolutionary explanation may continue to argue for its position as a 
superior mode of illuminating culture due to its focus on process through the modelling of 
biological and psychological mechanisms that “permit and shape human culture.” Yet, I have 
argued that it is precisely this Western scientific gaze which has and continues to alienate the 
indigenous communities from which many of the practices being researched are derived.722  
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As has been reiterated in this thesis, throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, scientists 
viewed indigenous practices, knowledge systems, and people as objects; and, as objects, or 
dehumanized “its,” construed as lacking the appropriate intellectual faculties to understand their 
own beliefs and practices, they were not entitled to a voice. Objectified and silent, indigenous 
groups and their beliefs and practices “were commodified as property belonging to the cultural 
archive of the West.”723 Furthermore, early forms of social Darwinism generated a common 
mythos around the lack of fitness of indigenous peoples which would lead to their ultimate 
demise.724 Indeed, the relationship between indigenous groups and Western science has been, at 
best, rocky.  
As Tuhiwai Smith surmises, much of this tumult can be attributed to the “globalization of 
knowledge and Western knowledge [which] constantly reaffirms the West’s view of itself as the 
centre of legitimate knowledge, [and] the arbiter of what counts as knowledge and the source of 
‘civilized’ knowledge.”725 Although we are now well into the 21st century these limiting patterns 
are recurring, particularly as new modes of cultural explanation emerge. It will take a conscious 
and active effort on behalf of researchers to be ever-mindful of these patterns and to overcome 
them through the cultivation of more symmetrical dialogue, particularly as new areas of interest 
come to the fore.  
As this research has demonstrated, the current non-symmetrical nature of evolutionary 
explanations can lead to the misrepresentation of cultural practices through both the 
dissemination of inaccurate information and through the generation of accounts that do not have 
relevance to the groups from which they come. When Cisco did not take into account Māori 
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724 Ibid., 62. 
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holistic understandings of tā moko, the result was a Westernised scientific narrative of an 
indigenous practice, in part, based upon non-factual information which has little relevance to 
Māori epistemology and ontology. Although many of the specific claims Cisco posits about 
Māori tā moko seemed sufficiently substantiated, such as its link to warfare, upon further review, 
they are frequently based upon controversial and outdated evidence.  
 One might argue that evolutionary explanations of culture are concerned with the 
processes of evolution which guide cultural change and, thus, due to their objectivity, supersede 
other explanations of culture and cultural practice, including a group’s own explanation of 
cultural practice and change. However, in the case of Māori tā moko, the account Cisco delivered 
utilising costly signalling theory did not effectively illuminate any new aspects of tā moko that 
were not already accounted for by Māori narratives. Not only was this highlighted throughout the 
critique of costly signalling theory in Chapter Three, which revealed fundamental problems such 
as identifying the signaller, the receiver, and the signal itself, it was especially emphasised by the 
exercise of changing the language of the Mataora narrative to more closely reflect that of costly 
signalling theory. New language, terms, and framing were used, yet little new insight was 
gained. The insight that was gained affirmed that the Mataora narrative already offered an 
evolutionary explanation of tā moko through an indigenous, independent framework of tikanga 
Māori, though without the employment of Western biological terms. 
 Understanding that evolutionary explanation and selective mechanisms for Māori exist 
and are available through Māori narratives affords non-Māori a unique opportunity to realise the 
informative value of indigenous narrative. To non-Māori, moko is perceived as having a “double 
skin” which “juxtaposes interiority and exteriority,” creating a disconnect between the meaning a 
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permanent mark has for the individual and the way it is perceived on the outside.726 In part, this 
perception is the result of Western relationships to tattoo, where tattoo has always been “other,” 
resulting in a fixation on the external product, rather than its internal meaning. However, this 
disconnect is also due to the lived quality of Māori narrative, embodied by tā moko, which 
cannot be expressed, because it is inherent. For Māori, narratives underscore the 
“interconnectedness” of everything within the cosmos; yet all cannot be witnessed in daily 
existence. As Marsden stresses, contrary to Western conceptions of the natural world, Māori “do 
not live in a closed system where what we see is all there is,” and pūrākau (mythological 
traditions) are central to integrating and articulating Māori holistic reality as framed within the 
“nature of the world” and in the process of perpetual recreation.727  
This study underscores the significance of narrative and narrative assemblage. The 
narrative of Mataora is a complex account, which not only explains tā moko, but also serves as a 
template for right conduct for Māori and highlights the transtemporal and transspatial quality of 
Māori holistic reality. By underscoring the parallels and differences between the narrrative of 
Mataora and the explanation of the practice through a costly signalling theory framework, I 
affirm the innate complexity and informative value of Māori narratives which, in their capacity 
to accommodate the complexities of tā moko as a signal, surpass that of costly signalling theory.  
 To discount the reality and exegetical imperative of Māori narrative is to denounce the 
inherent complexities of indigenous peoples and to reduce them into a fractionalised portrayal of 
themselves, framed and judged by a system other than their own. The narrative assemblage 
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encourages us to question this.728 What do we learn about Māori through Western stories? When 
broaching another’s narratives, what filters are we consciously or unconsciously imposing to 
generate the patterns we discover? How do we discover the narratives of others, rather than 
construct them?  
In this study, narrative supplied by the Cisco case study portrayed Māori as one 
dimensional. Not only were Māori construed as being preoccupied by war, but Cisco also 
delimited the tā moko tradition to only chiselled moko, ultimately ignoring the long-standing 
tattooing tradition Māori inherited from their Polynesian ancestors and the atua. The one-
dimensionality of the Cisco case study continued in the lack of engagement with the context in 
which tā moko developed and was perpetuated, raising significant politico-ethical considerations. 
Tikanga Māori and mātauranga Māori are critical to dicussions about tā moko and, interestingly, 
afford many parallels to the Western interpretation of tā moko. In fact, this study demonstrated 
that Māori conceptions of the Mataora narrative make a more effective case for tā moko as a 
costly signal than did the employment of costly signalling theory. Because the narrative of 
Mataora is often referred to as a myth, which, in the Western world, is generally accompanied by 
trepidation over definitions and a host of negative and naive implications with regards to belief 
systems, its explanatory utility, particularly through a Western scientific lens, is held to be 
virtually non-existent. Yet, as Doniger insists:  
myth is cross-culturally translatable, which is to say comparable, commensurable 
The simultaneous engagement of the two ends of the continuum, the same and  
different, the general and the particular, requires a particular kind of double vision,  
and myth, among all genres, is uniquely able to maintain that vision. Myth is the 
most interdisciplinary narrative.729 
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Indeed, findings from this study reinforce Doniger’s point and suggest that it is time utilise 
narrative assemblage to rethink our position on the explanatory value of indigenous narrative or 
myth and its relationship to Western scientific models of culture and to address politico-ethical 
considerations that arise when investigating indigenous cultural practice. Undoubtedly, this is a 
rich area for future research for both indigenous peoples and Westerners. A good starting point 
from the evolutionary explanation side would be to conduct investigations through the lenses 
provided by indigenous peoples, to see what mechanisms are already in place within group 
practices and evolution. Collaborative efforts between indigenous peoples and Western 
researchers could then take place to further the use of narrative assemblage and indigenous 
modes of knowledge by identifying what contributions Western evolutionary explanations might 
offer in the way of additional support or new insights into existing explanations. Of course, this 
would require an open dialogue from all parties involved and represents another avenue for the 
employment transmissive assemblage. By examining processes, rather than agencies, a more 
neutral space can be created, one which transcends the bounds of identity and narrative. 
However, to achieve this neutrality requires that the rift between science and indigenous 
realities be acknowledged and addressed. As has become apparent throughout this research, on 
the one hand we have scientific realities, which are grounded in the search for facts and 
objectively substantiated truths; and, on the other hand are indigenous realities, which are 
holistically shaped and defined by enduring patterns of existence and which stress transtemporal 
and transpatial interconnectedness. Though indigenous peoples perceive holistic realities 
buttressed by transtemporality and transpatiality as undeniable, substantiated truths, such 
conceptions may not fit the Western model of objectivity. Given the findings of this study, the 
reluctance of indigenous peoples to engage with Western modes of scientific inquiry is not 
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surprising, particularly since it has been the objective stance of Western science that influenced 
colonial efforts which has largely contributed to the objectification of indigenous peoples.730 Yet, 
as I have endeavoured to affirm, there is fertile ground for further dialogues to emerge in an 
effort to develop synthesised and decolonised explanations of cultural practice. 
Significantly, my research provides a space for indigenous groups and, in this case 
particularly Māori groups, to assert their own agency within the area of cultural evolution. 
Moving in this direction is paramount and long overdue, since indigenous researchers are often 
reluctant to utilise methodologies grounded in Western science due to the devastating impact of 
colonialism and imperialism upon indigenous peoples who were turned into subjects for study.731 
Furthermore, by encouraging heteroglossia, through the introduction in Chapter Four of a more 
integrative and symmetrical signalling model, we can continue to develop integrative space to 
foster more symmetrical dialogues which aim to decolonise the study of indigenous cultural 
practices through the lens of Western science. Because such models also do not limit agency to 
humans, a myriad of future avenues for research emerge, including integrative models and 
investigations into how the dynamics between humans, animals, and inanimate objects shape the 
networks which guide our evolution. 
Although I have critiqued Cisco’s employment of costly signalling theory and identified 
some of the key issues which emerge when applying evolutionary explanations of culture to 
indigenous groups, I have only grazed the surface. There are numerous evolutionary explanations 
of culture, each with its own models and predictions of how cultures evolve and the adaptive 
mechanisms responsible for this evolution. Yet, little work has been done in terms of the 
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relationship of these models to, handling of, and accounting for indigenous groups’ practices. 
With the increased prevalence of evolutionary explanations within the social sciences and 
humanities, if we are to engage in fruitful dialogue between Western scientists and indigenous 
scholars, then research also needs to be conducted into indigenous explanations of cultural and 
biological evolution. We simply cannot rule out the possibility that indigenous groups have their 
own understandings of these processes which may both benefit and be benefitted by Western 
science, particularly with regards to stances toward selection criteria and selective processes that 
influence cultural change. 
 One of the most interesting facets of such discussions might be the role that temporal 
conceptions play in the way different groups approach the evolution of their own practices. For 
example, some evolutionary explanations imply that the past, as it once was, is no longer 
accessible, and that what we are left with is the accumulation of information which has had 
fidelity on the population level. Think of the simple but effective arrowhead example from Boyd 
and Richerson, where tribal elders used different lengths of arrowheads but on the population 
level what is stored is an average of these different lengths. Those specific arrowhead lengths are 
no more. What remains is an average of them. The same is true of cultural groups and our 
ancestors. According to Western modes of thinking, we have evolved and our cultures are no 
longer what they once were. Our ancestors have passed, leaving us their legacies, but they are no 
longer present in the here and now, aside from the DNA we might share with them. 
This is strikingly different from Māori conceptions of the effect of time on cultural 
inheritance and causal agents who influence the present state of Māori people and the 
information which circulates amidst them. For Māori, the atua and the ancestors are ever-present. 
There is no past state to which one must return to access them or the world in which they lived 
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in, as that world and the ancestors are present; in other words, the past is the present. Thus, any 
Māori concept of evolution or ōrokohanganga is presently bound to the beginning and the future, 
and, thus, must not be subject to the implied linear notions of progress often present in Western 
evolutionary explanations of culture.732 
Additionally, whilst I have presented some of the challenges faced when employing 
evolutionary explanations to indigenous practices, I have not really delved into the prevalent 
issues within indigenous studies. Questions such as what constitutes indigeneity and about how 
different groups, such as Māori iwi, hapū, and whānau, negotiate their own autonomy within 
what is now also upheld as a singular indigenous tradition are fertile grounds for future 
discussions; as is the issue of how those negotiations are reflected within group practice. Indeed, 
“the recognition of who is Indigenous is fraught with tensions related to ethnicity, race, 
colonisation, and culture.”733 Related questions, such as who retains the cultural mandate to 
study indigenous groups and their practices also remain ripe for discussion, particularly as 
scientific modes of inquiry become increasing prevalent within the social sciences and 
humanities. 
Moreover, I would argue that there is considerable room to craft more models like the 
one presented in Chapter Four. Such models could be built from any number of evolutionary 
explanations of culture, like dual-inheritance theory or meme theory. Where evolutionary 
explanations of culture help us to identify key variables, symmetrical approaches like actor-
network theory, indigenous ontological perspectivism, and Kaupapa Māori all help us to trace 
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associations between these entities which may not be readily apparent. There is no end to the 
number of models that could be created or possible approaches which could be integrated.  
As more effort is put into assembling more integrative models, the potential exists to 
incorporate even more perspectives. Indigenous ontological perspectivism raises an interesting 
possibility that at some point in the future we may be able to model cultural practice from the 
point of view of the animals with whom de Castro maintains we share ontologies. This also has 
profound consequences for costly signalling theory, since it is derived from animal signalling. 
Imagine if we could map culture and communication from the perspective of animals, not just 
our interpretation of their perspectives. Perhaps their understanding of culture and cultural 
practice would lead to revolutionary changes in the perception of our own world.  
  In light of these realisations, we are reminded of the imperative for self-reflexivity. In the 
words of Maceda:  
If our colonial legacy remains unexamined, our ability to fully understand and  
appreciate indigenous knowledge will evoke us to the extent that our minds,  
if not our hearts, will remain colonized. It is only through the decolonization of  
our minds, if not our hearts, that we can begin to develop the necessary political clarity to 
reject the enslavement of a colonial discourse that creates a false dichotomy between 
Western and indigenous knowledge.734  
 
It behoves us, not only to question our own motives as researchers, but, moreover, to question 
the purpose of our investigations and their ramifications on others. Are we perpetuating this 
dichotomy or working to decolonise our approaches? In our research, what are our biases and 
how is our employment of Western scientific discourse affecting or further dichotomising our 
intentions and results? Why are models outside of the Western scientific paradigm still deemed 
less credible as explanations of cultural practice? What benefit does a study have for a particular 
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practice when its explanation is deemed irrelevant amongst members of the group whose practice 
it is? Do evolutionary explanations enhance our understanding of cultural practices? I am not 
sure that we have easy answers to any of these questions, despite our immediate inclination to 
dismiss them as trivial or outdated. For indigenous peoples and marginalised groups, these 
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